McNett v. Briggs

19 Citing cases

  1. McKenzie v. Cost Bros., Inc.

    260 Pa. Super. 295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)   Cited 4 times

    A compulsory nonsuit may be entered only in a clear case where the facts and circumstances lead unerringly to but one conclusion. McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 272 A.2d 202 (1970)." Cited in Jurich v. United Parcel Service of New York, Inc., 239 Pa. Super. 306, 361 A.2d 650 (1976).

  2. Berry v. Lintner

    323 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974)   Cited 4 times

    "On appeal from the grant of a compulsory nonsuit we consider the evidence, and all the reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to plaintiff." McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 324, 272 A.2d 202, 204 (1970). Applying this rule, the facts in the present case are as follows: On April 10, 1970, at approximately 9:45 p.m., plaintiff's decedent was struck and killed by an automobile driven by defendant, in a southerly direction, on route 51 near Perryopolis, Pennsylvania. The impact occurred approximately in the center of the outside western lane of the 48-foot wide 4-lane highway.

  3. Yandrich v. Radic

    453 A.2d 304 (Pa. 1982)   Cited 2 times

    Nevertheless, it is clear that unless contributory negligence has been established as a matter of law, the jury must be permitted to determine who will prevail on that issue. See Condo v. Caris, 255 Pa. Super. 16, 18, 386 A.2d 112, 113 (1978); McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 272 A.2d 202 (1970), citing Scholl v. Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Co., 356 Pa. 217, 224, 51 A.2d 732, 736 (1947); Williams v. Flemington Transportation Co., 417 Pa. 26, 34, 207 A.2d 762, 766 (1965) ("Taking the question [of contributory negligence] from the jury would have deprived decedent of the benefit of the full presumption [of due care] that he is entitled to, for had he lived . . . he would be entitled to place that matter before the jury for its determinations of the factual matter. This he would be denied by reason of his death.

  4. Fisher v. Findlay

    465 A.2d 1306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)   Cited 3 times

    A compulsory nonsuit may be entered only in a clear case where the facts and circumstances lead unerringly to but one conclusion. McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 272 A.2d 202 (1970)." Cited in Jurich v. United Parcel Service ofNew York, Inc., 239 Pa. Super. 306, 361 A.2d 650 (1976).

  5. Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp.

    313 Pa. Super. 436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)   Cited 7 times
    Reversing the trial court finding that the defendant had a duty unconnected with its contract to exercise reasonable care in conducting dredging activities to avoid subjecting persons who were not parties to the contract to unreasonable harm

    Prost v. Caldwell Store, Inc., supra 409 Pa. at 427, 187 A.2d at 276 quoting Bisson v. John B. Kelly, Inc.,supra 314 Pa. at 110, 170 A. at 143 (emphasis supplied). Accord: Smith v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, 397 Pa. 134, 138-139, 153 A.2d 477, 480 (1959); Lavely v. Wolota,supra 253 Pa.Super. at 202, 384 A.2d at 1302; Printed TerryFinishing Company, Inc. v. City of Lebanon, supra 247 Pa.Super. at 291, 372 A.2d at 467; McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 327-328, 272 A.2d 202, 205 (1970). The evidence in this case was sufficient to permit a finding that Dravo Corporation knew or should have known that the sand bar at the foot of Canton Street had been used widely by members of the public for various activities, including vehicular intrusions of the river.

  6. O'Callaghan v. Weitzman

    291 Pa. Super. 471 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)   Cited 6 times
    In O'Callaghan v. Weitzman, 291 Pa. Super. 471, 436 A.2d 212 (1981), the court described as "well-settled" the principle that "the deliberate nondisclosure of a material fact amounts to a culpable misrepresentation no less than does an intentional affirmation of a material falsity."

    In reviewing the propriety of the lower court's actions, we note that a nonsuit may only be entered where the facts and circumstances lead unerringly to but one conclusion. A.J.Aberman, Inc. v. Funk Building Corp., 278 Pa. Super. 385, 420 A.2d 594 (1980); McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 272 A.2d 202 (1970). "It is hornbook law that a judgment of nonsuit can be entered only in clear cases and before it may be entered the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences of fact arising therefrom; and all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in its favor."

  7. Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District

    283 Pa. Super. 155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)   Cited 2 times

    The granting of a motion for compulsory non-suit is proper only where the facts adduced at trial indicate that the plaintiff has failed to put forth sufficient evidence as is necessary to support his cause of action. McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 272 A.2d 202 (1970). However, the mere happening of an accident is not evidence of negligence.

  8. A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. Funk Building Corp.

    278 Pa. Super. 385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)   Cited 39 times
    Affirming summary judgment that mall owners' December 1973 action against contractor for failure to properly install roof was barred by Pennsylvania's six-year statute of limitations, where undisputed facts showed that mall owners experienced leaks in multiple locations since roof was installed in 1965, putting them on notice of defect well before December 1967

    In determining the propriety of an order entering a nonsuit, the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every fact and every reasonable inference of fact arising from the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, and all conflicts must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. McDonald v. Ferrebee, 366 Pa. 543, 79 A.2d 232 (1951); Paul v. Hess Bros., 226 Pa. Super. 92, 312 A.2d 65 (1973); McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 272 A.2d 202 (1970). A nonsuit may only be entered in a clear case where the facts and circumstances lead unerringly to but one conclusion.

  9. Bethay v. Philadelphia Housing Authority

    271 Pa. Super. 366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)   Cited 11 times
    Affirming trial judge's decision to grant directed verdict after closing arguments and suggesting that any time prior to a jury's verdict is permissible

    Skoda v. WestPenn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963). A decedent may not be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law unless the only reasonable inference arising from the evidence shows a want of due care. McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 272 A.2d 202 (1970). The presumption of due care is enough in itself to negate contributory negligence unless it is overcome by substantive evidence.

  10. Rosato v. Nationwide Ins. Co.

    397 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)   Cited 7 times
    In Rosato v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 263 Pa. Super. 340, 397 A.2d 1238 (1979), this court said "However, an officer may, based upon skid measurements and his expertise, state the approximate speed of a car even though he was not present at the accident."

    Appellants cite those cases holding that the higher degree of care when crossing between intersections has no application if the pedestrian has been on the highway a sufficient period of time for the motorist to see him and act to avoid hitting him. Cardiff v. Updegrave, 409 Pa. 535, 187 A.2d 644 (1963); Brown v. Jones, 404 Pa. 513, 172 A.2d 831 (1961). Since Mrs. Rosato was struck just north of the center line, appellants submit that she must have been in the road for a sufficient period of time for appellee Daniel to see her and act to avoid her. See, McNett v. Briggs, 217 Pa. Super. 322, 272 A.2d 202 (1970). Appellants have waived this issue, however, by failing to specifically object at the close of the court's charge.