McNeal v. State

81 Citing cases

  1. Larkins v. State

    230 Ga. 418 (Ga. 1973)   Cited 35 times
    In Larkins v. State, 230 Ga. 418, 421 (2) (197 S.E.2d 367) (1973), this court pointed out that "[e]vidence of other crimes to prove malice, intent and motive is admissible only where the act of which the accused stands charged would be legal in the absence of those elements."

    Matters such as this are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and unless an abuse of that discretion is clearly shown the decision of the judge will not require a reversal of the case. Pippins v. State, 224 Ga. 462, 463 ( 162 S.E.2d 338); Fountain v. State, 228 Ga. 306 (3) ( 185 S.E.2d 62); McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633, 636 ( 187 S.E.2d 271). In the instant case, the witness in question was listed on the indictment as one of the witnesses for the State. It is not contended by the appellant that he covertly remained in the courtroom without accused's or counsel's knowledge.

  2. Winget v. State

    138 Ga. App. 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 11 times
    In Winget v. State, 138 Ga. App. 433 (1976) another drug case in which the same witness Smarr testified for the state, it was held that his testimony of "buys" of drugs from others constituted grounds for reversal as the evidence was "irrelevant and immaterial and introduced solely to bolster the good character of the undercover agent in the eyes of the jury."

    The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the district attorney's request. See McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 (4) ( 187 S.E.2d 271); Fountain v. State, 228 Ga. 306 (3) ( 185 S.E.2d 62); Spurlin v. State, 222 Ga. 179 (2) ( 149 S.E.2d 315); Pippins v. State, 224 Ga. 462 (2) ( 162 S.E.2d 338). 2.

  3. Montgomery v. State

    128 Ga. App. 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that "[t]here is no requirement in the law that a house be continuously occupied in order to be a `dwelling'. It is sufficient that it is occasionally occupied for residential purposes . . ."

    1. Defendant contends he was denied his right to an individual examination of each juror when the court refused to allow three questions. As all these questions related to the legal presumption of innocence, the questions were not proper. McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 ( 187 S.E.2d 271). 2.

  4. McAllister v. Brown

    419 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1976)

    In the instant case it cannot be said that the statement in question was not hearsay and particularly that it did no harm, since it was really double hearsay and involved an alleged confession of guilt not only related by an unknown informer, but one whose identity was, upon request, refused by the police officer in question.         On February 11, 1972 the Georgia Supreme Court decided the case of McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 (h.n. 7), 187 S.E.2d 271. In that case error was assigned that the court erred in admitting testimony of a police officer over objection relating to his conversation with the prosecutrix outside of the presence of appellant.

  5. Newsome v. State

    288 Ga. 647 (Ga. 2011)   Cited 7 times

    The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that the utterances were admissible for impeachment purposes. Specifically, the cases cited by the Court of Appeals were: Campbell v. State, 234 Ga. 130 ( 214 SE2d 656) (1975) (introduction of defendant's prior conviction for armed robbery); McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 (5) ( 187 SE2d 271) (1972) (introduction of defendant's prior rape of another woman); Hayes v. State, 138 Ga. App. 223 (7) ( 225 SE2d 749) (1976) (introduction of defendant's previous attempt to cash a check similar to the forged instruments at issue); and Goldberg v. State, 20 Ga. App. 162, 163 (2) ( 92 SE 957) (1917) (introduction of "testimony relating to crimes other than the one charged in the accusation"). Other than a 1983 opinion from the Court of Appeals that followed Smith v. State to hold, again in dicta, that evidence of a defendant's conversation was admissible under the analysis applicable to similar transaction evidence, see Waters v. State, 168 Ga. App. 918 (2) ( 310 SE2d 774) (1983) (conversation evidence admissible either for impeachment purposes or under Smith v. State, supra), Georgia case law has applied the similar transaction analysis to words unaccompanied by conduct only when those words were themselves capable of constituting a criminal offense.

  6. Simmons v. State

    282 Ga. 183 (Ga. 2007)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on mere presence and guilt by association, because "mere presence is only a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the crime charged, and ... the trial court's instructions clearly informed the jury of this requirement"

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the use of such a question during voir dire. Anderson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 816 (1) ( 289 SE2d 22) (1982). See also McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633, 636 ( 187 SE2d 271) (1972). 8. Simmons contends that the trial court erred by qualifying a certain juror who stated that he had read about Simmons' case in a local newspaper and thought that Simmons might have already been convicted.

  7. White v. State

    253 Ga. 106 (Ga. 1984)   Cited 85 times
    In White, the Supreme Court did not discuss the possibility that the cosmetic case—like the bottles in Leonard and the bottle of tonic water in this case—might have once been kept on a store shelf accessible to the public, but it concluded that nothing in the evidence supported an alternative hypothesis that explained how the fingerprint of the defendant was left on the cosmetic case.

    Davis v. State, 242 Ga. 901 (3) ( 252 S.E.2d 443) (1979); Disby v. State, 238 Ga. 178 (1) ( 231 S.E.2d 763) (1977). Because the prosecutor stated that Detective Funderburke was the chief investigator in the case and that his presence was necessary to the orderly prosecution of the case, we find that the trial court did not err in permitting Funderburke to remain in the courtroom and in refusing to direct that he be called as the state's first witness. Blalock v. State, 250 Ga. 441 (1) ( 298 S.E.2d 477) (1983); Davis v. State, supra, 242 Ga. at 904; McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 (4) ( 187 S.E.2d 271) (1972). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

  8. Henderson v. State

    251 Ga. 398 (Ga. 1983)   Cited 42 times
    Acknowledging that OCGA § 15–12–133 “is a source of concern to our trial judges, both because of the method of examining prospective jurors it authorizes and because of the scope of such examination,” and noting that “the Code section is written in general terms”

    Accordingly, it has been held not to be error for the court to refuse to allow defense counsel in criminal cases to ask questions concerning the law and its application to the case on trial, specifically the presumption of innocence, Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36 (4) ( 165 S.E.2d 708) (1969). ("Do you, at the moment believe the defendant innocent?"); McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 (3) ( 187 S.E.2d 271) (1972) ("If you were asked right now to return a verdict without hearing any evidence from either side, what would your verdict be?"); Mills v. State, 137 Ga. App. 305 (2) ( 223 S.E.2d 498) (1976); Montgomery v. State, 128 Ga. App. 116 (1) ( 195 S.E.2d 784) (1973); the weight to be given the fact that the defendant has been charged or indicted, Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539 (7) ( 255 S.E.2d 5) (1979); Freeman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 615 ( 208 S.E.2d 625) (1974); the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19 (2) ( 214 S.E.2d 514) (1975); Mills v. State, supra; the jury's duty to acquit if the state fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, Bethay v. State, supra; Hall v. State, 135 Ga. App. 690 (4) ( 218 S.E.2d 687) (1975); Stack v. State, supra; the defendant's right not to testify, Anderson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 816 ( 289 S.E.2d 22) (1982); Freeman v. State, supra, 132 Ga. App. 615, and the credibility of law enforcement

  9. Welch v. State

    251 Ga. 197 (Ga. 1983)   Cited 25 times

    The sheriff never testified, and the investigator was shown to be needed to assist the district attorney in the trial of the case, an exception we have previously approved. See McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 (4) ( 187 S.E.2d 271) (1972). Appellants also argue, without a formal enumeration, that it was error to deny a change of venue, in light of highly inflammatory and prejudicial media coverage of the upcoming trial.

  10. High v. Zant

    250 Ga. 693 (Ga. 1983)   Cited 27 times

    "In examining a prospective juror, counsel for the accused should not ask technical legal questions in regard to the presumption of innocence, but should confine his questions to those which may illustrate any prejudice of the juror against the accused, or any interest of the juror in the cause." McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 (3) ( 187 S.E.2d 271) (1972). The questions proffered were improper, and the responses thereto were not grounds for excusing the jurors.