And the brief in support of the petition for rehearing does not make specific mention of any overlooked authority that is considered by counsel to be contrary to any principle announced in our opinion. Some authorities that seemed to us to support contentions that were or might have been made by respondent in support of the judgment, like McMullen v. People's etc. Ass'n., 57 Minn. 33, 58 N.W. 820, and Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Steen, 99 Miss. 504, 55 So. 47, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 734, were cited and commented on in our opinion, but we did not find those authorities in respondent's brief. The principal contention in support of the petition for a rehearing is that we were wrong in applying to this case the conceded general rule that a bank to which a note is sent for collection and remittance becomes the agent of the owner or holder to receive payment.

Adams v. Hackensack Imp. Com., 44 N.J.L. 683, 43 Am. Rep. 406; British American Mtg. Co. v. Tibbals, 63 Ia. 468, 19 N.W. 319; Peaslee Gaulbert Co. v. Dixon, 172 N.C. 411, 90 S.E. 421; In re Schanke Co. 201, Ia. 678, 207 N.W. 756; Nineteenth Ward Bank v. South Weymouth Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 670; Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Leonard Watch Co., 249 Mass. 14, 143 N.E. 827; Belk v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., 100 Nebr. 260, 159 N.W. 405. By some cases it is suggested that where the papers are sent to the collecting bank at the request of the debtor, and the bank after payment to it fails to remit to the creditor, the debtor will not be discharged. McMullen v. People's etc. Ass'n., 57 Minn. 33, 58 N.W. 820; Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. v. Steen, 99 Miss. 504, 55 So. 47, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 724; Fair v. Bowen, 127 Mich. 411, 86 N.W. 991. It is doubtful whether in the case at bar there is anything to show that the papers were sent to the state bank at the instance of the mortgagor, but if we assume that the state bank in requesting the De Moulin company to send the papers was acting as the agent of the mortgagor, we must remain of the opinion that the bank on receipt of the papers became the agent of the plaintiff to receive payment and deliver the release. Note to Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. v. Steen, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 734; Bank of Hatch v. Mossman, 25 N. Mex. 547, 185 P. 275; Schafer v. Olson, 24 N.D. 542, 139 N.W. 983, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 762, Ann. Cas. 1915c, 653; Burch v. Odell (N.D.) 209 N.W. 792; Farmer v. Wallin, 212 Mo. App. 380, 246 S.W. 53. The point is thoroughly discussed in Burch v. Odell, supra, and we feel that it is unnecessary to add anything to what is said in that case.

The jury, which is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, is entitled to assess his credibility and decide what weight it will give to his testimony ( Delgado v. Murray , 115 A.D.3d 417, 982 N.Y.S.2d 444 [1st Dept. 2014] ; Uygur v. Superior Walls of Hudson Val., Inc. , 35 A.D.3d 447, 448, 826 N.Y.S.2d 154 [2d Dept. 2006] ). Great deference is accorded to the factfinders, who had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses ( Bobek v. Crystal , 291 A.D.2d 521, 739 N.Y.S.2d 396 [2d Dept. 2002], lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 505, 763 N.Y.S.2d 811, 795 N.E.2d 37 [2003] ; Corcoran v. People's Ambulette Service, 237 A.D.2d 402, 656 N.Y.S.2d 877 [2d Dept. 1997] ). It is undisputed that on January 2, 2014, the vitreoretinal surgeon was unable to look into the back of the eye because there was blood in the vitreous cavity.

Under these circumstances, the use of juror affidavits in an attempt to attack the verdict is patently improper (see Richards v. Forest City Enters., 272 A.D.2d at 462, 708 N.Y.S.2d 320 ; Hoffman v. Domenico Bus Serv., 183 A.D.2d at 808, 584 N.Y.S.2d 122 ). “[A] jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Corcoran v. People's Ambulette Serv., 237 A.D.2d 402, 403, 656 N.Y.S.2d 877 ; see Costa v. Lopez, 120 A.D.3d 607, 607, 990 N.Y.S.2d 878 ; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 134, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184 ). “ ‘When a verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view’ ”

Tapia v. Dattco, Inc., 32 A.D.3d at 844, 821 N.Y.S.2d 124; Broadie v. St. Francis Hosp., 25 A.D.3d 745, 746, 807 N.Y.S.2d 656), or for a new trial on the issue of liability on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence ( see Corcoran v. People's Ambulette Serv., 237 A.D.2d 402, 403, 656 N.Y.S.2d 877; Gianniosis v. LID Mgt. & Finishing Serv. Co., 194 A.D.2d 413, 413, 599 N.Y.S.2d 233; Borgo v. Sontag, 98 A.D.2d 786, 788, 469 N.Y.S.2d 805; cf. Mohamed v. Frische, 223 A.D.2d 628, 628, 636 N.Y.S.2d 859; Avila v. Mellen, 131 A.D.2d 408, 409, 515 N.Y.S.2d 856; see generally Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163; Tapia v. Dattco, Inc., 32 A.D.3d at 845, 821 N.Y.S.2d 124; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 133, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184). Finally, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) which was, in effect, to set aside the judgment and for a new trial on the issue of liability on the ground that the verdict was the product of substantial juror confusion ( see Mattei v. Figueroa, 262 A.D.2d 459, 460, 692 N.Y.S.2d 119; cf. Roberts v. County of Westchester, 278 A.D.2d 216, 217, 717 N.Y.S.2d 276; Clarke v. Order of Sisters of St. Dominic, 273 A.D.2d 431, 432–433, 710 N.Y

Turning to defendant's cross-motion, a jury verdict should not be set aside as against the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached its verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746, 631 NYS2d 122, 655 NE2d 163; Nicastro v. Park, 113 AD2d 129, 134, 495 NYS2d 184 [2nd Dep't 1985]). Great deference is accorded to the fact-finding function of the jury, and determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses are for the fact-finders, who had the opportunity to see and hear the witness ( see Corcoran v. People's Ambulette Serv., 237 AD2d 402, 656 NYS2d 877 [2nd Dep't 1997]). A review of the evidence in this case demonstrates that a fair basis existed for the jury to find that plaintiff sustained a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevented him from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted his usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following accident.