Opinion
No. 05-07-00805-CR
Opinion Filed February 29, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F07-47762-WP.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and FRANCIS.
Arvis Vernon McMillon waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, a firearm. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 29.02(a), 29.03(a) (Vernon 2003). The trial court assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment. In a single point of error, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified. Appellant argues the trial court's failure to admonish him that he would have to serve one-half of any sentence assessed before he was eligible for parole rendered his guilty plea involuntary. Appellant asserts that had he known about this reqirement, he would not have waived a jury or pleaded guilty. The State responds that the record shows appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. When considering the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we must examine the entire record. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (per curiam). If the trial court properly admonished the defendant before a guilty plea was entered, there is a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. See id. In this case, the records show the trial judge properly admonished appellant both orally and in writing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Article 26.13(a) does not require the trial court to admonish a defendant about his eligibility for parole before accepting a plea of guilty. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a). Moreover, appellant's signed judicial confession that he committed the offense exactly as stated in the indictment is included in the records. A judicial confession admitted into evidence and contained in the clerk's record is sufficient to prove appellant's guilt. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). During the proceedings, appellant testified he was freely and voluntarily waiving a jury trial and entering a guilty plea because he was guilty and for no other reason. Appellant testified he understood the consequences of signing a judicial confession and the punishment range for the offense. Appellant further testified about the circumstances involving the offense. Appellant and three other men robbed a gas station store. One of the men pointed a gun at the clerk while appellant jumped over the counter and took money from the register. Appellant testified he completed a three-year probation for a prior burglary conviction, and asked to be given deferred probation. We conclude the trial court was not required to admonish appellant about his eligibility for parole before accepting the guilty plea, and that appellant's plea was voluntary. See Kirk, 949 S.W.2d at 771. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. In a cross-point, the State asks us to modify the trial court's judgment to reflect an affirmative deadly weapon finding. The records show appellant was indicted for using or exhibiting a firearm during the commission of the robbery. Appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, a firearm. After accepting appellant's guilty plea, the trial court found appellant guilty "exactly as charged in the indictment." However, the trial court's judgment states "N/A" under "Findings on Deadly Weapon." Thus, the trial court's judgment is incorrect. We sustain the State's cross-point. We modify the trial court's judgment to show an affirmative deadly weapon finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.