. First, plaintiffs must demonstrate a prima facie case, including the existence of some plausible accommodation through which they may perform the essential functions of the job. McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2013). To establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of [plaintiff's] disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125-26

Each of Alford's claims is subject to the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972). See McMillan v. City of N.Y., 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying the framework to ADA claims); Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying the framework to a retaliation claim under the ADA). Under McDonnell Douglas, once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation or discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 411 U.S. at 802-03.

Id. Where a discrimination claim is based on both adverse employment actions and the employer's failure provide an accommodation, "the plaintiff bears the burdens of both production and persuasion as to the existence of some accommodation that would allow [her] to perform the essential functions of [her] employment." McMillan v. City of N.Y., 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). II. Intentional Discrimination

Claims alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate in violation of the ADA are analyzed using the burden-shifting framework articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802–05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). SeeMcMillan v. City of New York , 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir.2013) (citing McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co. Inc. , 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir.2009) ); see alsoSnowden v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. , 612 Fed.Appx. 7, 8 (2d Cir.2015). Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Sista v. CDC Ixis North Am., Inc. , 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir.2006) ; Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Comm. Adolescent Prog., Inc. , 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir.1999). If the plaintiff can satisfy that burden, which is not a demanding one, Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel , 143 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir.1998), the onus shifts to the defendant to offer through the introduction of admissible evidence a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action at issue.

To succeed on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that: “(1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the [statute]; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.” McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009)). For purposes of this motion, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff has established the first two elements of his failure to accommodate claim.

1. Intentional Discrimination - Discriminatory Discharge "Claims alleging intentional discrimination in violation of the ADA are subject to the burden-shifting analysis established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)," McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013), in which the initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that: "(1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse employment action because of his disability."

show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse employment action because of his disability.McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pesce v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 159 F. Supp. 3d 448, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same). With regard to a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff states a prima facie claim by demonstrating that:

“Claims alleging disability discrimination in violation of the ADA are subject to the burden-shifting analysis originally established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,” 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). McMillan v. City of N.Y., 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying framework and denying summary judgment where there was material issue of fact regarding whether timeliness in the morning was an “essential function” of schizophrenic plaintiff's employment and whether reasonable accommodation was available); see also McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96–97 (2d Cir.2009) (applying framework and finding that employee who worked with various chemical fumes failed to show that there was a reasonable accommodation of her respiratory ailment that employer could have pursued beyond its offer to provide her with a respirator that would deliver breathable air during working hours, which she rejected). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has described the McDonnell Douglas framework as follows:

See N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(1)(a); N.Y. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). Employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to the ADA are governed by the burden-shifting standard established for Title VII claims by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013).

Claims of discrimination under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are analyzed using the familiar burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Jackson v. NYC. Dep't of Educ., 768 Fed.Appx. 16, 17 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order); McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013); Heilweil v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1994). At the first step, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case, by establishing that: “(1) his employer is subject to the ADA [or Rehabilitation Act]; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA [or Rehabilitation Act]; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse employment action because of his disability.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125 (citation omitted); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 63 Fed.Appx. 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (applying same to Rehabilitation Act).