Opinion
24-3121-JWL
08-07-2024
PETTIX MCMILLAN, Plaintiff, v. BRYON ALEXANDER, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Pettix McMillan is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein.
1. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas (“LCF”). Plaintiff has paid the filing fee.
Plaintiff alleges that he was injured while working out on outdoor weight equipment at LCF. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff attaches documentation showing that the incident occurred on March 29, 2022. See Doc. 1-1 (Plaintiff's Affidavit of Truth; grievances). Plaintiff alleges that he received a severe head injury that was caused by a “neglected, unattended-to, semi-broken machine weight equipment cable [that] snapped while Plaintiff was exercising,” causing the weight bar to land on Plaintiff's forehead. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff argues that he received a “major laceration” across his forehead that required several stitches. Id. He claims that the one-inch laceration required stitches, and he now suffers from “post concussion syndrome,” PTSD, migraines, mental and emotional injuries, blackouts, memory loss, loss of cognitive skills, nausea, neck pain, and sensitivity to light. Id. at 2-3.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bryon Alexander was made aware of the faulty weightlifting equipment and was responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the equipment. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff alleges that he and several other inmates voiced their concerns to Alexander about broken, unsafe, and faulty equipment, but Alexander did nothing after being made aware of these concerns. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kim Tilson failed to act diligently in treating Plaintiff's injuries. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Tilson originally refused to provide Plaintiff with stitches, and did nothing to help Plaintiff with his physical pain and emotional/mental distress. Id.
Plaintiff names as defendants Bryon Alexander, Activity Specialist II at LCF, and Kim Tilson, Medical Health Care Administrator at LCF. Plaintiff seeks nominal, punitive, and compensatory damages. Id. at 7.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings claims based on and incident occurring on March 29, 2022. The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is determined from looking at the appropriate state statute of limitations and tolling principles. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). “The forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983....In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a).” Brown v. UnifiedSch. Dist. 501, Topeka Pub. Sch., 465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Although the Kansas Supreme Court tolled the state statutes of limitations in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was reinstated prior to the events underlying the claims in this case. See Korgan v. Estate of Hansen by and through Cramer, 2022 WL 4465074, at *2-4 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2022) (finding that the statute of limitations was tolled from March 19, 2020 through April 14, 2021). The tolling or suspension is set forth in Kansas Supreme Court Administrative Order 2020-PR-016, as amended by Kansas Supreme Court Administrative Order 2020-PR-32. The AO reinstated the statute of limitations effective April 15, 2021.
While state law governs the length of the limitations period and tolling issues, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, the claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] § 1983 action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1059 (2006). A district court may dismiss a complaint filed by an indigent plaintiff if it is patently clear from the allegations as tendered that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 1258-59; see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007); Hawkins v. Lemons, No. 09-3116-SAC, 2009 WL 2475130, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2009).
It plainly appears from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Although Plaintiff's Complaint was not electronically filed with the Court until July 15, 2024, he signed his Complaint on June 21, 2024. Plaintiff's alleged violations occurred around March 29, 2022. It thus appears that any events or acts of Defendants taken in connection with Plaintiff's claims took place more than two years prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint and are time-barred. See Fratus v. Deland, 49 F.3d 673, 674-75 (10th Cir. 1995) (district court may consider affirmative defenses sua sponte when the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed). Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting that he would be entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.
IV. Response Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Failure to respond by the deadline may result in dismissal of this action without further notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff is granted until September 9, 2024, in which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.
IT IS SO ORDERED.