Opinion
Case No. 2:05-cv-26.
March 21, 2005
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996) (" PLRA"), the court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992). Applying these standards, the court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I. Factual AllegationsPlaintiff Dontay N. McMann, an inmate at the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility (AMF), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Warden Timothy Luoma. Plaintiff's claims arise from his classification to administrative segregation for the past six years. Plaintiff has been an inmate in the MDOC since 1997 and is serving time on eleven sentences, five of which arise from charges brought when he attempted to escape from the Muskegon County Jail the day after he was sentenced. After his first eleven days at the Riverside Reception Center, Plaintiff was placed directly into administrative segregation based on the felonies he committed in the County Jail. Plaintiff has remained in administrative segregation since that time.
After serving three years in administrative segregation, Plaintiff filed a § 1983 action in this court, see McMann v. Gundy, et al., 1:00-cv-919 (W.D. Mich. 2001), claiming that his continued placement in administrative segregation violated his constitutional rights. That action was dismissed for failure to state a claim on August 13, 2001. Plaintiff contends that he has been totally misconduct free for the past five years. Plaintiff states that it has been recommended that he be assessed for assaultive offender therapy, that he receive vocational training, and that he be given a work assignment, but that none of these recommendations can be implemented while he is in administrative segregation.
Plaintiff states that MDOC procedures call for Security Classification Committee (SCC) review of administrative segregation prisoners on a bi-monthly basis. In addition, if there has been an assault on prison staff, the Regional Prison Administrator must also agree before a prisoner can be reclassified to the general population. Plaintiff claims that the bi-monthly review merely gives the appearance of due process without any actual substantive review. Plaintiff asserts that he has been denied reclassification month after month, with the same boilerplate language being used: "A longer period of positive behavior must be demonstrated." Plaintiff alleges that in September of 2003, AMF Deputy Warden Edlund forwarded a recommendation for Plaintiff to be released from administrative segregation to the Regional Prison Administrator, noting that Plaintiff had made good progress and that placing him in the general population would allow for increased programming. However, on September 24, 2003, Defendant Luoma denied the recommendation for release from administrative segregation prior to submission to the Regional Prison Administrator. Defendant Luoma noted that Plaintiff had a "serious escape history with assaultive behavior" and that further demonstration of good behavior was warranted.
Finally, Plaintiff gives examples of other prisoners who have attempted escape who are now being housed in the general population. However, Plaintiff does not appear to be asserting an equal protection claim. Plaintiff specifically claims that Defendant's conduct in denying reclassification to the general population violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and attorney fees.
II. Failure to state a claim
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177, 114 S. Ct. 1218 (1994). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988); Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1994).
Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated when Defendant Luoma denied Deputy Warden Edlund's recommendation that Plaintiff be released from administrative segregation. To determine whether segregation of an inmate from the general prison population involves the deprivation of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause, the Court must determine if the segregation imposes an "atypical and significant" hardship on the inmate "in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that administrative segregation does not involve an "atypical and significant" hardship implicating a protected liberty interest without regard to duration. See, e.g., Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 522 U.S. 848 (1997). The determination of whether a liberty interest exists is based upon "whether it will affect the overall duration of the inmate's sentence." Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); accord McGowan v. Settles, No. 99-5912, 2000 WL 658071, at *1 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000). While Plaintiff complains about the restrictions imposed upon segregated prisoners, he has not alleged that the segregation will impact the duration of his sentence. In addition, there is nothing on this record to indicate that Plaintiff's experience in segregation has been any different from the experiences of all the other inmates who are segregated at AMF. Furthermore, courts should be hesitant to find a liberty or property interest in state-created correctional policies. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Placement in segregation is not "the type of atypical and significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. at 486; see also Rimmer-Bey, 62 F.3d at 791.
Even if Plaintiff's incarceration in segregation for six years is deemed to be atypical and significant, the consequence would merely be to entitle him to a periodic due process review of his segregation status. Before Sandin was decided, the law in this area was supplied by Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). In Hewitt, the Supreme Court held that the states could create a liberty interest in general population classification through mandatory language found in regulations. If so, the Due Process Clause required some sort of periodic review of segregation status:
Of course, administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates. This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements. The decision whether a prisoner remains a security risk will be based on facts relating to a particular prisoner — which will have been ascertained when determining to confine the inmate to administrative segregation — and on the officials' general knowledge of prison conditions and tensions, which are singularly unsuited for "proof" in any highly structured manner.459 U.S. at 477 n. 9. Sandin overruled Hewitt on the existence of a liberty interest arising from administrative regulations. It did not purport to disturb Hewitt's holding concerning the extent of process due a prisoner in segregation. Consequently, even if the Court assumes that confinement in administrative segregation is so atypical that a liberty interest would be recognized, the process due a prisoner with such an interest is merely the periodic review dictated by Hewitt.
Applying Hewitt, the Court finds that Plaintiff's original placement and continuation in segregation is well-supported and, therefore, meets due process standards. While Plaintiff claims that he was not given a timely classification hearing, he does not dispute that he participated in an escape attempt from the Muskegon County Jail in which three officers were assaulted. He presented an obvious escape risk and a threat to prison staff at AMF. Moreover, Plaintiff was criminally charged with escape, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm and unarmed robbery. Plaintiff ultimately pled guilty to some or all of the criminal charges. In addition, Plaintiff concedes that he has received bi-monthly reviews by the SCC. Plaintiff contends that the reasons given by the SCC to continue his incarceration are merely boilerplate. However, the fact that Plaintiff disagrees with the reasoning and recommendations of the SCC does not render the periodic reviews constitutionally deficient. Plaintiff received more than adequate procedural due process.
In essence, Plaintiff asks this Court to substitute its judgment for that of prison officials concerning the most appropriate classification of a prisoner who has attempted an escape and assaulted corrections officers. It is not for the federal court to engage in oversight of decisions affecting prison management. The Supreme Court has continuously cautioned federal courts from assuming "a greater role in decisions affecting prison administration." Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 (2001); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-96 (1987); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125-126 (1977). These concerns are even stronger when a state penal institution is involved. Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229, 241 (6th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff's circumstances do not present a constitutional violation necessitating federal court intervention.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court determines that Plaintiff's action fails to state a claim and will therefore be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).The court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the court dismisses the action, the court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the court will assess the $255 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $255 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.