Opinion
No. CV 07-14-PHX-MHM.
April 17, 2009
ORDER
Currently before the Court is Defendant Michael J. Astrue's (the "Commissioner") Motion for Relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), requesting that the Court reconsider its September 8, 2008 order that Plaintiff's EAJA attorney's fees and costs be made payable directly to Plaintiff's counsel. (Dkt. #20).
I. BACKGROUND
On September 24, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). (Dkt. #16). The Commissioner filed a Response, requesting that the Court substantially reduce Plaintiff's fee request and reject Plaintiff's request that the Court order payment of EAJA fees directly to Plaintiff's counsel; "such fees must be made payable to Plaintiff." (Dkt. #17, p. 5).
On September 8, 2008, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and costs in the requested amount of $5,665.76 as the "prevailing party" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2414(d)(1)(A). (Dkt. #19). The Court also directed the EAJA attorney's fee and cost award to be paid directly to Plaintiff's counsel, rather than the plaintiff himself. (Id., p. 13).
On September 20, 2008, the Commissioner moved for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), requesting that the Court grant the Motion and amend its September 8, 2008 order to direct that EAJA fees be paid directly to Plaintiff, not Plaintiff's counsel. (Dkt. #s 20, 21). Plaintiff filed a Response, arguing only that the Commissioner's Motion was untimely. (Dkt. #22). However, the Commissioner's Motion for Relief was timely, and thus the Court provided Plaintiff a further opportunity to file a substantive response to the Motion as required under LRCiv 7.2(g). (Dkt. #23). Plaintiff declined to file a response.
II. STANDARD
III. DISCUSSION
59Palmer v. Champion Mortg.465 F.3d 2430Federal Practice and Procedure Turner v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co. 228 F.3d 10581063McDowell v. Calderon197 F.3d 12531254Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 128 S.Ct. 26052617supra 59Reeves v. Astrue526 F.3d 732735Manning v. Astrue510 F.3d 1246125159Reeves Rasho v. Astrue Lozano v. Astrue Reeves
However, this Court is not bound by out-of-circuit decisions.See Hall v. Eichenlaub, 559 F.Supp.2d 777, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2008) ("[A] district court is not bound by decisions of Courts of Appeals for other circuits."); cf. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A]n opinion of our court is binding within out circuit, not elsewhere in the country."). Nor is this Court bound by the decisions of another district court within this circuit. Starbuck v. San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 457 n. 13 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The doctrine of stare decisis does not compel one district judge to follow a decision of another in the same district."). Further, although parties may cite to an unpublished decision issued on or after January 1, 2007, pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 32.1, "[u]npublished dispositions and orders of th[e] [Ninth Circuit] . . . are not precedent." 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a); see also United States Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994) ("This seems to us a prime occasion for invoking our customary refusal to be bound by dicta, and our customary skepticism toward per curiam dispositions that lack the reasoned consideration of a full opinion.") (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court is not bound by Lozano, Reeves, Lasho, or the other opinions cited by the Commissioner, and the Court did not commit clear error of law by declining to adopt their reasoning.
More importantly, in Reeves, the Eleventh Circuit merely adopted the reasoning and conclusion reached by the 10th Circuit in Manning and the Federal Circuit in FDL Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 967 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992), that 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A)'s "reference to the `prevailing party' unambiguously directs the award of attorney's fees to the party who incurred those fees and not to the party's attorney. Accord Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2007)."Reeves, 526 F.3d at 735. However, this Court already addressed, and declined to adopt, that conclusion (Dkt. #19, pp. 6-7) in light of U.S. ex rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts Equipment, Inc., 89 F3.d 574, 577 (9th Cir. 1996). (Dkt. #19, pp. 8-9, 11-13); accord Laosouvanh v. Astrue, 2009 WL 799122, at *4 (E.D. Cal 2009). Thus, although the Commissioner cites to new opinions the instant Motion appears to be an improper attempt to re-litigate matters that were raised prior to entry of judgment. See, e.g., Exxon, 128 S.Ct. at 2617 n. 5; Fox v. American Airlines, Inc., 295 F.Supp.2d 56, 60 (D.D.C. 2003) ("[A] motion to amend judgment is not simply an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Commissioner declined to address Virani in the instant Motion for Relief.
The Court notes that the Commissioner's Motion for Relief relies in large part on Manning and Chonko v. Astrue, 2008 WL 1809188 (D.N.J. 2008). (Dkt. #21, pp. 5-8, 10-11). The Court noted both of those cases in its previous Order. (Dkt. #19, p. 7). In addition, although the Commissioner states that the Court's alternative holding that "in order to give full effect to the Savings Provision and harmonize it with § 2412(d)(1)(A), the Court must also direct EAJA attorney fee awards to the plaintiff's attorney and not the plaintiff" (id., p. 10), amounts to an "unfounded insistence that the Savings Provision evinces an intent that attorney directly receive EAJA fees" (Dkt. 21, p. 5), the Court's conclusion with respect to the Savings Provision is the same as that in Quade v. Barnhart, 570 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1171 (D. Ariz. 2008):
This Court does not find either the Savings Provision or §§ 2412(d)(1)(B), 2(A) conclusive on the issue of whether § 2412(d)(1)(A) prevents payment of attorney's fees to the attorney directly. Those provisions, however, cast doubt on the certitude that the use of "prevailing party" in § 2412(d)(1)(A) permits payment of attorney's fees only to the actual party. These provisions undermine the `coheren[ce] and consist[ency] of the statutory scheme the government urges." Robinson [v. Shell Oil Co.], 519 U.S. [337,] [] 340 . . . [(1997)]; see also, Sutherland, § 45:2-8. Accordingly, this Court reaches beyond the bare language of the statute to determine and effect Congressional intent of the statute.
In addition, the Court finds it disconcerting that the Commissioner failed to acknowledge that the Eighth Circuit recently rejected, based on circuit precedent, the conclusion reached in Reeves, Manning, and FDL Technology, holding that "EAJA fee awards become the property of the prevailing party's attorney when assessed and may not be used to offset the claimant's debt." Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). Nor did the Commissioner acknowledge that various district courts, some of which were cited in the Court's previous order (Dkt. #19, p. 7), have come to similar conclusions as this Court with respect to EAJA attorney fee awards. In particular, the Court notes that Judge Raner Collins (D. Ariz.) recently adopted Magistrate Judge Charles Pyle's thorough and well-reasoned Report and Recommendation, which independently came to the same conclusion as this Court — "Plaintiff's attorney . . . is entitled to direct receipt of the EAJA award of attorney's fees."Quade, 570 F.Supp.2d at 1179-80. Magistrate Judge Pyle similarly applied the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Virani and held, among other things, that adopting the Commissioner's interpretation of the EAJA such that payment of attorney's fees must be directed to the actual plaintiff "is an absurd result that thwarts the purpose of the EAJA." Quade, 570 F.Supp.2d at 1173. As indicated in its September 8, 2008 order, this Court agrees, and thus finds no reason to revisit the Commissioner's previous arguments with respect to EAJA attorney fee awards.
In Quade, CV05-0015-TUC-RCC (CRP), the Commissioner also filed a Motion for Relief Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), similarly asserting that Reeves and Lozano established that Magistrate Judge Pyle's Report and Recommendation was based on a manifest error of law or fact. Dkt. #49. Judge Collins summarily denied the Commissioner's Motion: "The Court does not find the [Commissioner's] argument persuasive nor the cases cited applicable." Dkt. #51.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. (Dkt. #20)