McLoud v. State of New York

7 Citing cases

  1. Galawanji v. 40 Sutton Place Condominium

    262 A.D.2d 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 9 times

    Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.). We hold that 12 NYCRR 23-1.8 (a), which requires provision of "[a] pproved eye protection equipment" to employees "while engaged in any other operation which may endanger the eyes", is specific enough for purposes of stating a cause of action under Labor Law § 241 Lab. (6) ( cf., McLoud v. State of New York, 237 A.D.2d 783; Crawford v. Williams, 198 A.D.2d 48, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 751). The record does not support appellants' contention that plaintiff would not have worn protective goggles while engaged in a grinding operation even if they had been provided. Nor does it avail appellants that plaintiff's eye was injured not by flying loose particles but by the grinder itself when it kicked back ( cf., Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 N.Y.2d 555, 562).

  2. Maldonado v. State

    255 A.D.2d 630 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 20 times

    l settled that the State, through its correctional authorities, is not bound by the Labor Law ( see, D'Argenio v. Village of Homer, 202 A.D.2d 883) but nevertheless owes a duty to provide reasonably safe, machinery and equipment to an inmate engaged in a work program ( see, Martinez v. State of New York, 225 A.D.2d 877, 878; Kandrach v. State of New York, 188 A.D.2d 910, 913). While the general standards set forth in the Labor Law or the regulations promulgated thereunder may be reviewed in determining the standard of care owed by the State, the record in this case demonstrates no reason to impose liability on the State ( cf., Herman v. Lancaster Homes, 145 A.D.2d 926, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 601; Cherry v. State of New York, 42 A.D.2d 671, affd 34 N.Y.2d 872). The testimony and evidence reveal no indication that on the day of his accident decedent requested safety goggles, examined the available goggles or notified his supervisors that he considered the eyewear unsuitable for use ( see, McLoud v. State of New York, 237 A.D.2d 783). The safety measures at the job site were reasonable and adequate under the circumstances and the claim should therefore be dismissed. Mercure, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Peters and Spain, JJ., concur.

  3. Ramjitsingh v. 2269 First Ave Owners, LLC

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 33450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

    With respect to 12 NYCRR 23-1.8 (c) (requiring wearing of "safety hats"), testimony that hard hats were required in all areas of the job site is sufficient to demonstrate factual issues regarding the applicability of section 23-1.8 (c) (see McLean v 405 Webster Ave. Assoc., 98 A.D.3d 1090, 1095 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Seales v Trident Structural Corp., 142 A.D.3d 1153, 1157 [2d Dept 2016]) and plaintiff's testimony that he was not instructed to wear a hard hat in all areas of the job site is sufficient to require denial of defendants' motion in this respect (see McLean v 405 Webster Ave. Assoc., 26 Misc.3d 1219[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51396[U], *13 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2010], affd 98 A.D.3d 1090 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Sheley v Kingsfort Builders, Inc., 207 A.D.3d 1155, 1156 [4th Dept 2022]; cf. Beshay v Eberhart L.P. No. 1, 69 A.D.3d 779, 781 [2d Dept 2010]; McCormack v Universal Carpet & Upholstery Cleaners, 29 A.D.3d 542, 544 [2d Dept 2006]; McLoud v State of New York, 237 A.D.2d 783, 784-785 [3d Dept 1997]). The fact that the rod struck plaintiff in the head suggests that wearing a hard hat may have prevented or reduced his injuries.

  4. Smalls v. New 56th & Park (NY) Owner, LLC

    2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 30899 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    However, plaintiff's own testimony demonstrates that he was provided with an adequate safety hat and that he was wearing a safety hat at the time of the accident. The testimony of Lewin and the Lend Lease safety officer suggesting that plaintiff may have removed the liner of his hard hat does not make a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.8 (c) (1) a proximate cause of the accident (see Beshay v Eberhart, L.C. #1, 69 AD3d 779, 781 [2d Dept 2010]; McCormack v Universal Carpet & Upholstery Cleaners, 29 AD3d 541, 544 [2d Dept 2006]; McLoud v State of New York, 237 AD2d 783, 785 [3d Dept 1997]). Defendants are thus entitled to dismissal of the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action with respect to 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (c) (3) and 12 NYCRR 23-1.8 (c) (1), and also with respect to 12 NYCRR , 23-1.7 (a) (2), 23-1.30, 23-1.32, 23-1.33 (a) (1) - (3), 23-2.1, 23-2.3, 23-5.1 (c), 23-5.1 (f), 23-5.1 (i), 23-5.2, 23-5.3, 23-5.4 (a) - (c), 23-5.5 (e), and 23-5.6 because those latter sections are not specific, are not applicable to the facts, and/or because plaintiff has abandoned reliance on them by failing to address them in his opposition papers (see Pita v Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., 156 AD3d 833, 835 [2d Dept 2017]; Palomeque v Capital Improvement Servs., LLC, 145 AD3d 912, 914 [2d Dept 2016]).

  5. Torres v. City of New York

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 52021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    A plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant violated a rule or regulation that sets forth a specific standard of conduct. ( McCloud v. State, 237 AD2d 783, 654 NYS2d 860 [3d Dept. 1997]). Compliance with a regulation of the Industrial Board of Appeals that sets forth a specific standard or conduct is also non delegable (see Long v. Forest Fehlhaber, 55 NY2d 154, 159, 433 NE2d 115, 448 NYS2d 132).

  6. ROSA v. CON. ED. OF NEW YORK, INC.

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 31431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

    None of these cases address the issue of liability where a worker suffered eye injuries after he or she was provided eye protection. See McLoud v. State of New York, 237 A.D.2d 783 (3rd Dept. 1997) (no section 23-1.8(a) liability where plaintiff was provided with eye protection). The plaintiff has offered no expert evidence as to any deficiency in the goggles provided or as to alternative, more appropriate eye protection.

  7. BADZMIEROWSKI v. PBAK, LLC

    2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 51207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004)

    Otherwise § 241(6) would be redundant, as it would merely reiterate the common law negligence standards which are codified in Labor Law § 200. Moreover, the Industrial Code alleged to have been violated cannot merely set forth a general standard of care; rather, it must contain "'concrete specifications' with which the defendant must comply" ( Donovan v. SL Concrete Construction Corp., Inc., 234 AD2d 336, 336-37 [2d Dept 1996]; see also Curley v. Gateway, 250 AD2d 888, 891 [3d Dept 1998]; McLoud v. State, 237 AD2d 783, 784-85 [3d Dept 1997]). However, while proof of a violation of a specific Industrial Code is required to sustain an action under Labor Law § 241(6), such proof does not establish liability, and is merely evidence of negligence ( see Ross, 81 NY2d at 502; Long, 55 NY2d 154).