Opinion
No. 02-1008-WEB.
March 28, 2002
Memorandum and Order
Plaintiff filed this action against his former employer, Cessna Aircraft Company, alleging that Cessna discriminated against him on account of his race and disability, and also that Cessna breached its contract with plaintiff. The matter is now before the court on Cessna's motion to dismiss. The court finds that oral argument would not assist in deciding the issues presented.
I. Allegations in the Complaint.
According to the complaint, plaintiff is an African-American male who was first employed by Cessna in 1979. In 1998, plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury to his knees and filed a workers' compensation claim. Doc. 1 at ¶ 6. In May 1999 plaintiff had knee surgery, was off work for a period of time under a medical leave of absence, and then returned to work with restrictions. Plaintiff developed problems in both knees and sought and obtained an accommodation from Cessna to work at a sit-down job. ¶ 8. During 1999, plaintiff developed severe stomach problems and was diagnosed with irritable bowel syndrome or spastic colon. He was on medical leave from late June to September of 1999 and received short-term disability benefits. ¶ 9. During 2000, plaintiff experienced more knee problems and was accommodated by Cessna with assignment to more sedentary jobs. Plaintiff had a second knee surgery in June of 2000 and subsequently returned to work with restrictions. Cessna accommodated him by assigning him to a position in the mail room. ¶ 10.
On Wednesday, August 23, 2000, plaintiff had swelling in his knees and could not go to work. He called his supervisor, Ray Perry, and according to the complaint Perry told plaintiff there was no problem with him taking the day off. ¶ 14. Plaintiff called Cessna's Health Services and was told to come in and have defendant's physicians take a look at the knee. Plaintiff did so. ¶ 15. Plaintiff did not clock in the 23rd because he had been given an excused absence by Cessna. ¶ 19. Plaintiff returned to work on August 24th and 25th. On the 25th, a union representative told plaintiff that his supervisor was going to fire plaintiff for job abandonment. ¶ 18. On Monday, August 29, 2000, plaintiff was fired for allegedly abandoning his job. By way of explanation, Cessna informed plaintiff that when he called in sick on the 23rd he should not have come into Health Services, although plaintiff had in fact come in because Health Services had directed him to do so. ¶ 19.
According to the complaint, Cessna's termination of plaintiff was contrary to its established policies on absenteeism. The complaint alleges that the termination was pretextual and was "motivated by plaintiff's race and/or disability. . . ." ¶ 23. Count 1 alleges that Cessna's action constituted prohibited discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination. Count 2 alleges that plaintiff's knee and colon conditions constituted disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and that Cessna's actions constituted discrimination on account of disability in violation of the ADA and the "state counterpart." Count 3 alleges that Cessna breached its employment contract with plaintiff.
II. Motion to Dismiss.
Cessna moves to dismiss Count 1 on the asserted grounds that the complaint "contains no factual allegations whatsoever to support [plaintiff's] racial discrimination claims." Cessna also moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims under the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, arguing plaintiff has not shown that he properly exhausted administrative remedies on those claims. Doc. 6 at 1.
III. Standards Governing a Motion to Dismiss.
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In considering a motion to dismiss, "[a]ll well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true" and all reasonable inferences must be indulged in favor of the plaintiff. Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984). The question is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
IV. Discussion.
Plaintiff concedes in his response that he has not exhausted administrative remedies on the state law claims under the Kansas Act Against Discrimination. Accordingly, those claims will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
As for plaintiff's claim of race discrimination under Title VII, the court finds that the complaint is sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the court's view, defendant is essentially arguing that plaintiff is obligated to allege facts showing a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As the Supreme Court recently made clear, however, the McDonnell Douglas test is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. The test at the pleading stage is whether the complaint contains "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998 (2002). "Such a statement must simply `give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Id. The plaintiff's nine-page complaint in the instant case meets that test. It sets forth the circumstances leading up to the termination, the specific dates and persons involved, the factual basis for the allegation that Cessna's explanation was pretextual, and it alleges that race was a motivating factor in Cessna's decision. This is sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 8(a).
V. Conclusion.
Defendant Cessna's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is granted with respect to plaintiff's claims under the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, and such claims are hereby dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The motion is denied with respect to plaintiff's claim of race discrimination under Title VII.
IT IS SO ORDERED.