Opinion
C. A. 1:22-3694-SAL-SVH
12-07-2022
Kevin Terrell McLean, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Detention Center; Spartanburg County; Chuck Wright; and Officer Xavier Durham, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Kevin Terrell McLean (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his amended complaint seeking compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § i983 against the Spartanburg County Detention Center (“SCDC”), Spartanburg County, Spartanburg County Sheriff Chuck Wright, and Officer Xavier Durham. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(i)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges SCDC staff provide “insufficient cell standards” and “recreation time of 3 hours or less each day.” [ECF No. i0 at 6]. He also alleges the shift deputies are biased and the mental health units commit men of average intelligence. Id. He generally alleges there is interference with attorney-client privilege by forcing inmates to use electronic kiosks. Id. He alleges Wright “acting under the color of state law and institutional policy as sheriff and warden of the [SCDC] willfully and negligently placed Petitioner in the jail's conditions refusing Petitioner's requests to meet requirements.” Id. at 7. He further claims Durham “stopped [his] car based solely on the fact [he is] a member of black culture and searched [his] person[] and [] vehicle without probable cause.” Id. at 7.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
1. Younger Abstention
Absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a state's pending criminal proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Nivens v. Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 158-62 (4th Cir. 2003); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). Further, federal district courts should abstain from considering constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., 887 F.2d at 52. Here, Plaintiff can properly present his constitutional claims in his state criminal proceeding.
2. SCDC is not a proper defendant
To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). Only “persons” may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” For example, inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not “persons” and cannot act under color of state law. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F.Supp.2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a ‘person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”). Here SCDC is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.
3. No Supervisory Liability
To the extent Plaintiff sues SCDC, Spartanburg County, and Sheriff Wright for their employees' actions, his claims are subject to summary dismissal. The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). Although Plaintiff alleges Wright's actions were willful, he also alleges they were pursuant to institutional policy as Sheriff and Warden. Because Plaintiff fails to allege any specific actions or omissions by SCDC, Spartanburg County, or Wright, these defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
4. False Arrest
Plaintiff's claim against Durham for false arrest is also subject to summary dismissal. Plaintiff indicates he was arrested without probable cause. Although Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (finding Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not bar false arrest claims by pretrial detainees), would apply to this case, Plaintiff's claims fail because he was indicted on November 18, 2022, in Spartanburg County on charges of distribution of methamphetamine, trafficking in cocaine; and trafficking in meth or cocaine base.A grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause sufficient to defeat claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest under § 1983. See Gatter v. Zappile, 67 F.Supp.2d 515, 519 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (collecting cases holding that a grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause, aff'd, 225 F.3d 648 (3d Cir. 2000); Odom v. Roberts, C/A No. 6:12-2452-TMC-JDA, 2012 WL 4061679, at *2 (D.S.C. August 27, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 6:12-2452-TMC, 2012 WL 4059916 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim against Durham should be dismissed.
See Spartanburg Cnty, Clerk of Court, Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited December 6, 2022). A court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that court may “properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the complaint be summarily dismissed.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).