Opinion
2:24-cv-00575-BHH-MGB
02-09-2024
Anthony Marcelle Mclean, Jr., Plaintiffs, v. Raleigh Police Department; Detective Brown; Lt. Batton; and Officer Perrin, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Anthony Marcelle Mclean, Jr., proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Raleigh Police Department and three of its officers, Detective Brown, Lt. Batton, and Officer Perrin (collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons stated in greater detail below, the undersigned recommends that this action be transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
According to the Complaint, on November 16, 2021, Defendants “violate[d] [Plaintiff's] constitutional rights by fabricating a criminal case [against him] by planting evidence and conducting illegal searches and seizures.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Detective Brown, Lt. Batton, and Officer Perrin demonstrated “an abuse of police power [ ] when they planted marijuana as evidence.” (Id.) The Complaint seems to suggest that Defendants' purported conduct resulted in criminal charges against Plaintiff, which were apparently filed in state court as “Case No. 21CRS218278.” (Id. at 6.) This is the extent of the Complaint.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, a civil action may be brought in one of the following: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If an action is filed in the improper venue, the court may dismiss the case, or transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a); see also United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 162 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that the decision of whether to transfer or dismiss a case is committed to the sound discretion of the district court); Rouse v. Nessel, No. 8:20-cv-954-DCC-JDA, 2020 WL 6279198, at *8 (D.S.C. July 6, 2020) (“A court may raise the issue of defective venue sua sponte.”), adopted, 2020 WL 4435189 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2020).
Here, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants do not meet any of the criteria under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. As a threshold matter, none of the Defendants in this action appear to be citizens or residents of South Carolina; rather, they are located in Raleigh, North Carolina. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) Moreover, the purported events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims explicitly occurred in Raleigh, North Carolina. (Id. at 4.) And finally, Plaintiff appears to be detained at the Wake County Sheriff's Office in Raleigh, North Carolina on criminal charges that are presumably pending before a North Carolina state court. (Id. at 2, 6.) In short, there is simply no reason for the District of South Carolina to hear Plaintiff's claims in this case.
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that venue for this action more properly lies in the Eastern District of North Carolina, where Raleigh is located. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court transfer-rather than summarily dismiss-this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina so that the proper district court may evaluate Plaintiff's claims.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).