Opinion
No. 19-55667
08-12-2020
MATTHEW GREGORY McLAUGHLIN, for himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KAMALA D. HARRIS, Attorney General, in her individual capacity; et al., Defendants-Appellees, and CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT; STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Defendants.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 8:18-cv-00546-JLS-KES MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
California attorney Matthew Gregory McLaughlin appeals pro se from the district court's order dismissing his action alleging constitutional violations arising out of his proposed ballot initiatives and California Assembly Bill 1100. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (failure to state a claim); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed McLaughlin's claims arising out of his proposed ballot initiatives, an unpublished state court decision, and California's Anti-SLAPP law for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because these claims are "de facto appeal[s]" of prior state court decisions and raise issues that are "inextricably intertwined" with those decisions. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that in "determin[ing] whether an action functions as a de facto appeal," this court "pay[s] close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed McLaughlin's claim challenging the constitutionality of California Assembly Bill 1100 because McLaughlin failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Assembly Bill 1100 was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a neutral law of general applicability violates the First Amendment only if "the law is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest").
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.