McLain v. General Motors Corp.

11 Citing cases

  1. Baird v. Owczarek

    C.A. No. N11C-09-241 RRC (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 2013)   Cited 1 times
    Finding reasonable fee to be between $2,536.99 and $3,512.76

    541 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Del. 1988). 586 A.2d 647 (Del. Super. 1988). See Id. at 653 ("The jury verdict will be set aside if there is a reasonable possibility that allegedly extraneous information or influences affected the verdict.").

  2. State v. Webster

    I.D. No. 1402016703 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2015)   Cited 2 times
    Recognizing that under "current practice" grand jury proceedings are not transcribed

    Jessup, 136 A.2d at 218. See, e.g., McClain v. Gen. Motors Corp., 586 A.2d 647, 652-53 (Del. Super. 1988). Id. (stating that because the juror was not threatened with physical harm or complain of undue intimidation, the Court declined to further consider the juror's allegation).

  3. Thompson v. Papastavros Associates

    729 A.2d 874 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that "[t]here is nothing . . . to suggest an extraneous or extrinsic influence on the deliberative process" because the "[p]laintiffs' contention . . . is no more than an inference on a hearsay allegation that the two jurors did not recognize and disclose during voir dire biases against people who bring law suits for money damages"

    This policy: i) discourages harassment of jurors by losing parties eager to have the verdict set aside; ii) encourages free and open discussion among jurors; iii) reduces incentives for jury tampering; iv) promotes verdict finality; and v) maintains the viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body.Sheeran v. State, Del.Supr., 526 A.2d 886, 894 (1987); Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948, 952 (1980); McLain v. General Motors Corp., 586 A.2d 647, 649-50 (1988); State v. Watson, Del.Super. 186 A.2d 543, 544 (1961), aff'd, Del.Supr. 184 A.2d 780 (1962); see also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953); McDonald v. Pless 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915). It has long been held that there is no difference between a civil and criminal case so far as the principle of impeachment of a verdict is concerned.

  4. Adams v. Luciani

    846 A.2d 237 (Del. 2003)   Cited 9 times

    The trial judge decided to take no action.McLain v. General Motors Corporation, 586 A.2d 647 (Del.Super. 1988), citing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953).McLain at 651, citing Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886 (Del.Super. 1987).

  5. Alejo Jimenez v. Heyliger

    792 F. Supp. 910 (D.P.R. 1992)   Cited 14 times
    Finding that federal courts retain the power to reconsider issues that were decided before if they wish

    A party seeking a new trial does not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the extraneous influence conclusively effected the jury verdict, since some sorts of jury misconduct are presumed prejudicial and a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises in support of the movant. McLain v. General Motors Corp., 586 A.2d 647, 654 (Del.Super.Ct. 1988). Where there is a strong possibility that extraneous prejudicial influences may have tainted the integrity of the jury verdict, courts require not a "positive finding that the jury was actually influenced by what took place; but rather . . . a determination as to whether or not it was reasonably certain that they were not."

  6. Desantis v. Gardiner

    C.A. No. N18C-01-304 WCC (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    Id. (internal citations omitted); see also McLain v. Gen. Motors Corp., 586 A.2d 647, 652 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (finding intimidation or harassment of juror by other jurors is intrinsic to the verdict). In the instant matter, the Court finds that Juror No. 3's statements to counsel concern solely intrinsic matters.

  7. State v. Murawski

    ID No. 1503002453 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2015)

    " The trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to hold a hearing to determine juror misconduct or to summon a juror for further investigation due to alleged exposure to prejudicial information or improper influence.Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 894 (Del. 1987); McLain v. General Motors Corp., 586 A.2d 647, 649-50 (Del. 1988). State v. McGriff, 2000 WL 1211139, *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2000) (citing Tanner v. United States, 526 A.2d 886 (1987)).

  8. Redden v. State

    ID No. 0701015161 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2010)   Cited 4 times

    Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Del. 1988) (citations omitted).McLain v. Gen. Motors Corp., 586 A.2d 647, 654 (Del. Super. 1988).Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 363-64 (1966) (holding that bailiff's comments to jurors that defendant was a "wicked fellow," that he was guilty, and that "if there is anything wrong (in finding [defendant] guilty) the Supreme Court will correct it" was prejudicial and the judgment was reversed).

  9. Luciani v. Adams

    C.A. No. 99C-06-185 CHT (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2003)   Cited 2 times

    juror by another. McClain v. General Motors Corp., 586 A.2d 647, 649-50 (Del.Super. 1988). Id. at 649-652.

  10. State v. Shaia

    Criminal Action Nos. 99-03-0615, et seq (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2000)   Cited 2 times
    Granting a new trial because the court clerk's trial notes, which made references to motions and excluded evidence, were left in the jury room and members of the jury stated that they had seen the notes

    Where the bailiff's comments relate to the content or procedure of the jury's deliberations, indicate a view of the evidence, or introduce extra-record facts, a presumption of prejudice will arise. McLain v. General Motors Corp., Del. Super., 586 A.2d 647, 654 (1988). Finally, where a state witness sat at the lunch table with a juror, even though they did not discuss the case, there was sufficient danger that the juror made judgments on the credibility of that witness based on out-of-court information to warrant a finding of inherent prejudice. State v. Deshields, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. 95-07-02 13, Carpenter, J. (Sept. 30, 1996) Opinion and ORDER ("While at first glance, the short lunch conversation appears harmless and incapable of creating bias in Juror #9, upon closer inquiry, it is clear that the circumstances are highly suspect, prejudicial and constitute egregious circumstances as contemplated by Hughes and it progeny.").