Opinion
24A-CR-417
12-06-2024
Idreik McKnight, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Christopher Taylor-Price Marion County Public Defender Agency Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, Catherine Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Jennifer Prinz Harrison, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D20-2106-F2-17920
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Christopher Taylor-Price Marion County Public Defender Agency Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, Catherine Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Crone, Senior Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] Following a jury trial, Idreik McKnight was convicted of level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and level 6 felony dealing in marijuana. On appeal, McKnight claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence found on his cell phone and that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his dealing in a narcotic drug conviction. Finding no abuse of discretion as to the admission of the challenged evidence and sufficient evidence to support McKnight's conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In June 2021, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) detectives assigned to the Southeast Violent Crimes Task Force were investigating possible narcotics dealing on the south side of Indianapolis. On June 8, IMPD Detective Jacob Tranchant, a task force member, was in an unmarked police car and was conducting undercover surveillance of a Super 8 Motel. In the preceding days, Detective Tranchant had observed a black Dodge Charger making round trips between the Super 8 Motel and the Travel Inn located a few blocks away. As part of the investigation, Detective Tranchant requested that IMPD Detective Steven Brinker, a uniformed detective, perform a traffic stop on the Charger.
[¶3] Detective Brinker located the Charger at approximately 6:30 p.m. and initiated a traffic stop because the car had an expired temporary license plate. Detective Brinker later determined that the car was owned by McKnight's girlfriend, Breonna Thomas, who was riding in the front passenger seat. McKnight was driving, and a puppy was sitting in the backseat. Detective Brinker approached the car and directed McKnight to roll down the window. The detective detected the odor of marijuana coming from the car. He removed McKnight and Thomas, handcuffed them, and sat them down on the side of the road. Another detective, who had arrived at the scene, searched the car and found on the passenger-side floorboard a bag containing a substance that the detective recognized from his training as marijuana. The car was towed. McKnight was arrested. The detectives performed a patdown search and found approximately $3,200 in cash and a cell phone in McKnight's pockets.
[¶4] Meanwhile, Detective Tranchant located the room that Thomas had reserved at the Super 8 Motel, and he and another detective knocked on the door. The detectives could smell the odor of marijuana coming from the room. A six-year-old boy answered the door and immediately began to cry. The detectives discovered a total of four unattended children in the room, all aged six and under. The detectives determined that Thomas was the children's mother. She was transported from the traffic stop to the motel room to care for the children and keep them calm.
[¶5] When Thomas returned to the motel, the detectives asked her to consent to a search of the room. She consented to the search at first but then changed her mind. The children were removed to the motel lobby. Detective Tranchant asked Thomas, who was standing in the hallway, "if we could step inside her motel room to ... go over the paperwork" related to the search, and Thomas agreed. Tr. Vol. 2 at 219. When the detectives entered the room, they saw a digital scale that had a "brown or greyish" residue on it. Id. The scale was in plain view, lying on top of a dresser and next to the television.
[¶6] Detective Tranchant obtained a warrant to search the room. In addition to the digital scale, the detectives found a shoebox sitting on a shelf directly under the top of the dresser. The shoebox contained plastic baggies, torn pieces of aluminum foil, a second scale, and plastic bags containing brown and white powdery substances. The substances were determined to be one bag of 25.97 grams of marijuana, one bag of 13.63 grams of marijuana, one bag of 13.15 grams of fentanyl, one bag of 10.97 grams of para-fluorofentanyl, one bag of 38.05 grams of heroin mixed with fentanyl, and one bag of 51.64 grams of heroin mixed with fentanyl. The detectives also found in the motel room an ashtray containing cigar ends and McKnight's birth certificate.
[¶7] Detective Tranchant also obtained a warrant to search the cell phone found on McKnight's person. That search revealed two photographs, one taken on May 26, 2021, and the other taken on June 1. Both photographs showed a hand holding marijuana. Two videos were also found on the phone. In the first video, taken on March 15, a large greyish-white block is displayed, along with a digital scale. A voice in the video is heard saying, "[C]ome on dog your plug ain't doing this G." Tr. Vol. 3 at 34. At McKnight's trial, Detective Tranchant testified that the term "plug" referred to a supplier of narcotics. The second video, taken on May 9, showed a large amount of marijuana.
[¶8] In addition to the photographs and videos, text messages between McKnight and other individuals were found on McKnight's cell phone. On May 28, 2021, McKnight sent a text message to a phone number ending in 0950, telling the individual that they owed McKnight $100. The individual responded, "Got someone needing a g if you wanna sell one. Otherwise I got that 100 on friday." Ex. Vol. 1 at 23. Detective Tranchant testified that the term "g" was slang for a gram of heroin or fentanyl and, at the time, the market price for the drugs was around $100. McKnight responded, "Yea pull up." Id. The individual texted, "How much is it?" Id.
[¶9] On June 3, McKnight again exchanged text messages with the 0950 phone number. The individual asked McKnight, "You got a 50[?]" Id. Detective Tranchant explained that the individual was asking if McKnight had $50 worth of heroin or fentanyl. The same number then texted, "We out here[.]" Id. at 24. On June 4, McKnight received a text message from that number asking, "Got a 50??" Id. McKnight responded, "Yes pull up[.]" Id. That same day, McKnight received a text message from a different cell phone number, asking, "You think you could bring a 80[?]" Id. at 30. McKnight responded, "Yea send addy[.]" Id. The individual texted an address. McKnight then responded, "Ight bet[.]" Id. at 31. The individual sent additional text messages to McKnight, asking if he could "send a picture of the puppy" and, later, asking if he could "bring a 60[,]" to which McKnight responded, "Yea[.]" Id. at 32-33.
[¶10] On June 5, McKnight received a text message from the 0950 number, asking him if he had "a 40" and "an 80[?]" Id. at 25-26. McKnight responded, "Yea[,]" and stated that he was at the "Super 8" motel. Id. at 26-27. On June 8, the individual sent a text message to McKnight, asking, "Got a 50??" Id. at 27. McKnight responded, "Yea." Id. at 28. The individual texted, "Ok about 20 minutes [...] same spot[,]" and then added, "Super 8?" Id. McKnight responded, indicating that he would arrive in five minutes. Also on June 8, McKnight received a text message from a third number. The individual asked McKnight for "2 nice grapes[.]" Id. at 36. Detective Tranchant explained at McKnight's trial that "grapes" is a slang term, referring to grams of heroin or fentanyl.
[¶11] On June 10, 2021, the State charged McKnight with level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and level 6 felony dealing in marijuana. On December 12, 2023, the State filed a notice of intent to offer Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) evidence, that is, evidence of McKnight's "other crimes, wrongs or acts to show motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake, and/or identity." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 136. Specifically, the State intended to introduce text message conversations, videos, and photographs from McKnight's cell phone. McKnight filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to prohibit the State from offering evidence on the selling, preparation, or manufacturing of marijuana, heroin, or fentanyl, "specifically in the form of videos, still photographs, and text message[s] ... retrieved as a result of the cell phone analysis of [McKnight's] phone." Id. at 138.
[¶12] At a final pretrial conference, held on December 15, 2023, the State argued that the text message conversations from June 8, 2021, were "direct substantive evidence" of the alleged "dealing" that occurred on that date, and the text messages that were sent on the prior dates were probative of McKnight's intent. Tr. Vol. 2 at 40. The State also argued that the videos and photographs were probative of McKnight's intent and identity. McKnight argued that the photographs and the videos were "extremely prejudicial" and would be used to support the "forbidden inference[,]" that is, that McKnight possessed, and was acting in conformity with, certain criminal character traits. Id. at 44. The trial court denied the motion in limine.
[¶13] McKnight's two-day jury trial was held on December 18 and 19, 2023. The theory of his defense was that he was a small-time marijuana dealer and that his girlfriend, Thomas, was the narcotics dealer. During opening statements, McKnight's counsel admitted that McKnight was a "small-time marijuana drug dealer" but claimed that he was not a dealer of heroin or fentanyl. Id. at 179. During the trial, the State moved to admit the evidence that was found on McKnight's cell phone, and the trial court admitted it over McKnight's objection.
[¶14] The jury found McKnight guilty as charged. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a term of seventeen and one-half years for the dealing in a narcotic drug conviction and a concurrent term of two and one-half years for the dealing in marijuana conviction. McKnight now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 - The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence the incriminating pre-June 8, 2021 text messages, videos, and photographs that were found on McKnight's cell phone.
[¶15] McKnight contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the text messages, videos, and photographs that were found on his cell phone that pertained to activities that occurred before he was arrested and charged with the instant offenses. The admission and exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Griffith v. State, 31 N.E.3d 965, 969 (Ind. 2015). "An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances presented." Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138, 143 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). "The trial court's ruling will be sustained on any reasonable basis apparent in the record, whether or not relied on by the parties or the trial court." Washburn v. State, 121 N.E.3d 657, 661 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (citing Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1267 (Ind. 2008), cert. denied), trans. denied.
[¶16] Indiana Evidence Rule 401 provides that relevant evidence is evidence that "has any tendency to make a fact [of consequence in determining the action] more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[.]" Indiana Evidence Rule 402 provides that relevant evidence is admissible with certain exceptions and that "[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible." Indiana Evidence Rule 403 provides that the court may "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." "Unfair prejudice ... looks to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis." Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Camm (D.R.C.) v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 224 (Ind. 2009)). "All evidence that is relevant to a criminal prosecution is inherently prejudicial, and thus the Evidence Rule 403 inquiry boils down to a balance of the probative value of the proffered evidence against the likely unfair prejudicial value of that evidence." Hendricks v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1123, 1134 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), trans. denied), trans. denied.
[¶17] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." However, prior bad acts may be admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2). When reviewing the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), the trial court must determine whether the prior conduct is relevant to a matter other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act and balance the probative value of that evidence with its prejudicial effect under Rule 403. Edwards v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007), trans. denied.
[¶18] McKnight asserts that the challenged evidence should not have been admitted because it was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and improper character evidence. According to McKnight, "the State used the ... evidence of [his] pre-June 8 conduct" to show that "because [he] dealt drugs in the days leading up to June 8, 2021, he likely was doing so on June 8[.]" Appellant's Br. at 13. McKnight also argues that the court's alleged error in admitting the evidence was not harmless.
[¶19] The issue here is whether McKnight possessed the narcotics and also whether he intended to deal them. And because McKnight did not have any drugs on his person when he was found and did not have exclusive possession of the motel room, the State had to prove that he constructively possessed the heroin and fentanyl at issue. To prove that a defendant constructively possessed contraband, the State must show that "the defendant has both (i) the intent to maintain dominion and control over the drugs and (ii) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the drugs." Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2004). And, as in this case,
[w]hen a defendant's possession of the premises on which drugs are found is not exclusive, then the inference of intent to maintain dominion and control over the drugs "must be supported by additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the controlled substances and their presence."Id. at 341 (quoting Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997)).
[¶20] During opening statements, McKnight's counsel suggested that Thomas was dealing the heroin and fentanyl, not McKnight. Counsel told the jury that McKnight was a "small-time marijuana drug dealer" but "that's where it stops." Tr. Vol. 2 at 179. Counsel argued that Thomas had "the knowledge of the drugs, and the evidence will show, that she also had the power over those drugs." Id. The theory that Thomas was the narcotics dealer was exhibited again in defense counsel's cross-examination of Detective Tranchant. During closing arguments, defense counsel stated that McKnight "was dealing in marijuana" on June 8, 2021, and that "[t]here [was] no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt" that, on that date, McKnight "had any knowledge of heroin or fentanyl in that [m]otel room." Tr. Vol. 3 at 76, 77. Counsel argued, "We know who did have knowledge and ability to control those drugs in that room was Ms. Thomas." Id. at 81.
[¶21] Defense counsel's opening statements, closing arguments, and cross examination put McKnight's knowledge of the presence of the heroin and fentanyl at issue. Therefore, evidence of his prior bad acts from the text messages, videos, and photographs was admissible under Evidence Rule 404(b)(2) to show his knowledge of the narcotics. Accordingly, the challenged exhibits survive the first component of the Evidence Rule 404(b) test, as the evidence was relevant to a matter other than McKnight's propensity to commit the charged offenses.
[¶22] As for the second component, the trial court was required to determine if the probative value of the challenged evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Hendricks, 162 N.E.3d at 1134; Ind. Evidence Rule 403. There was no doubt that the challenged evidence was inherently prejudicial. However, trial courts are given wide latitude in weighing the probative value of evidence against the prejudice caused by its admission, Bishop v. State, 40 N.E.3d 935, 952 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015), trans. denied, and McKnight has not convinced us that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.
[¶23] The text messages and the videos, in particular, were highly probative to challenge McKnight's assertion that he did not have knowledge of the heroin and fentanyl in the motel room and to show his intent to deal. Furthermore, over 100 grams of heroin/fentanyl were found in the motel room, and Detective Tranchant testified that the weight of the narcotics was consistent with dealing, not personal use. McKnight's birth certificate was found in the room. And on June 8, the day McKnight was arrested, he received one text message from an individual asking if he could "bring a 60" and a text message from someone else asking for "2 nice grapes." Ex. Vol. 1 at 33, 36. Detective Tranchant testified that the language was slang for dealing in heroin and fentanyl and that a dealer would not refer to marijuana as "grapes[.]" Tr. Vol. 3 at 33.
[¶24] In light of the additional evidence that McKnight knew about and intended to deal the narcotics that were found in the motel room, we cannot conclude that the challenged evidence likely had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury. See, e.g., Echeverria v. State, 146 N.E.3d 943, 949 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (drug ledgers containing names, dates, and dollar amounts of prior drug transactions were admissible due to their "substantial probative value for purposes of establishing intent, identity, or even preparation, and while they might have some prejudicial effect, it does not outweigh their probative value"), trans. denied. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted McKnight's pre-June 8 text messages, videos, and photographs into evidence.
Section 2 - The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain McKnight's conviction for level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug.
[¶25] McKnight also argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for dealing in a narcotic drug because, according to McKnight, the State failed to prove that he constructively possessed the narcotics. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1191. Rather, we consider the evidence most favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. New v. State, 135 N.E.3d 619, 625 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). We further note that the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007). Instead, "the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict." Id.
[¶26] To convict McKnight of dealing in a narcotic drug, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed at least ten grams of heroin or fentanyl with the intent to deliver it. Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1(a)(2), -e(1). McKnight argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that he had constructive possession of the heroin and fentanyl found in the motel room. Possession can be either actual or constructive. Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over the contraband in question. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). When actual possession cannot be shown, such as in McKnight's case, then the conviction may instead rest on proof of constructive possession. Id. "A person constructively possesses contraband when the person has (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it." Id.
[¶27] Regarding the "capability" element of constructive possession, the State must show "that the defendant is able to reduce the controlled substance to the defendant's personal possession." Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). For the intent element, the State must demonstrate that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the substance. Id. Such knowledge "'may be inferred from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premise containing the contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband.'" Id. (quoting Taylor v. State, 482 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1985)). A non-exhaustive list of examples of possible "additional circumstances" showing knowledge may include:
(1) a defendant's incriminating statements; (2) a defendant's attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item's proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 175; see also Gee, 810 N.E.2d at 344 ("[T]he State is required to show that whatever factor or set of factors it relies upon in support of the intent prong of constructive possession ... demonstrate[] the probability that the defendant was aware of the presence of the contraband and its illegal character.").
[¶28] The evidence presented by the State established that McKnight had the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the heroin and fentanyl found in the motel room. Between May 28 and June 8, 2021, Detective Tranchant saw a car making multiple round trips between the Super 8 Motel and the Travel Inn. In the days leading up to McKnight's arrest on June 8, and on the day of his arrest, McKnight received text messages from individuals asking him if he had heroin or fentanyl to sell. He sent text messages responding in the affirmative and twice texted that he was at the Super 8 Motel. A video found on his phone showed a large greyish-white block, along with a digital scale. Detective Tranchant testified that, based on his experience, "[w]hen it comes to the [drug] dealer's cell phone, typically they'll have a lot of pictures with themselves, and their illegal product, whether that's drugs, guns, whatever they're dealing in. It's almost like a trophy shop [sic]." Tr. Vol. 2 at 190. When McKnight was arrested, the detectives found $3,200 on his person.
[¶29] The detectives determined that a room at the Super 8 Motel was registered under Thomas's name. Detective Tranchant testified that the room was a "typical hotel room [with] just one ... big opening with a couple of beds and a bathroom." Id. at 217. When the detectives searched the room, they found McKnight's birth certificate along with two digital scales. A powdery residue was found on one of the scales. The detectives also found a shoebox containing plastic baggies, torn pieces of aluminum foil, and plastic bags containing brown and white powdery substances. The shoebox sat on a shelf just below the top of a dresser in an easily accessible location. The powdery substances were determined to be 13.15 grams of fentanyl, 10.97 grams of para-fluorofentanyl, and a total of 89.69 grams of heroin mixed with fentanyl. Detective Tranchant testified that the weight of the narcotics was consistent with dealing, not personal use. See, e.g., Love v. State, 741 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) ("Possessing a large amount of a narcotic substance is circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver. The more narcotics a person possesses, the stronger the inference that he intended to deliver it and not consume it personally.") (quoting Berry v. State, 574 N.E.2d 960, 963 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991), trans. denied).
[¶30] Given all the evidence presented, a jury could reasonably determine that McKnight had the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control of the heroin and fentanyl found in the motel room. Therefore, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that McKnight constructively possessed the heroin and fentanyl found in the motel room and thus proved that he committed level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction.
[¶31] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.