Whether, when the probation of a first offender is revoked, the sentencing court must give the defendant credit for time served on probation when imposing sentence pursuant to conviction, and under what circumstances may language in the first-offender sentence alter that rule. See OCGA § 42-8-38 (c); OCGA § 42-8-60 (b); Stephens v. State, 245 Ga. 835 ( 268 S.E.2d 330) (1980); McKinney v. State, 240 Ga. App. 812 (3) ( 525 S.E.2d 395) (1999). This case involves several principles of law affecting probationers sentenced under the First Offender Act.

[Cit.]" McKinney v. State, 240 Ga. App. 812, 813 (1) ( 525 S.E.2d 395) (1999). Under the first offender statute, the case "has, in effect, been suspended" during the period of probation.

263 Ga.App. 620, 621–622, 588 S.E.2d 801 (2003). 12. Johnson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 425, 427(2), 641 S.E.2d 655 (2007); McKinney v. State, 240 Ga.App. 812, 815(2), 525 S.E.2d 395 (1999); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235 (2006) (recognizing, for purposes of statute mandating that a defendant serve not less than seventy-two hours of incarceration upon a second DUI conviction within a five-year period, that house arrest is a form of limited confinement); Royal Indem. Co. v. Agnew, 66 Ga.App. 377, 379, 18 S.E.2d 57 (1941) (any portion of a body of laws may well be invoked to ascertain the meaning of words and phrases used in another part). The General Assembly provided for the creation of programs of electronic pretrial release to, among other things, “[a]ssist[ ] sheriffs in alleviating jail overcrowding by creating alternative methods of pretrial release and monitoring and home confinement [.]...” Indeed, the General Assembly found that “a program of electronic pretrial release, monitoring, and home confinement incorporates modern technology to accomplish” various purposes.

Id. at 139, citing OCGA § 42-8-60 (a). Id. Accord McKinney v. State, 240 Ga. App. 812, 814 (2) ( 525 SE2d 395) (1999).Tallant, supra, citing OCGA § 42-8-34 (c).

OCGA § 42-8-65 (b). See Davis v. State, 273 Ga. 14, 16, n. 1 ( 537 SE2d 663) (2000); McKinney v. State, 240 Ga. App. 812, 813 (1) ( 525 SE2d 395) (1999). Id.

" (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McKinney v. State, 240 Ga. App. 812, 815 (2) ( 525 SE2d 395) (1999). Further, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) defines "incarceration" as imprisonment or confinement in a jail or penitentiary.

Like the privilege to drive in Nolen, Simile's situation deals with a privilege — the opportunity of obtaining a post-secondary education which is granted by the institutions of higher learning in this State to those deemed qualified. See McKinney v. State, 240 Ga. App. 812, 814(1) ( 525 S.E.2d 395) (1999) (being listed as a first offender in GCIC records is a privilege, suspension of which is not punishment); McGraw v. State, 230 Ga. App. 843, 844(2)(b) ( 498 S.E.2d 314) (1998) (license to drive grants privilege, suspension of which is not punishment); Thompson v. State, 229 Ga. App. 526, 528 ( 494 S.E.2d 306) (1997) (requiring payment of an administrative reinstatement fee after suspension of driver's license not punitive). Simile's situation is also similar to that in Clark v. State, 220 Ga. App. 251, 252 ( 469 S.E.2d 250) (1996).

Id. As explained in Davis , under Georgia law, a defendant who pleads guilty and is sentenced under the provisions of Georgia's First Offender Act is not convicted of that offense unless and until the court that imposed the sentence revokes defendant's first offender status and enters an adjudication of guilt. 537 S.E.2d at 665, n. 1 ("Only a court that imposed first offender probation has authority to revoke that status; it is the only legal authority that can formally adjudicate the offender.") (quoting McKinney v. State , 240 Ga.App. 812, 525 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1999) ); see alsoCook v. State , 338 Ga.App. 489, 790 S.E.2d 283, 290-91 (2016) (holding that defendant could not be sentenced as a recidivist because his first offender status had not yet been revoked and he was not a convicted felon at the time he committed the subsequent felony); Gunter v. State , 182 Ga.App. 548, 356 S.E.2d 276, 277 (1987) (holding that defendant was not "convicted" as there was no adjudication of guilt following his first offender plea and thus defendant was not precluded from possessing a firearm by statute prohibiting such possession by convicted felons). Pursuant to Georgia law, defendant was not convicted of simple robbery in Case No. 14-CR-3008, because defendant's first offender probation status was not revoked and no adjudication of guilt was entered by the Superior Court of Dekalb County, Georgia.

Johnson v. State, 226 Ga. App. 503, 504 ( 487 S.E.2d 90) (1997). See also McKinney v. State, 240 Ga. App. 812, 815 (2) (S.E.2d) (1999). Therefore, Yother's confinement was lawful, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a directed verdict.