Furthermore, because of the rather short statute of limitation period for filing tort actions, the beneficiaries of the new decision were a rather limited class. Divorce law, however, is a rather settled area of law, and there was no clear foreshadowing that the right to homemaker services could be recovered other than a general broadening of equitable principles in divorce actions. Pierce v. Pierce, supra, Marshall v. Marshall, supra; McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978); Dyer v. Tsapis, supra; Murredu v. Murredu, supra. In fact, in Patterson v. Patterson, supra, we indicated that the value of such services could not be obtained by way of the imposition of a constructive trust.
We also conclude that the trial court erred in ordering the husband to transfer the automobile to the wife. Our recent decision in McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1979), holding that a spouse in a divorce action may be ordered to give the other possession and use of an automobile and to convey its title, is distinguishable. In McKinney, the wife was awarded possession and title to one of the couple's two automobiles but this was only "for the purpose of making effectual that part of the final order granting to her custody of the minor children."
In a number of cases this Court has indicated that a trial court's jurisdiction in divorce cases is purely statutory and that a trial court possesses no powers in cases involving matters of property beyond those specifically conferred by statute. See, e.g., McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978); State ex rel. Hammond v. Worrell, 144 W. Va. 83, 106 S.E.2d 521 (1958). Recently in Segal v. Beard, 181 W. Va. 92, 380 S.E.2d 444 (1989), the Court examined the jurisdictional power of a trial court to modify an order settling the property rights of the parties to a divorce:
Selvy v. Selvy, 115 W. Va. 338, 341, 177 S.E. 437, 439 (1934), questioned on another point, LaRue v. LaRue, 172 W. Va. 158, 166 n. 10, 304 S.E.2d 312, 319 n. 10 (1983). See also McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 321, 251 S.E.2d 216, 217 (1978). W. Va. Code, 48-2-15(e) [1986] is the statute on proceedings for modification of divorce decrees held before a circuit court.
At the time this case was submitted for decision, the circuit court had only very limited power to order transfer of legal title in disposing of the marital estate of the parties to a divorce. See McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978); Patterson v. Patterson, supra. Since that time, however, the Legislature has substantially revised the domestic relations law of this State with respect to the division of marital property. 1984 W. Va. Acts, ch. 60. W. Va. Code ยง 48-2-32(d)(7)(A) (1986 Replacement Vol.) now authorizes a circuit court to "[d]irect either party to transfer their interest in specific property to the other party" in order to achieve equitable distribution of the marital estate.
"Code, 48-2-15, confers on a court in a divorce suit power to make any order or decree concerning the estate of the parties, or either of them, as it may deem expedient, only for the purpose of making effectual any order or decree made in the case relating to the maintenance of the parties, or the custody and maintenance of their children." Syllabus point 1, Simmons v. Simmons, 171 W. Va. 170, 298 S.E.2d 144 (1982), quoting, syllabus point 1, McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978). This Court has also recognized that questions relating to the maintenance of the parties or their children are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its rulings with respect to such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its discretion.
Our traditional rule in prohibition is that the writ will lie where the trial court does not have jurisdiction or having jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers. State ex rel. Arnold v. Egnor, 166 W. Va. 411, 275 S.E.2d 15 (1981); McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978). Although Monongahela is not entitled to an absolute rule since the plaintiffs may still pursue their de novo appeal, a moulded writ is issued preventing the trial on the new complaint as to Monongahela in the circuit court for an amount in excess of the $1,500 damage limit.
The appellant now contends that the trial court erred in: granting ownership of the jointly-owned household furnishings and livestock to the appellee; awarding her possession of the jointly-owned real estate; refusing to reconsider an excessively high alimony award; and, awarding a portion of his business and personal property to the appellee. "`Code, 48-2-15, confers on a court in a divorce suit power to make any order or decree concerning the estate of the parties, or either of them, as it may deem expedient, only for the purpose of making effectual any order or decree made in the case relating to the maintenance of the parties, or the custody and maintenance of their children.' Syllabus point 1, McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978)." Syl. pt. 1, Simmons v. Simmons, 171 W. Va. 170, 298 S.E.2d 144 (1982).
The first is found in W. Va. Code ยง 48-2-15 (1980 Replacement Vol.) which governs alimony, maintenance and custody of children. We discussed this statute in Syllabus Point 1, McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978), where we stated: Code, 48-2-15, confers on a court in a divorce suit power to make any order or decree concerning the estate of the parties, or either of them, as it may deem expedient, only for the purpose of making effectual any order or decree made in the case relating to the maintenance of the parties, or the custody and maintenance of their children.
This is the general rule and will continue to be the law. We have held, however, in the case of McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W. Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978), that title to personal property such as automobiles which have a short usable life may be transferred since such a transfer is merely the equivalent of an award of alimony. The case before us involves Mr. and Mrs. Patterson, a husband and wife who, according to evidence introduced by the wife, were, for practical purposes, business partners.