Opinion
No. CV 01-0453718 S
October 2, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In 1979, the plaintiff began her employment with the town of Hamden as an account clerk in its finance department. She remained in that department until 1991, when she accepted the newly-created position of account clerk in Hamden's police department. The plaintiff's responsibilities included, among other things, assisting the chief of police in the police department's budget preparations.
In April 2000, however, Hamden's legislative council passed a budget for the ensuing fiscal year that eliminated the plaintiff's position and salary from the police department's budget and transferred the plaintiff's position back to Hamden's finance department, as of July 1, 2000. According to the plaintiff, the legislative council passed this budget on the recommendation of Gagliardi and with the concurrence of Amento, both of whom, the plaintiff alleges, sought to exact revenge for her active and public support of various candidates in Hamden's 1997 and 1999 mayoral races.
Later, on June 7, 2000, Riccitelli, in his capacity as deputy chief of police, issued a letter of reprimand to the plaintiff in which he criticized her review of the police department's accounts, noting that her inaccurate projections embarrassed the office of the chief of police and forced the department to violate a labor agreement. Riccitelli also censured the plaintiff for her disrespectful attitude toward Donald Gray, a police department captain responsible for reviewing budget matters. Distressed by the letter, the plaintiff contacted Hamden's employee assistance program and was ultimately referred to a psychologist, who advised the plaintiff not to return to work.
On June 20, 2000, while the plaintiff was on sick leave, Riccitelli dispatched two police officers to the plaintiff's home to hand deliver a second letter of reprimand. In this letter, Riccitelli criticized the plaintiff for a second account shortfall based on her inaccurate projections and warned her that any future shortages would result in more serious disciplinary action. According to the plaintiff, Riccitelli issued the two letters of reprimand in retaliation for her opposition to the hiring of Riccitelli's stepdaughter as a temporary worker in Hamden's tax department, because it would have violated the union's contract with the town of Hamden.
Distraught by these events, the plaintiff remained on sick leave until her benefits ran out in December 2000, and, on January 26, 2001, the town of Hamden and Amento terminated the plaintiff's employment because she never returned to work. The plaintiff subsequently filed this ten-count complaint against the defendants, in which she alleges a violation of her right to free speech guaranteed by the United States and Connecticut constitutions, respectively (counts one and two); intentional infliction of emotional distress (counts three, four, and nine); a violation of her right to free speech, equal protection, and due process guaranteed by the United States constitution (counts five and six); defamation (count seven); a violation of her right to due process guaranteed by the United States constitution (count eight); and negligent infliction of emotional distress (count ten).
The plaintiff withdrew count ten, conceding that the Supreme Court's decision in Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 792 A. 26 752 (2002), "foreclose[s] plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, since she has not claimed termination or constructive discharge." (Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum, p. 14.)
The defendants move for summary judgment as to all ten counts of the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that: they are entitled to qualified immunity, immunity under General Statutes § 52-557n (a)(2)(A), legislative immunity, and conditional privilege; their conduct was neither extreme nor outrageous; the plaintiff's claims under the Connecticut constitution are not recognized in Connecticut; and the plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the United States constitution. In support, the defendants filed memoranda of law and the following exhibits: certified deposition transcript of John Ambrogio, a former chief of police; letter of reprimand, dated June 7, 2000; letter of reprimand, dated June 19, 2000; affidavit of James Hliva, Hamden's director of finance; certified deposition transcript of Nolan; certified deposition transcript of Riccitelli; certified deposition transcript of Evelyn Parise, legislative assistant to Hamden's legislative council; certified deposition transcript of Gagliardi; letter of reassignment, dated July 25, 2000. In opposition, the plaintiff filed memoranda of law, the affidavit of the plaintiff and the certified deposition transcript of Amento.
"[S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 251-52, 819 A.2d 773 (2003). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 252. "[A]lthough the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact . . . a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 252-53.
Count One
In count one, the plaintiff alleges that Amento and Gagliardi retaliated against her for engaging in speech protected under the first amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims that Amento and Gagliardi violated her free speech rights when, in retaliation for her support of various candidates in Hamden's 1997 and 1999 mayoral races, Gagliardi, with Amento's concurrence, recommended to the town council that it pass a budget that eliminated the plaintiff's position from the police department. The defendants move for summary judgment as to count one on the ground that the plaintiff's first amendment claim is inadequate as a matter of law, as there was no adverse employment action.
Section 1983 provides in part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ."
The Supreme Court has held that a public employee does not relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment . . . It also recognized that the state has an interest as an employer in regulating speech by employees so as to promote the efficiency of public services performed by its employees . . . Acknowledging the wide variety of fact situations where critical statements by a public employee may be thought to furnish grounds for dismissal, the Supreme Court has declined to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged . . . Instead, to assess the extent to which a state may regulate the speech of its employees, courts must balance the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees . . .
Before this balancing test is reached, a plaintiff making a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 must initially demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected, (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) a causal connection exists between his speech and the adverse employment determination against him, so that it can be said that his speech was a motivating factor in the determination . . . If a plaintiff establishes these three factors, the defendant has the opportunity to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same adverse employment action even in the absence of the protected conduct.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1999).
The defendants challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence as to the second element, i.e., the existence of an adverse employment decision. A plaintiff may prove an "adverse employment decision" either by presenting evidence of "the classic examples of discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, demotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand"; Phillips v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002); or by showing that "(1) using an objective standard; (2) the total circumstances of her working environment changed to become unreasonably inferior and adverse when compared to a typical or normal, not ideal or model, workplace . . . Incidents that are relatively minor and infrequent will not meet the standard, but otherwise minor incidents that occur often and over a longer period of time may be actionable if they attain the critical mass of unreasonable inferiority." Id.
In this case, the alleged adverse employment decision was the defendants' causing the plaintiff to be transferred from the police department to the finance department. "[A] transfer is an adverse employment action if it results in a change in responsibilities so significant as to constitute a setback to the plaintiff's career." Galabya v. New York City Board of Education, 202 F.3d 636, 641 (2d Cir. 2000); see also St. Ledger v. Area Co-op Educational Services, 228 F. Sup.2d 66, 74 (D.Conn. 2002) ("The defendants' transferring [the plaintiff] to a different position is a `classic example' of `adverse employment action,' if it truly was `adverse' to her"). In St. Ledger, the court addressed whether the defendants' transferring the plaintiff to another position constituted an adverse employment action. Applying the standard set forth in Galabya, the court stated that the plaintiff "has presented no evidence that her new position . . . was not materially less prestigious than her prior position . . . or a demotion, or less suited to [the plaintiff's] skills and expertise. [The plaintiff's] base salary, benefits, and opportunities for advancement also do not appear to have been affected. As well, it appears that the position was commensurate with her experience and qualifications . . . and there was no evidence presented of a material change in the nature of work she performed." St. Ledger v. Area Co-op Educational Services, supra, 74. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the alleged actions taken by the defendants constituted an adverse employment action. The court, therefore, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's first amendment retaliation claim. Id., 75.
Here, the defendants submit the affidavit of James Hliva, director of Hamden's finance department, in which he states that "[t]he duties and responsibilities of the Account Clerk were essentially unchanged following the transfer to the finance department" and that "[t]he compensation for the position of Account Clerk remained . . . unchanged when the position was transferred to the Finance Department . . ." (Defendant's Exhibit D.) The plaintiff, however, does not submit any evidence to show that her new position in the finance department was "materially less prestigious" than her position in the police department. Consequently, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision and, therefore, the plaintiff fails to satisfy the second element of a first amendment retaliation claim. Thus, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to count one.
Count Two
In count two, the plaintiff realleges the facts in count one and asserts that Amento and Gagliardi violated her right to free speech, as guaranteed by article first, §§ 1, 4, and 8 of the Connecticut constitution. The defendants move for summary judgment as to count two on the ground that the plaintiff's claims under the state constitution are not recognized in Connecticut.
"Not every constitutional right or relationship gives rise to tort liability for its violation. Compare, e.g., Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 627 A.2d 909 (1993) (no private cause of action based on violation of due process clause of state constitution, article first § 8), with Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 710 A.2d 688 (1998) (private cause of action based on violation of search and seizure provisions of state constitution, article first, §§ 7 and 9)." Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456, 493, 717 A.2d 1177 (1998). "[A]s a general matter, we should not construe our state constitution to provide a basis for the recognition of a private damages action for injuries for which the legislature has provided a reasonably adequate statutory remedy." Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, supra, 339.
Article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution provides: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." In Smith v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. X07 CV 98 070792 (July 14, 2000, Bishop, J.), the court concluded that "[s]ince the legislature has created an adequate statutory remedy in [General Statutes] § 31-51q which affords the protections of Article I § 4, the court does not find that there exists a separate constitutional claim for the violation of free speech." See also Hankard v. Avon, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 960565611 (June 22, 1999, Hale, J.) ("the court . . . decline[s] to recognize a cause of action under the state constitution for the alleged violation of the plaintiffs' right to speak freely since the legislature has provided an adequate remedy by statute"). This court follows these cases and similarly concludes that there is no private cause of action under article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim brought under article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution.
General Statutes § 31-51q provides in part: "Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge . . ."
The plaintiff's claim under article first, §§ 1 and 8, must also fail. Preliminarily, § 1, which prohibits the legislature from passing an act solely for the benefit of an individual without a public purpose, and § 8, which provides in part that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law," have no bearing on the alleged deprivation at issue, i.e., the plaintiff's right to free speech. Further, the Connecticut Supreme Court has expressly declined to recognize a private cause of action based on a violation of § 8, the due process clause of the Connecticut constitution; Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, supra, 226 Conn. 314; and "no appellate court or trial court in this state has recognized a cause of action for monetary damages under [article first, § 1] of the state constitution." Schlicht v. Royer, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. X03 CV 99 0509270 (December 3, 2002, Aurigemma, J.). "Since our Supreme Court has yet to recognize a cause of action for money damages for a deprivation of fundamental rights under article first, [§§ 1 or 8] of the state constitution, this court is without authority to do so." Best v. D'Amario-Rossi, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 99 0334718 (January 2, 2003, White, J.). Thus, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim brought under article first, §§ 1 and 8, of the Connecticut constitution.
Count Three
In count three, the plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress against Amento and the town of Hamden. The defendants move for summary judgment as to count three on the grounds that: (1) the defendants' conduct was not extreme or outrageous, and (2) the town of Hamden is immune from liability under General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2)(A).
General Statutes § 52-557n (a) provides in part: "(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct . . ."
In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe . . . Whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine . . . Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury . . .
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society . . . Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! . . . Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210-11, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).
In Appleton, the Supreme Court addressed the plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context, particularly whether the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous. In her affidavit, the plaintiff, a tenured teacher, claimed that one of the defendants" `made condescending comments to [her] in front of [her] fellow colleagues questioning [her] vision and ability to read'; telephoned the plaintiff's daughter, representing that the plaintiff `had been acting differently' and should take a few days off from work; and telephoned the police, who came to the school and escorted the plaintiff out of the building to her car. The plaintiff also asserted in her affidavit that she was subjected to two psychiatric examinations at the request of the board, and that she was forced to take a suspension and a leave of absence and, ultimately, forced to resign." Id., 211. The court stated that, although "[t]hese occurrences may very well have been distressing and hurtful to the plaintiff . . . [t]hey do not . . . constitute extreme and outrageous conduct . . ." Id. Thus, the court held that, "[a]s the defendants' actions were not so atrocious as to exceed all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, their conduct is insufficient to form the basis of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id., 212.
Here, in count three, the plaintiff alleges that Amento and the town of Hamden intentionally engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct in failing to notify her that the legislative council eliminated her position in the police department. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that a friend informed her of the council's action and that she "was shocked and horrified, and suffered severe emotional distress, when she learned in this manner that her position had been eliminated in the budget adopted by the Town of Hamden." (Complaint, Count Three, ¶ 30.) With Appleton as guidance, even assuming that the plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to support her allegations of the defendants' conduct, as a matter of law, the defendants' conduct was not "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 211. The court, therefore, grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count three.
Count Four
In count four, the plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress against Amento and the town of Hamden, claiming that, at the time the council transferred her position, Amento and the town of Hamden knew that she was one year from retirement and that she "could not work in the Finance Department because of a prior problem between the plaintiff and Patricia Riccitelli, a co-worker in that department and the wife of Carmen Riccitelli, which resulted in the plaintiff leaving the Finance Department a decade earlier." (Complaint, Count Four, ¶ 33.) The defendants move for summary judgment on the same grounds as set forth in count three, i.e., the defendants' conduct was not extreme or outrageous and the town of Hamden is immune from liability under § 52-557n (a)(2)(A).
In Dollard v. Board of Education, 63 Conn. App. 550, 777 A.2d 714 (2001), the Appellate Court considered whether the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment context. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged the following: "In 1998 and early 1999, the defendants jointly engaged in a concerted plan and effort to force the plaintiff to resign from her position or to become so distraught that they would have a colorable basis for terminating her employment. The defendants carried out their plan by hypercritically examining every small detail of her professional and personal conduct. Specifically, the defendants transferred the plaintiff to a school where she did not want to be assigned and then secretly hired someone to replace her at the school from which she had been transferred. The defendants also publicly admonished the plaintiff for chewing gum, being habitually late, being disorganized and not using her time well. Finally, the defendants unnecessarily placed the plaintiff under the intensive supervision of a friend of [one of the defendants]. The defendants ultimately forced the plaintiff to resign." (Emphasis added.) Id., 552-53. According to the court, the defendants' conduct "was no more extreme and outrageous than the conduct alleged in Appleton." Id., 555. The court concluded that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In the present case, even if the plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to support her allegations of the defendants' conduct, as a matter of law, the defendants' conduct was no more extreme than that alleged in Dollard. As noted in Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 757, 792 A.2d 752 (2002), albeit in the context of negligent infliction of emotional distress, "individuals reasonably should expect to be subject to . . . vicissitudes of employment, such as workplace gossip, rivalry, personality conflicts and the like." Because the alleged conduct cannot be characterized as extreme or outrageous, and, therefore, fails to satisfy the second element of the test for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count four.
Count Five
In count five, the plaintiff alleges that Riccitelli violated her rights to free speech, due process, and equal protection, and brings an action against Riccitelli in his individual capacity under CT Page 11032 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that, after an altercation with Captain Donald Gray, Riccitelli called the plaintiff into his office, refused her request for union representation, and issued her a letter of reprimand. The plaintiff further alleges that Riccitelli bypassed the chief of police by issuing the letter while the chief was on vacation and violated the procedures for issuing letters of reprimand to unionized employees set for in the union's contract with the town of Hamden. According to the plaintiff, Riccitelli took these actions in retaliation for her opposition to the hiring of Riccitelli's stepdaughter as a temporary worker in Hamden's tax department because it would have violated the union's contract with the town of Hamden. The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the United States constitution.
First Amendment
"[A] plaintiff making a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 must initially demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected, (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) a causal connection exists between his speech and the adverse employment determination against him, so that it can be said that his speech was a motivating factor in the determination . . . If a plaintiff establishes these three factors, the defendant has the opportunity to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same adverse employment action even in the absence of the protected conduct." Morris v. Lindau, supra, 196 F.3d 110.
The defendants challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence as to the existence of an adverse employment decision. A plaintiff may prove an "adverse employment decision" by presenting evidence of "the classic examples of discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, demotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand . . ." (Emphasis added.) Phillips v. Bowen, supra, 278 F.3d 109. Here, it is undisputed that Riccitelli issued a letter of reprimand to the plaintiff. Because a letter of reprimand constitutes a classical example of an adverse employment decision; id.; the plaintiff has satisfied the second element of a first amendment retaliation claim.
The plaintiff has not, however, presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action. "The causal connection must be sufficient to warrant the inference that the protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse employment action, that is to say, the adverse employment action would not have been taken absent the employee's protected speech . . . Causation can be established either indirectly by means of circumstantial evidence, for example, by showing that the protected activity was followed by adverse treatment in employment, or directly by evidence of retaliatory animus." (Citation omitted.) Morris v. Lindau, supra, 196 F.3d 110. "[A] plaintiff can indirectly establish a causal connection to support a discrimination or retaliation claim by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse [employment] action. Reed v. A.W. Lawrence Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (twelve days between alleged sexual harassment and discharge could suggest a causal relationship)." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop of Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001).
"This court has not drawn a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship between the exercise of a federal constitutional right and an allegedly retaliatory action. Compare Richardson v. New York State Dep't. of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1999) (abusive acts within one month of receipt of deposition notices may be retaliation for initiation of lawsuit more than one year earlier); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 769 (2d Cir. 1998) (discharge less than two months after plaintiff filed a sexual harassment complaint with management and ten days after filing complaint with state human rights office provided prima facie evidence of a causal connection between protected activity and retaliation); and Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (eight-month gap between EEOC complaint and retaliatory action suggested a causal relationship), with Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1990) (passage of three months too long to suggest a causal relationship between complaint and failure to provide good recommendation)." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop of Schenectady County, supra, 252 F.3d 554.
It is undisputed that Riccitelli issued the letter of reprimand to the plaintiff in June 2000. Further, in his deposition testimony, Riccitelli asserted that his stepdaughter worked for the town of Hamden approximately seventeen or eighteen years ago. (Defendants' Exhibit F, p. 35.) The plaintiff has not, however, presented any evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that Riccitelli's issuance of the letter of reprimand occurred in temporal proximity to the plaintiff's opposition to the hiring of Riccitelli's stepdaughter as a temporary worker to create a reasonable inference of a causal connection. See Petrario v. Cutler, 187 F. Sup.2d 26, 33 (D.Conn. 2002). Accordingly, because the plaintiff has not presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that Riccitelli retaliated against her for her opposition to the hiring of his stepdaughter, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's first amendment claim against Riccitelli.
Due Process
"Due process claims may take either of two forms: procedural due process or substantive due process. Procedural due process claims concern the adequacy of the procedure provided by the governmental body for the protection of liberty or property rights of an individual. Substantive due process claims, on the other hand, concern limits on governmental conduct toward an individual regardless of procedural protections." DeLeon v. Little, 981 F. Sup. 728, 734 (D.Conn. 1997).
As to procedural due process, "[a] plaintiff claiming due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment must possess a property or liberty interest that is somehow jeopardized by governmental action, necessitating a pre- or post-deprivation hearing as a safeguard . . . However, [t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions . . . An interest protected or cognizable under the due process clause must have a basis in existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 436, 673 A.2d 514 (1996).
"Thus, [p]roperty interests are more than abstract needs, desires or unilateral expectations of benefits or privileges. Rather, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit or privilege to have a property interest in that benefit . . . Property interests are not created by the Constitution, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 436-37.
Although the plaintiff may have had a constitutionally-protected property interest in continued employment, the plaintiff concedes that she was neither terminated nor constructively discharged. (Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum, p. 14.) Further, it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not suffer a loss of pay or benefits (Defendants' Exhibit E, p. 97); and that she was not demoted or suspended as a result of the letter (Defendants' Exhibit F, pp. 85-86). The issuance of a letter of reprimand, without more, does not deprive the plaintiff of a constitutionally-protected property interest. See Gillard v. Norris, 857 F.2d 1095, 1097-99 (6th Cir. 1988) (reprimand and three-day suspension did not deprive plaintiff of a property interest); Lowe v. Kansas City, Missouri Board of Police Commissioners, 841 F.2d 857, 858 (8th Cir. 1988) (placing letter of reprimand in officer's file did not deprive officer of protected property interest); Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1976) (transfer and recorded reprimand did not deprive appellant of a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment). Thus, the plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the alleged actions taken by Riccitelli deprived her of a constitutionally-protected property interest.
"Similarly . . . government acts defaming an individual implicate a liberty interest only where the individual suffers a related alteration of his legal status or deprivation of a right recognized under state law . . . Accordingly, damage to reputation alone is insufficient to establish a claim for harm to a liberty interest . . . [A] cognizable claim will lie [only] if a plaintiff can show loss of reputation plus some serious additional harm, such as loss of employment, as a result of defamatory remarks by a government official." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, supra, 236 Conn. 437.
As noted above, it is undisputed that the plaintiff never suffered a loss of wages or benefits, demotion, suspension, or termination as a result of the letter of reprimand. Moreover, the plaintiff does not present any evidence that the letter of reprimand "so stigmatized [her] as to make it unlikely that [she] will be able to obtain employment in [her] chosen field." Id., 441. Thus, the court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest, and, therefore, grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's procedural due process claim.
As to substantive due process, "[t]he Supreme Court has enunciated two alternative tests by which substantive due process is examined. Under the first test, the plaintiff must prove that the governmental body's conduct `shocks the conscience.'" DeLeon v. Little, supra, 981 F. Sup. 734. "[W]ith regard to [the] `shocks the conscience' test that [t]he acts must do more than offend some squeamishness or private sentimentalism . . .; they must be such as to offend even hardened sensibilities, or constitute force that is brutal and offensive to human dignity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 734-35. "[M]alicious and sadistic abuses of government power that are intended only to oppress or to cause injury and serve no legitimate government purpose unquestionably shock the conscience." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russo v. Hartford, 184 F. Sup.2d 169, 196 (D.Conn. 2002).
"A salient example of such abuse of power may be found in the very case in which the standard was first enunciated. In Rochin v. California, [ 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96, L.Ed. 183 (1952)], the United States Supreme Court held that the forced pumping of a suspect's stomach to retrieve evidence `shocked the conscience.' As the court described it, `[i]llegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents — this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.'" ATC Partnership v. Windham, 251 Conn. 597, 608, 741 A.2d 305 (1999).
Here, even if the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants engaged in the alleged conduct regarding the reprimand, as a matter of law, that conduct does not "shock the conscience." In fact, according to Nolan, Hamden's chief of police, Riccitelli, as deputy chief, "can issue a letter of reprimand to . . . employees, civilian or sworn . . . within [his] own division." (Defendants' Exhibit E, p. 68.) Further, when asked whether it was improper for Riccitelli to issue a letter of reprimand to the plaintiff without first consulting the chief of police, Nolan stated: "By policy and department rules and [regulations], no. By general operating procedures, where something of this nature should be brought to the attention of the person in charge, which is myself, yes." (Defendants' Exhibit E, p. 86-87.) Nolan also stated that, although he "would prefer that [he] be aware of these letters or anything of this nature" (Defendants' Exhibit E, p. 87.); Riccitelli did nothing "illegal or improper or in violation of the department rules or regulations . . ." (Defendants' Exhibit E, p. 87). Moreover, as to the plaintiff's allegation that Riccitelli issued the letter of reprimand in retaliation for her opposition to the hiring of Riccitelli's stepdaughter as a temporary worker in Hamden's tax department, the court has already found that the plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that Riccitelli's issuance of the letter of reprimand occurred in temporal proximity to the plaintiff's opposition to the hiring of Riccitelli's stepdaughter as a temporary worker to create a reasonable inference of a causal connection. Thus, although Riccitelli's alleged conduct may have been ill-advised, it cannot be said to "shock the conscience." See Catanzaro v. Weiden, 188 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff "must show that the government action was arbitrary, conscience-shocking, or oppressive in a constitutional sense, and not merely incorrect or ill-advised" [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]).
"Under the second test, the plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of an identified liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause." DeLeon v. Little, supra, 981 F. Sup. 734 . The court has already determined that the plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a constitutionally-protected property or liberty interest.
Because no issue of material fact exists as to the existence of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest, and because the plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that she was the subject of conduct that "shocks the conscience," the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's substantive due process claim.
Equal Protection
In count five, the plaintiff also alleges that Riccitelli violated her federal right of equal protection. Because the plaintiff has not alleged that she is a member of any protected class, the court assumes that her equal protection claim is based on a "class of one."
"The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat similarly situated people alike . . . `Although the prototypical equal protection claim involves discrimination against people based on their membership in a vulnerable class, we have long recognized that the equal protection guarantee also extends to individuals who allege no specific class membership but are nonetheless subjected to invidious discrimination at the hands of government officials.' . . . In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam), the Supreme Court recently affirmed the validity of such `class of one' claims `where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.' To prevail on a `class of one' equal-protection claim, plaintiff must `show, not only "irrational and wholly arbitrary" acts, but also intentional disparate treatment.'" (Citations omitted.) Barstow v. Shea, 196 F. Sup.2d 141, 148 (D.Conn. 2002). "Moreover, we are to afford governmental decisions `a strong presumption of validity.' Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). A governmental decision should be upheld if there is `any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis' for the different treatment. Id." Galligan v. Town of Manchester, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:01 CV 2092 (D.Conn. May 19, 2003).
In this case, although the plaintiff alleges that "there was no legitimate basis for the Letter of Reprimand in that the plaintiff had not been insubordinate" (Complaint, Count Five, ¶ 41); the plaintiff does not dispute that she had an altercation with Captain Gray or that her budget projections resulted in account shortfalls. Rather, the plaintiff argues that issues of material fact exist as to "whether [the plaintiff] was actually insubordinate to Captain Gray, [and] whether the budgetary projections she made were intolerably inaccurate . . ." (Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum, pp. 6-7.) These considerations are irrelevant to the determination of whether Riccitelli had a rational basis for issuing the letter of reprimand. According to Riccitelli, the letter of reprimand is based upon information provided to him by Captain Grey, the police department supervisor responsible for reviewing budget matters. (Defendants' Exhibit F, p. 60.) Thus, even assuming that Riccitelli treated the plaintiff differently, the plaintiff has failed to present evidence that would establish that such treatment was irrational and wholly arbitrary or without legitimate reason. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's equal protection claim.
Count Six
In count six, the plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Riccitelli violated her rights to free speech, due process, and equal protection, by sending two police officers to her home, while she was on sick leave, to deliver a second letter of reprimand, in which Riccitelli accuses the plaintiff of malfeasance in the performance of her duties and threatens her with suspension. According to the plaintiff, Riccitelli issued the letters of reprimand in retaliation for her opposition to the hiring of Riccitelli's stepdaughter as a temporary worker in Hamden's tax department because it would have violated the union's contract with the town of Hamden. The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the United States Constitution.
First Amendment
In accordance with the discussion in count five, the plaintiff's first amendment retaliation claim must fail. Although the letter of reprimand constitutes an "adverse employment decision"; Phillips v. Bowen, supra, 278 F.3d 109; the plaintiff has not presented any evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that Riccitelli's issuance of the letter of reprimand occurred in temporal proximity to the plaintiff's opposition to the hiring of Riccitelli's stepdaughter as a temporary worker to create a reasonable inference of a causal connection. See Petrario v. Cutler, supra, 187 F. Sup.2d 33. Accordingly, because the plaintiff has not presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that Riccitelli retaliated against her for her opposition to the hiring of his stepdaughter, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's first amendment retaliation claim against Riccitelli.
Due Process
The court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's due process claim for the same reasons articulated in the court's due process discussion in count five.
Equal Protection
The plaintiff also alleges that Riccitelli violated her right of equal protection. The court assumes that her equal protection claim is based on a "class of one." "[T]he Supreme Court recently affirmed the validity of such `class of one' claims `where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.' To prevail on a `class of one' equal-protection claim, plaintiff must `show, not only "irrational and wholly arbitrary" acts, but also intentional disparate treatment.'" Barstow v. Shea, supra, 196 F. Sup. 148. According to Riccitelli, he issued the second letter of reprimand after Captain Grey informed him that there was a shortfall in crossing guard account. (Defendants' Exhibit F, pp. 71-74.) The plaintiff does not contest that there was a shortfall; rather, she claims that an issue of material fact exists as to whether the "budgetary projections were intolerably inaccurate . . ." (Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum, p. 7.) Further, according to Hamden's chief of police, it is the police department's practice to have an internal affairs officer hand deliver letters of reprimand to police department employees who are absent from work. (Defendants' Exhibit E, p. 85.) Thus, the plaintiff's equal protection claim must fail as the plaintiff has failed to present evidence that would establish that such treatment was irrational and wholly arbitrary or without legitimate reason. See Galligan v. Town of Manchester, supra, Docket No. 3:01 CV 2092 ("A governmental decision should be upheld if there is `any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis' for the different treatment"). Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's equal protection claim.
Count Seven
In count seven, the plaintiff alleges defamation against Riccitelli and the town of Hamden. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Riccitelli made false statements in the letters of reprimand he issued to the plaintiff, made the statements with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard for the truth, placed the letters in the plaintiff's personnel file, and did so in his capacity as an employee of the town of Hamden. The defendants move for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's defamation count on the grounds that the statements in the letters of reprimand were true and, even if the statements were defamatory, they were conditionally privileged. The defendants also argue that the town of Hamden is immune from liability under § 52-557n (a)(2)(A). The plaintiff responds that the letters of reprimand are factually inaccurate and that Riccitelli may not avail himself of the conditional privilege because the letters were made in bad faith.
To prevail on a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove "that the defendants published false statements that harmed the [plaintiff], and that the defendants were not privileged to do so." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 27, 662 A.2d 89 (1995). "In a civil action for libel, where the protected interest is personal reputation, the rule in Connecticut is that the truth of an allegedly libelous statement of fact provides an absolute defense." Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 112, 438 A.2d 1317 (1982).
The plaintiff has presented evidence suggesting that the following statement in the June 7, 2000 letter of reprimand was false: "What disturbs me more is your attitude towards Captain Gray and the fact that you told him to figure out the shortage for the last holiday himself." In her affidavit, the plaintiff asserts that "Captain Gray became agitated, screamed at me, banged his fist on a desk, and slammed a stapler on the desk. He then demanded that I `refigure' the budget amounts to eliminate the shortfall. (Plaintiff's Exhibit A.) According to the plaintiff, "I immediately left Captain Gray's office, returned to my own office, and began shaking and crying." In light of this evidence, the court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the truth of Riccitelli's statement.
The defendants argue, however, that the statement Riccitelli made cannot support a cause of action for defamation because it is a statement of opinion. "[T]he statement in question must convey an objective fact, as generally, a defendant cannot be held liable for expressing a mere opinion." Daley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 795, 734 A.2d 112 (1999). "A statement can be defined as factual if it relates to an event or state of affairs that existed in the past or present and is capable of being known . . . In a libel action, such statements of fact usually concern a person's conduct or character . . . An opinion, on the other hand, is a personal comment about another's conduct, qualifications or character that has some basis in fact." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., supra, 188 Conn. 111. Although "this distinction [between fact and opinion] may be somewhat nebulous . . . [t]he important point is whether ordinary persons hearing or reading the matter complained of would be likely to understand it as an expression of the speaker's or writer's opinion, or as a statement of existing fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 111-12.
Riccitelli's statement can be characterized as a statement of fact and, therefore, can support a cause of action for defamation. At a minimum, Riccitelli's statement suggests that it is based on fact, and, therefore, raises a genuine issue of material fact. As noted by the Supreme Court, "[w]here the court cannot reasonably characterize the allegedly libelous words as either fact or opinion because, for example, innuendo is present, this becomes an issue of fact for the jury, which would preclude a directed verdict." Id., 112 n. 5.
The defendants argue, in the alternative, that Riccitelli's statements were conditionally privileged. "The defendants must sufficiently prove five prerequisites in order to establish the defense of . . . conditional [privilege] claimed by them. The essential elements are (1) an interest to be upheld, (2) a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, (3) good faith, (4) a proper occasion, and (5) a publication in a proper manner to proper parties only." Miles v. Perry, 11 Conn. App. 584, 595, 529 A.2d 199 (1987). As explained by the Supreme Court, "[t]here are two facets to the defense of privilege. The occasion must be one of privilege, and the privilege must not be abused. Whether the occasion is one of privilege is a question of law . . . [W]hether the privilege was abused . . . depends upon whether there was malice in fact . . . in uttering and broadcasting the alleged defamatory matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 234 Conn. 28.
As to the first facet, "[a] qualified . . . privilege arises out of an `occasion,' such as, when one acts in the bona fide discharge of a public or private duty." Miles v. Perry, supra, 11 Conn. App. 594 n. 8. "[C]ommunications between managers regarding the review of an employee's job performance . . . are protected by a qualified privilege. Such communications . . . are necessary to effectuate the interests of the employer in efficiently managing its business." Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 234 Conn. 29. Here, the defendants have produced evidence, not refuted by the plaintiff, indicating that the letters of reprimand were issued in circumstances that satisfy the "occasion" facet.
As to the second facet, whether Riccitelli abused the privilege, however, the court finds that summary judgment is inappropriate. A qualified privilege "does not protect a defendant who makes statements that are both defamatory and malicious." Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 545, 733 A.2d 197 (1999). A privilege is abused if the defendant "made the statement about the plaintiff with actual malice — that is, with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard as to its truth." Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 234 Conn. 29. Thus, "[e]ven when a legitimate interest is at stake, a claim of conditional privilege is defeated if the defendant acts with malice in making the defamatory communication at issue. For purposes of our law of defamation, malice is not restricted to hatred, spite or ill will against a plaintiff, but includes any improper or unjustifiable motive." Bleich v. Ortiz, CT Page 11042 196 Conn. 498, 504, 493 A.2d 236 (1985). The issue of "whether the privilege is . . . defeated through its abuse is a question of fact to be decided by the jury." Id., 501; see also Miles v. Perry, supra, 11 Conn. App. 594 n. 8 ("It is a question of fact for a court or a jury, however, to determine whether the defendant has abused a conditional privilege"). The court, therefore, denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Riccitelli. As to the town of Hamden, however, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment, because § 52-557n (a)(2)(A) specifically exempts the town of Hamden from liability for the wilful, i.e., intentional, deliberate, reckless and malicious, misconduct of its employees.
General Statutes § 52-557n (a)(2) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct . . ."
Count Eight
In count eight, the plaintiff alleges that Amento and the town of Hamden violated her due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants' claim that the plaintiff's transfer from the police department to the finance department was part of a nondiscriminatory reorganization was a pretext for actual discrimination. The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that Amento and the town of Hamden did not deprive the plaintiff of a constitutionally-protected interest.
As to procedural due process, the plaintiff's counsel asserted that the plaintiff was deprived of her liberty interest in her first amendment right to free speech. In count one, however, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's first amendment claim, concluding that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision. Accordingly, because this court has already granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's first amendment claim in count one (which, as with count eight, is premised on the plaintiff's transfer), the plaintiff cannot prevail on its due process claim by way of her right to free speech. See LaFlamme v. Essex Junction School District, 170 Vt. 475, 482, 750 A.2d 993 (2000) ("with regard to the infringement of his free speech, [the plaintiff] presented that issue to the jury and lost. He cannot prevail on a due process claim by way of a violation of his right to free speech if the jury found that no such violation in fact occurred."). Thus, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's procedural due process claim.
With regard to substantive due process, "[u]nder the first [substantive due process] test, the plaintiff must prove that the governmental body's conduct `shocks the conscience.'" DeLeon v. Little, supra, CT Page 11043 981 F. Sup. 734. Even if the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to show that the Amento and the town of Hamden engaged in the alleged conduct, as a matter of law, that conduct does not "shock the conscience." Transferring the plaintiff to a different position, with no loss of pay or status, is "a far cry from the stomach pumping of Rochin . . ." ATC Partnership v. Windham, supra, 251 Conn. 609.
"Under the second test, the plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of an identified liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause." DeLeon v. Little, supra, 981 F. Sup. 734 . As stated above, the plaintiff was allegedly deprived of her liberty interest in her first amendment right to free speech. The first amendment, however, provides "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against [this] particular sort of government behavior"; ATC Partnership v. Windham, supra, 251 Conn. 610; and, therefore, "that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing [this claim]." Id.
Because an "explicit textual source of constitutional protection" exists against the type of governmental misconduct alleged by the plaintiff, and because the plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that she was the subject of conduct that "shocks the conscience," the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's substantive due process claim.
Count Nine
In count nine, the plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress against Riccitelli. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Riccitelli engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct by issuing two unfounded letters of reprimand and by sending a police officer to her house while she was on sick leave to hand deliver the second letter of reprimand. According to the plaintiff, Riccitelli took these actions in retaliation for her opposition to the hiring of Riccitelli's stepdaughter as a temporary worker in Hamden's tax department. The defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that Riccitelli's conduct was not extreme or outrageous.
One element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is that the conduct alleged must be "extreme and outrageous." Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 210. In Muniz v. Kravis, 59 Conn. App. 704, 709, 757 A.2d 1207 (2000), "[i]n support of her claim that the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had sent an armed security guard to notify her and her husband of their termination of employment and had given them only twenty-four hours to leave the premises. This happened at a time when the plaintiff was on vacation and when her husband was recovering from a planned surgery. The plaintiff claimed that this caused her great emotional distress and anguish." The court concluded that "[w]hile there are no Connecticut cases with facts exactly similar to those in this case, it is clear that there is liability only for `conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society . . .'" Id. As the court concluded that the plaintiff's allegations did not meet this threshold standard, the court held that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id., 711
In the present case, Riccitelli's conduct is no more extreme and outrageous than that alleged in Muniz. As a matter of law, the defendants' conduct was not "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 211. "Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count nine.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to counts one through six, eight, and nine, and denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count seven.
The Court
By Gilardi, J.