Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV614-064
09-03-2014
JAMES ALLEN McKENZIE, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN STANLEY WILLIAMS; CERT. OFFICER ATTICAL; SERGEANT GRIFFIN; and OFFICER SANTIAGO, Defendants.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Macon State Prison in Oglethorpe, Georgia, filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his confinement while he was housed at Smith State Prison in Glennville, Georgia. A prisoner proceeding in a civil action against officers or employees of government entities must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. In determining compliance, the court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires a district court to screen the complaint for cognizable claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The court must dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2).
In Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical to that contained in the screening provisions at § 1915A(b). As the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to prisoner complaints filed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in Mitchell interpreted § 1915(e), its interpretation guides this court in applying the identical language of § 1915A.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Arrical, Griffin, and Santiago conducted a search of his cell and confiscated several items of his personal property. Plaintiff contends that not all of his property was returned to him, and he filed a grievance about his missing property. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Williams granted his grievance, but the $100 he was awarded was insufficient compensation.
In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him "of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was committed by "a person acting under color of state law." Id.
The intentional deprivation of property gives rise to a due process clause violation when the government fails to provide an adequate post deprivation remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1, Georgia has created a civil cause of action for the wrongful deprivation of personal property. See Bvrd v. Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, 555 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987). As the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's property occurred in Georgia, Georgia law provides the appropriate remedy.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is my RECOMMENDATION that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED based on his failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 3th day of September, 2014.
/s/_________
JAMES E. GRAHAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE