Opinion
2023-CA-0073-MR
09-20-2024
CHARLES DAVID MCKENZIE APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Charles McKenzie, pro se Moore Haven, Florida BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Russell Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky J. Grant Burdette Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE JAY B. DELANEY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 03-CR-00009
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Charles McKenzie, pro se Moore Haven, Florida
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Russell Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky J. Grant Burdette Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; A. JONES AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
OPINION
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE
Charles David McKenzie appeals from an order which denied his motion to declare his sentence of parole satisfied. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 30, 2004, Appellant was sentenced to eight years in prison pursuant to a guilty plea. Appellant was then granted shock probation on April 16, 2004. On September 20, 2006, Appellant's probation was revoked and his original sentence imposed. Appellant was then paroled on December 19, 2007. At some point after he was paroled, Appellant was allowed to move to Florida and have his parole supervised by the State of Florida. This was done under the terms of the Interstate Compact of Adult Offender Supervision ("ICAOS").
In 2010, Appellant was charged with multiple felonies in Florida and was ultimately sentenced to eighteen years in prison. During the pendency of his Florida criminal case, the State of Florida informed Kentucky parole officials of the new criminal charges. The Kentucky Parole Board then revoked his parole. Once Appellant completes his sentence in Florida, he will be returned to Kentucky to serve out the remainder of his eight-year sentence.
On September 13, 2022, Appellant filed the underlying motion and requested that the court deem his prison sentence satisfied due to him spending eighteen years in prison in Florida. He argued that this prison term in Florida would exceed the prison term he would have to serve in Kentucky; therefore, his Kentucky sentence should be deemed satisfied. He made this request pursuant to ICAOS Rule 5.101-2. The trial court denied his motion and this appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by using Kentucky law, specifically Kentucky Revised Statutes ("KRS") 533.060(2), to deny his motion instead of relying on the language of Rule 5.101-2. Appellant claims he is entitled to have his Kentucky sentence be deemed satisfied pursuant to the ICAOS rule. We disagree with Appellant's arguments.
ICAOS Rule 5.101-2 is titled, "Discretionary process for disposition of violation in the sending state for a new crime conviction," and states:
https://interstatecompact.org/icaos-rules/chapter/ch5/rule-5-101-2 (last visited Sep. 17, 2024).
Notwithstanding any other rule, a sentence imposing a period of incarceration on an offender convicted of a new crime which occurred outside the sending state during the compact period may satisfy or partially satisfy the sentence imposed by the sending state for the violation committed. This requires the approval of the sentencing or releasing authority in the sending state and consent of the offender.
(a) Unless waived by the offender, the sending state shall conduct, at its own expense, an electronic or in-person violation hearing.
(b) The sending state shall send the violation hearing results to the receiving state within 10 business days.
(c) If the offender's sentence to incarceration for the new crime fully satisfies the sentence for the violation imposed by the sending state for the new crime, the sending state is no longer required to retake if Rules 5.102and 5.103 apply.
(d) If the offender's sentence to incarceration for the new crime only partially satisfies the sentence for the violation imposed by the sending state for the new crime, the sending state is required to retake if Rules 5.102 and 5.103apply.
(e) The receiving state may close the case under Rule 4.112 (a)(3).
Applying this rule to this case, this rule allows a sentencing or releasing authority to deem a previous sentence satisfied if the length of the new sentence would satisfy the length of the previous sentence. In other words, this rule does exactly what Appellant argues it does; however, it is not mandatory, it is discretionary. The title of the rule indicates it is a discretionary process and the language in the rule states that a new sentence "may satisfy" an old sentence. It also requires the approval of the sentencing or releasing authority. All of this indicates it is discretionary.
The Commonwealth argues, amongst other things, that the trial court in this case was the incorrect "sentencing or releasing authority" for Appellant to request relief from. The Commonwealth argues Appellant should have made the underlying request to the Kentucky Department of Corrections because it was this entity that released him on parole. This issue was not raised in the trial court. Because we are affirming the court's judgment, we will assume the Mason Circuit Court was the proper "sentencing or releasing authority" in this instance.
In this case, the trial court cited KRS 533.060(2) as to why it was denying Appellant's motion. KRS 533.060(2) states:
When a person has been convicted of a felony and is committed to a correctional detention facility and released on parole or has been released by the court on probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge, and is convicted or enters a plea of guilty to a felony committed while on parole, probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge, the person shall not be eligible for probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge and the period of confinement for that felony shall not run concurrently with any other sentence.
While Appellant moved to have his Kentucky sentence deemed satisfied pursuant to the ICAOS rule, he was in effect asking for his Kentucky sentence to run concurrently with his Florida sentence. The trial court acknowledged the ICAOS rule in its opinion, but believed that granting the motion would be inappropriate due to KRS 533.060(2). The trial court concluded that this statute indicates Kentucky prefers to give stiff penalties to those who violate their parole by committing another felony; therefore, the court declined to exercise its discretion and denied Appellant's motion.
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of rules and statutes are issues of law that we review de novo. Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 417 S.W.3d 762, 764 (Ky. App. 2013). We also review discretionary issues under the abuse of discretion standard. "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Based on these principles, we conclude that the trial court did not err in this case. The trial court's decision to deny Appellant's motion was not unreasonable due to Kentucky's preference that those people who violate their parole by committing a new felony should be required to serve out their sentence without the benefit of concurrent sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
ALL CONCUR.