3) [t]he issue in the first action must have been resolved by a final judgment on the merits. Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co., 794 P.2d 949, 951 (Alaska 1990) (quoting McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989)). Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co., 794 P.2d 949, 951 (Alaska 1990) (quoting McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989)).
Each is calculated differently, and not all require proof of lost earning capacity. McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Alaska 1989); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Grant, 693 P.2d 872, 876 (Alaska 1985); London v. Fairbanks Mun. Utils., Employers Group, 473 P.2d 639, 642 (Alaska 1970). However, the purpose of all workers' compensation law is partial reimbursement for loss of earning capacity due to injury. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352, 357 (Alaska 1979); Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264, 266 (Alaska 1974).
The applicability of collateral estoppel to a given set of facts is a question of law subject to independent review. McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1170-73 (Alaska 1989); Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148, 1153-56 (Alaska 1987); Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370, 374-79 (Alaska 1970). B. Applicability of Doctrine.
Here Parsons was self-represented and had filed an ambiguous request to "reopen" her case. Her request was barred by res judicata only if it was intended to be a new written claim for the benefits she had already sought unsuccessfully in 2010-11. McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1170-71 (Alaska 1989); see also Robertson v. Am. Mech., Inc., 54 P.3d 777, 779-80 (Alaska 2002) (applying res judicata to bar an amended claim filed shortly after Board decided original claim). Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen, 919 P.2d 158, 163 (Alaska 1996).
Sengupta v. Univ. of Alaska, 21 P.3d 1240, 1253 (Alaska 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Pirela v. Vill. of N. Aurora, 935 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1991)). Robertson v. Am. Mech., Inc., 54 P.3d 777, 779-80 (Alaska 2002) (citing McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989)). Rosales's arguments that res judicata should not bar his second petition to set aside the settlement and his new workers' compensation claim rest on his assertion that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim.
None of the cases deals with a request for remand to an administrative agency during the course of an appeal to the superior court. Robertson v. Am. Mech., Inc., 54 P.3d 777, 779-80 (Alaska 2002) (citing McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989)).See State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Carlson, 65 P.3d 851, 874 (Alaska 2003).
But when the courts evaluate an agency interpretation of a statute using the reasonable basis test, we do not accept the agency's interpretation as binding and do not use the same analysis to overrule an agency's interpretation of a statute that we use to overrule a legal precedent that we have established.Robertson v. Am. Mech., Inc., 54 P.3d 777, 779-80 (Alaska 2002) (citing McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989)).Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 152 P.3d 460, 468 (Alaska 2007); see Jeffries v. Glacier State Tel. Co., 604 P.2d 4, 8-9 (Alaska 1979).
It requires that "(1) the 8 prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the prior judgment, and (3) the same cause of action and same parties or their privies were involved in both suits."McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989).State v. Smith, 720 P.2d 40, 41 (Alaska 1986).
Whether CSED had the statutory authority to disestablish paternity is a question of law subject to de novo review. Hertz v. Carothers, 784 P.2d 659, 660 (Alaska 1990); McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1170 (Alaska 1989). The superior court held that since CSED knew of the dissolution decree and was aware of Wetherelt's claim that he had a vasectomy prior to his marriage to Mary, it "would have been up to CSED and Ms. Lake to establish a relationship of parent and child in order for CSED to proceed reasonably. . . . [T]he collection of funds by CSED in light of the evidence before them, without making the paternity determination, was an abuse of their discretion."
3) [t]he issue in the first action must have been resolved by a final judgment on the merits.Id. (quoting McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989)). While the first requirement (identical parties) is clearly met, the second requirement (same issues) is contested in this case.