The cited cases, however, deal with claims against state agencies, counties, school boards, etc., and involve public official immunity under state tort claims acts. See e.g., Urquhart v. Univ. Health Sys. of E.Carolina, Inc., 151 N.C.App. 590, 566 S.E.2d 143, 145 (2002); Paquette v. County of Durham, 155 N.C.App. 415, 573 S.E.2d 715, 719 (2002); McKagen v. Windham, 59 S.C. 434, 38 S.E.2d (1901). The present case, however, does not involve tort claims immunity.
C. 513: Opinion evidence of defendant as expertoperator improperly rejected: 90 S.C. 271; 1 McM., 51 19 S.C. 70; 57 S.C. 448; 92 S.C. 338; 92 S.C. 304, 100 S.C. 367; 12 Enc. L., 458: Liability of bottler of beverages: 179 S.W. 155. Messrs. Gaston, Hamilton Gaston and Hart Moss, for respondent, cite: When negligence may be inferred fromcircumstances: 54 S.E., 391; Ann. Cas., 1916-B, 572; 145 S.E., 14; 150 S.E., 198; 147 S.C. 487; 144 S.E., 395; 87 S.C. 178; Pure Food Law, 2 Code 1922, Sec. 398; Violationraised presumption of negligence: 140 S.C. 123; 108 S.C. 390; 118 S.C. 333; 76 S.C. 145: Case properlysubmitted to jury: 143 S.C. 286; 148 S.C. 69: Inferencethat state of affairs existing at a certain time may be reenforcedby evidence that it continued to exist subsequently: 22 C.J., "Evidence". Par., 29, 30; 40 Mich., 545; 137 S.C. 319; 87 S.C. 178: Testimony of other instances admissiblein reply to plaintiff's contention as to condition ofhis plant: 74 N.W., 277; 31 Cyc., 684, 682; 59 S.C. 434; 137 S.C. 319: Admissibility of opinion evidence: 74 S.C. 102; 12 A. E. Enc. L., 2d. Ed., 481: Rejection of cumulativeevidence not error: 83 S.C. 58; 33 S.C. 190: 69 S.C. 160; 83 S.C. 68; 90 S.C. 25; 86 S.C. 539; 52 S.C. 1; 60 S.C. 9: Liability of master for acts of servant: 121 S.C. 407; 120 S.C. 511: When Supreme Court willdisturb verdict: 88 S.C. 308; 131 S.C. 247; 145 S.C. 196; 103 S.C. 102; 140 S.C. 123. August 14, 1930.
and if the view is obstructedthe driver of the machine should stop, look and listen beforegoing on the track, and his failure so to do is such negligenceon his part as will defeat a recovery: 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 794; Ann. Cases 1913b, 697, and notes on page 681. VIII. The Court will take judicial notice of unquestionedlaws of nature and established principles of scienceand where the testimony is opposed to well established andunquestioned laws of nature and scientific facts will disregardthe testimony: 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 648, 650; 152 Ind. 607; 46 L.R.A. 33; 53 N.E. 415; Elliott on Evidence, paragraph 39. Messrs. Featherstone McGhee and Tillman Mays, for respondent, cite: As to wilfulness: 91 S.C. 546. As tocharge with reference to flagman: 33 Cyc. 1102; 104 U.S. ( 36 L.Ed. 485); 100 Am. Dec. 413; 3 Elliott, Railroads, sec. 1157; 37 Am. Rep. 444; 57 Am. St. Rep. 772; 8 A. E. Enc. of L. 417 and 418; 72 S.C. 389; 65 S.C. 214; 10 Rich. 227; 57 S.C. 205; 52 S.C. 323; 58 S.C. 70; 47 S.C. 28; 59 S.C. 434. As to motion for new trial: 14 S.C. 428 and 517; 33 S.C. 401. October 20, 1916.
Action by George Thomas Whaley against Eugene F. Ostendorff and John H. Doscher, Jr. Plaintiff appeals. Messrs. Logan Grace, for appellant, cite: The violationof a city ordinance in running an automobile is negligenceper se: 83 S.C. 454; 84 S.C. 539; 85 S.C. 25; 59 S.C. 434. Messrs. Mitchell Smith, contra, cite: Plaintiff is confinedto acts of negligence alleged: 76 S.C. 561. If there beno evidence to which an instruction can apply, it is notharmful: 74 S.C. 103; 72 S.C. 355; 75 S.C. 312; 72 S.C. 162; 70 S.C. 315; 69 S.C. 387. Opinion evidence mustyield to facts: Huddy on Auto. 156; 44 At. R. 964; 82 N.Y. Supp. 485; 78 S.C. 472. Nonsuit may be granted forcontributory negligence: 78 S.C. 374; 77 S.C. 328. Errorin stating issues is not reversible, unless the Court's attentionis called to it: 75 S.C. 560; 74 S.C. 102; 76 S.C. 1; 63 S.C. 520; 70 S.C. 148. If jury were not misled bywhole charge it was not error: 87 S.C. 169; 75 S.C. 560. If party desires terms particularly defined he mustpresent request therefor: 76 S.C. 382; 74 S.C. 319. Automobilesshould be dealt with on the highways as othervehicles: Huddy on Auto. 29, 113; 65 At. 778; 110 N Y Supp. 1040; 87 S.C. 144. Particular principle of law mustbe requested: 86 S.C. 64; 69 S.C. 555. There was no evid
54 S.C. 505; 60 S.C. 74; 51 S.C. 170; 65 S.C. 326; 69 S.C. 445; 75 S.C. 160; 62 S.C. 270; 64 S.C. 423; 68 S.C. 89. There was no legal duty on conductor to assist plaintiff: 27 S.C. 268; 46 S.C. 218; 53 S.C. 203. Interveningnegligence of the one assisting the passenger off wasthe proximate cause of the injury: 1 Thomp. on Neg., sec. 55; 1 Cool. on Torts, 99; 21 Ency., 485; Whitis, Thomp. on Neg., sec. 54; Watson on Dam. for Personal Injuries, sec. 70; 7 A. E.R.R. Cas., N.S., 359; 94 U.S. 469; 12 Kan., 277; 95 Pa. St., 295; 62 Kan., 727; 65 Kan., 390; 58 L.R.A. 403; 117 Pa., 390; 149 Pa., 222; 27 L.R.A., 583; 85 Pac. R., 686; 111 Mass. 136; 51 N.E., 1; 145 Fed.R., 273; 67 S.C. 68; 76 S.C. 202. Standard ofNegligence: 20 S.C. 219; 27 S.C. 271. Usual stoppingplace is for jury: 61 S.C. 357. Judge cannot charge as tofact, nor state what facts constitute negligence: 51 S.C. 460; 47 S.C. 488; 49 S.C. 650; 50 S.C. 168; 53 S.C. 151, 451; 54 S.C. 509; 56 S.C. 531, 399; 57 S.C. 340; 58 S.C. 329; 59 S.C. 434; 61 S.C. 563; 63 S.C. 494; 71 S.C. 159; 76 S.C. 63. Messrs. Buchanan and Hanahan, contra, cite: Presumptionis against capacity in infant: 66 S.C. 47; 62 S.C. 132. The proof supports punitive damages: 54 S.C. 498; 34 S.C. 311; 53 S.C. 210; 72 S.C. 350; 76 S.C. 248. Doster v. Tel. Co. Capacity and discretion of one of tenderyears are always for jury: 82 U.S. 401; 84 U.S. 657; 202 U.S. 600; 152 U.S. 262; 176 U.S. 232; 66 S.C. 47; 70 S.C. 242; 27 S.C. 456; 13 Pet., 181; 69 N.Y., 158; 51 S.C. 302; 75 S.C. 177; 7 Am. St. R., 823. Whether the stranger contributed to the injury is for jury: 6 Cyc., 633-4; 76 S.C. 204. Violation of a statute is negligenceper se: 53 S.C. 121; 58 S.C. 223; 68 S.C. 446; 6 Cyc., 586; 38 S.C. 485; 152 U.S. 262; 1 Street Leg. Lia., 172; 67 S.C. 61; 65 S.C. 440; 35 S.C. 493; 61 S.C. 345; 41 S.C. 440; 9 Rich. L., 84; 55 S.C. 389; 62 S.C. 130; 35 S.C. 405; 72 S.C. 136; 140 U.S. 435.
Messrs. Stanyarne Wilson and D.E. Hydrick, contra, cite: As to roads through open lands and woodland: 1 Bail., 56, 242; 11 Rich., 264; Cheves, 3; 2 Hill, 642; 2 Strob., 60; 1 McM., 329; 6 Rich., 396; 39 S.C. 23; 1 Speer, 22. Whatare "traveled places:" 33 S.C. 139; 34 S.C. 299, 450; 41 S.C. 20; 59 S.C. 434; 47 S.C. 385; 41 S.C. 1. As todegree of care to be exercised by the party injured: 41 S.C. 8; 47 S.C. 382. Court could not charge what acts constitutenegligence: 95 U.S. 162; 59 S.C. 99, 484; 41 S.C. 19; 34 S.C. 450. Not necessary to show that failure togive signals is proximate cause of injury: 47 S.C. 110. Definition of contributory negligence: 7 Ency., 2 ed., 371; 56 S.C. 91; 58 S.C. 228.
When grounds of objection are not stated, Judge need notrule:, 59 S.C. 243; 58 S.C. 70. As to trespasser and licensee:, 4 S.E.R., 248; 14 S.E.R., 328; 5 S.E.R., 577; 58 Wis. 577; 52 S.C. 323; 37 N.E.R., 917; 2 Jaggard on Torts, p. 824n. Gross negligence was left to jury:, 52 S.C. 323; 58 S.C. 70. Plaintiff not being trespasser, not incumbenton him to prove gross negligence:, 5 S.E.R., 577; 58 Wis. 646; 53 Wis. 626; 58 Ala., 672; 36 Md., 36; 50 Mo., 461; 38 Ill., 480; 60 Mo., 475; 59 S.C. 434. Wherefacts are ascertained, question of negligence is one of law:, 9 Rich. L., 94; 16 Ency., 1 ed., 466; 467n; 3 S.E.R., 302. As to contributory negligence: 10 Mees. W., 546; 2 C.B. N.S., 740; 144 U.S. 429; 7 Ency., 2 ed., 385, 386; 4 Ency., 1 ed., 27, 28; L.R. 1 App., 754; 65 Md., 394; 114 N.C. 728; 107 N.C. 686; 81 Mo., 368; 91 Mo., 357; 139 U.S. 551; Jaggard on Torts, 2 vol., p. 973, 974; 1 Strob. L., 525; 56 S.C. 94; 59 S.C. 323; 60 S.C. 153. September 23, 1901.
Cf. McKagen v. Windham, 59 S.C. 434, 38 S.E. 2 (1901) (reversing a judgment in favor of the plaintiff who was suing the members of a county board of control on a contract for wages, where the complaint did not allege that the defendants intended to bind themselves personally on the contract, nor did the plaintiff allege facts from which such an inference could be drawn; it is presumed that the members did not intend to bind themselves personally to a contract made by them on behalf of the county). Courts must look to the entire complaint to ascertain the capacity in which a defendant is sued.