Opinion
No. 3665.
Decided June 3, 1947.
A notice to quit certain described premises "on or before" a specified date sufficiently fixes the termination of the tenancy "at a day named" in such notice within the meaning of R. L., c. 413, s. 2. Words and phrases are to be given their common meaning unless they are technical words or have acquired some peculiar and appropriate meaning.
ACTION under the landlord and tenant act (R. L., c. 413), to recover possession of certain premises in Portsmouth. The defendant moved that the action be dismissed on the ground that the notice to vacate was invalid and excepted to the Court's denial of this motion and finding for the plaintiff.
The basis of the defendant's exception is that the notice did not fix the termination of the tenancy "at a day named therein" within the meaning of R. L., c. 413, s. 2, the material portions of which read as follows: "Any lessor . . . may at any time determine any lease . . . by giving to the tenant or occupant a notice in writing to quit the same at a day named therein." The notice which the defendant admits was duly served upon him reads as follows:
"State of New Hampshire Portsmouth Rockingham May 21, 1946
NOTICE TO VACATE Joseph Geiger 46 Market St. Portsmouth, N.H.
You are hereby notified that you are required to quit, vacate and give up the premises now occupied by you at 46 Market Street, in said Portsmouth, on or before June 24, 1946. The said premises being owned by the McIntire Enterprises, Inc.; a corporation existing under the laws of New Hampshire.
McIntire Enterprises, Inc., By: /s/ John R. McIntire Pres. Treas.
"Personally appeared William J. Linchey and took oath, That on this 21st day of May, 1946, he served the original of which the above is a true copy on, Joseph Geiger, Before me:
/s/ Harold M. Smith Justice of the Peace"
A bill of exceptions was allowed by Wheeler, J.
Harold M. Smith, for the plaintiff, filed no brief.
Samuel Levy (by brief), for the defendant.
In our opinion the notice clearly named June 24, 1946, as the day on which the tenancy was to terminate, and the exception must be overruled. See O'Dowd v. Heifer, 82 N.H. 387.
R. L., c. 7, s. 2, and the decisions thereunder, including the late cases of Davie v. Company, 90 N.H. 545; and North Hampton c. Assn. v. Commission, ante, 156, indicate that words and phrases are to be given their common meaning unless they are technical words or have acquired some peculiar and appropriate meaning. The words "on or before" used in the notice in question have acquired no peculiar and appropriate meaning, nor are they technical words, and a reasonable person in the defendant's position could not have misunderstood them. Furthermore, any latitude implied by them inured to the benefit of the defendant. In comparable situations other courts have had no difficulty in arriving at the same conclusion. Dillon v. Miller, 207 Ark. 401; Koehler v. Scheider, 10 N. Y. S. 101; 29 Words and Phrases (Perm. ed.), p. 460.
Exceptions overruled.
All concurred.