McHatton's Estate v. Peale's Estate

8 Citing cases

  1. Smith v. United States

    265 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1959)   Cited 3 times

    (3) That the taxpayer therefore did not have such unfettered control over income derived from the property of the estate as to make such income taxable to her under Sec. 22(a), Title 26 U.S.C.A.; taxpayer cites in support 44 Texas Jurisprudence, 837, McHatton's Estate v. Peale's Estate, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W. 103, Paton v. Baugh, Tex.Civ.App., 265 S.W. 250, Wagnon v. Wagnon, Tex.Civ. App., 16 S.W.2d 366, United States v. Smither, supra, and Flato v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 245 F.2d 413. Differentiating to her own satisfaction the cases relied on by appellees, she vigorously insists that, giving to the will the plain and reasonable construction its language imports, there is no logical escape from the conclusion that she is right in insisting that the will created a trust under the terms of which she held the property, and the district judge was wrong in holding that, under the will, she took a life estate in the property with unfettered control over the income and the right to use or not use it as she saw fit.

  2. Roberts v. Cleveland

    222 Ala. 256 (Ala. 1931)   Cited 30 times
    Noting that it is presumed that, "when a testator undertakes to make a will of all his property, he [does] not intend to die intestate as to any of it or during any period of time"

    The creation of such a trust is itself an expression of the intent of the testatrix to give to complainant only the income or an equitable life estate in the property or funds producing such income. Henderson v. Henderson, 210 Ala. 73, 97 So. 353; Schuldt v. Reading Trust Co., 270 Pa. 360, 113 A. 545; McHatton's Estate v. Peale's Estate (Tex.Civ.App.) 248 S.W. 103; Powell v. Pearson, 220 Ala. 247, 125 So. 39; Watkins' Adm'r v. Watkins' Ex'rs (Ky.) 120 S.W. 341; Ladies Ben. Soc. v. Orrell, 195 N.C. 405, 142 S.E. 493; Page on Wills, § 599; 40 Cyc. 1550; Mortimer v. Potter, 213 Ill. 178, 72 N.E. 817. The property or fund from which the income is derived passes to the heirs at law of testatrix as being undisposed of by her will. Wynn v. Bartlett, 167 Mass. 292, 45 N.E. 752; Cavan v. Woodbury, 240 Mass. 125, 133 N.E. 95; Keating v. Smith, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 232; Stearns v. Stearns, 192 Mass. 144, 77 N.E. 1154; Buffinton v. Maxam, 152 Mass. 477, 25 N.E. 975; Bradbury v. Jackson, 97 Me. 449, 54 A. 1068; Mays v. Beech, 114 Tenn. 544, 86 S.W. 713, 4 Ann. Cas. 1189; 2 Schouler on Wills (6th Ed.) § 1234. A contract cannot be set aside because of the fraud of a third person in which the other party to the contract was not implicated. 13 C. J. 387.

  3. Jones v. Preston State Bank

    515 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)

    Tipton v. Tipton, 12 S.W.2d 987 (Tex.Comm'n App.1929, opinion adopted). There was, therefore, no interest which she could have devised to appellant or which he could inherit from her. McHatton's Estate v. Peale's Estate, 248 S.W. 103, 106 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1923, writ ref'd). Even if appellant's mother had survived the last surviving first level beneficiary, or in some other way had prior to her death become entitled to some portion of the trust income, her heirs, devisees, or representatives would not be entitled to share in the trust income following her death for the entire amount thereof would go to those of the second level of beneficiaries who survived her. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 143, at 302 (1959).

  4. Zahn v. National Bank of Commerce

    328 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)   Cited 16 times

    ' (emphasis ours). We quote also from the opinion in McHatton's Estate v. Peale's Estate, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W. 103, 105: '* * * Upon the death of the testator his property immediately vests in some one, either the heirs at law, devisees under the will, or in the trustee or executor, and since it does not immediately vest title in the heirs it is not a valid will unless by construction it vests title in a trustee for the interim between the death of the testator and the time designated therein for closing or distributing the estate. The rule in such cases is that—

  5. Sims v. McMullan

    22 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)   Cited 3 times

    It may be necessary to hold that he has the fee, but it must be remembered that he holds such fee as trustee, and not as an individual. Lane v. Miller Vidor Lbr. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 176 S.W. 100; Wisdom v. Wilson, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 593, 127 S.W. 1128; Appel v. Childress, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 607, 116 S.W. 129; Matthews v. Darnell, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 181, 65 S.W. 890; Patten v. Herring, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 640, 29 S.W. 388; Grant v. Stephens, supra; McHatton's Estate v. Peale's Estate (Tex.Civ.App.) 248 S.W. 103; Montgomery v. Trueheart (Tex.Civ.App.) 146 S.W. 284. We think it is equally clear that no present interest vested under the will in V. B. Sims, except as trustee and executor, and that he must take an estate, if at all, in the nature of an executory devise and charged with the trust.

  6. Kemper v. Geo. W. Owens Lumber Loan

    12 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)

    It is not necessary that a will creating a power declare it in express or unequivocal terms, it being sufficient if it appears reasonably clear from the instrument, in the light of attending circumstances, that such was the intention. Adams v. Williams, 112 Tex. 469, 248 S.W. 673; Lane v. Miller Vidor Lumber Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 176 S.W. 106; McHatton's Estate v. Peale's Estate (Tex.Civ.App.) 248 S.W. 103. "Where the power is general to perform and carry out a particular object, a resort to the ordinary and usual methods or means comes within the scope of the power." Faulk v. Dashiell, 62 Tex. 642, 50 Am.Rep. 542.

  7. Munger v. Munger

    298 S.W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)   Cited 20 times

    Page 139, 70 S.W. 743. In the case of McHatton v. Peale (Tex.Civ.App.) 248 S.W. 103 (106), independent executors were given power to sell, exchange, or otherwise alienate property for the benefit of the estate. Referring to this language, the court said:

  8. White v. White

    257 S.W. 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)   Cited 2 times

    That such rules should not be resorted to when the language used by the testator sufficiently indicates his intention is clear. Dulin v. Moore, 96 Tex. 135, 70 S.W. 742; Darragh v. Barmore (Tex.Com.App.) 242 S.W. 714; McHatton's Estate v. Peale's Estate (Tex.Civ.App.) 248 S.W. 103. The devise to the testator's daughter was not absolute, but was "subject [quoting] to the conditions and limitations expressed in this will."