In addition to the prejudice of the risk of trial and the delay in the determination of the action it could be prejudicial to the infant's case "by permitting the jury to speculate that the plaintiff already has been compensated" and could create an adversarial posture between the insurer and the insured ( Humbach v. Goldstein, supra, 68, 69); see also McGuire v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 237 AD2d 417, lv. to app. dism 91 NY2d 922; Soden v. Long Island Railroad Company, 277 AD2d 442 and cases cited therein). The Appellate Division, Third Department observed in Berry v. St. Peter's Hospital, ( 250 AD2d 63, 67, lv to app dism, 92 NY2d 1045).
Decided February 17, 1998 Appeal from (2d Dept: 237 A.D.2d 417) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL DISSMISSED. FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS
The public interest in assuring the integrity of relations between insurers and their insureds requires that even the potential for conflict of interest in these situations be avoided and militates against allowing an insurer to, directly or indirectly, place its own interests above those of its insured ( see, Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Austin Powder Co., 68 N.Y.2d 465, 472). We agree with the Second Department that "[t]he intervention of various medical providers could create an adversarial posture between carriers and plaintiffs" ( Humbach v. Goldstein, supra, at 68; see, McGuire v. Long Is. Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 237 A.D.2d 417, lv dismissed 91 N.Y.2d 922), a posture which we view as antithetical to the fundamental nature of the relationship between an insured and his or her insurer. Both plaintiff and Berry were promised, as incidents of their employment, health insurance coverage which they understood would indemnify them for certain medical expenses.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs. Under the circumstances presented, the Supreme Court acted properly in denying the motion of Metrahealth Services, Inc., for leave to intervene (see, Humbach v. Goldstein, 229 A.D.2d 64; see also, Warner v. University Hosp., 246 A.D.2d 535; McGuire v. Long Is. Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 237 A.D.2d 417). Rosenblatt, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the Daniel Turner is awarded one bill of costs. The Supreme Court correctly denied the motion of Metrahealth Services, Inc., for leave to intervene (see, Humbach v. Goldstein, 229 A.D.2d 64, 66-68; McGuire v. Long Is. Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 237 A.D.2d 417). Mangano, P.J., Copertino, Joy, Florio and Luciano, JJ., concur.
In exercising its discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay the determination of the action or prejudice the substantial rights of any party. Permitting the current Mrs. Tawil to intervene would create an adversarial posture between her and the former Mrs. Tawil, which would likely transform a quotidian post-judgment action into a complicated multiparty litigation ( see McGuire v. Long Is. Jewish–Hillside Med. Ctr., 237 A.D.2d 417, 654 N.Y.S.2d 420 [1997]; see also, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McLean, 70 A.D.3d 676, 894 N.Y.S.2d 487 [2 Dept., 2010] ). This Court finds that permitting the current Mrs. Tawil to join under these facts and circumstances would almost certainly cause substantial prejudice to the former Mrs. Tawil and the children of the plaintiff's first family.
921 (1998), the Appellate Division, Second Department cited Teichman but held that where an insurer moved to intervene prior to the trial, its claim for subrogation and entitlement to reimbursement were premature because it had not reserved to itself any right to veto any proposed settlement agreement; moreover a lien existed in the insurer's favor as to third-party payments which were specifically identified as amounts paid for health care services, thus adequately protecting the insurer's rights. Similarly, in Halloran v. Don's 47 West 44th StreetRest. Corp., 255 AD2d 206 (1st Dept. 1998), the Appellate Division, First Department denied an insurer's motion to intervene on the grounds that it was premature as the insurer's contract gave it no right to reimbursement until the plaintiff actually recovered compensation for medical services, and because intervention would likely result in placing the interests of the insurer in impermissible conflict with those of the insured ( see also, McGuire v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 237 AD2d 417 [2nd Dept. 1997], lv dismissed 91 NY2d 922). Humbach also held that pursuant to CPLR 4545(c), the court would be required to reduce the amount awarded to the plaintiff by the amount of insurance reimbursement paid and therefore the insurer would not be able to recover its entire outlay since, under equitable subrogation, it had no rights greater than those of its insured ( Humbach at 67).
The reference to prematurity appears to relate to plaintiff's acknowledgement that "Oxford would have a lien on any payments from third parties which are specifically identified as amounts paid for health care services or benefits attributable to the plaintiff's injuries in the accident" (at 69). The Second Department followed the aforesaid holding in the subsequent case of McGuire v. Long Is. Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr. ( 237 A.D.2d 417).