Opinion
A18-0167
12-03-2018
Nathan C. McGuire, Appellant, v. Julie A. Bowlin, Respondent, Thomas M. Bowlin, Defendant, Joy M. Szondy, Respondent, Chelon L. Danielson, Respondent, Cheryl Hewitt, Respondent.
Donald Chance Mark, Jr., Sharon L. Van Dyck, Andrew T. James, Fafinski Mark & Johnson, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for appellant) Julie A. Bowlin, Chanhassen, Minnesota (pro se respondent) Andrew T. Shern, Andrew T. Shern Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Joy M. Szondy) Chelon L. Danielson, Woodbury, Minnesota (pro se respondent) Garth J. Unke, Kirsten J. Hansen, Stich, Angell, Kreidler & Unke, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Cheryl Hewitt) Jenneane Jansen, Kris Palmer, Jansen & Palmer, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amici curiae Minnesota State High School Coaches Association and National High School Basketball Coaches Association)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-15-6030 Donald Chance Mark, Jr., Sharon L. Van Dyck, Andrew T. James, Fafinski Mark & Johnson, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for appellant) Julie A. Bowlin, Chanhassen, Minnesota (pro se respondent) Andrew T. Shern, Andrew T. Shern Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Joy M. Szondy) Chelon L. Danielson, Woodbury, Minnesota (pro se respondent) Garth J. Unke, Kirsten J. Hansen, Stich, Angell, Kreidler & Unke, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Cheryl Hewitt) Jenneane Jansen, Kris Palmer, Jansen & Palmer, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amici curiae Minnesota State High School Coaches Association and National High School Basketball Coaches Association) Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant-basketball coach challenges summary judgment dismissing his claims of defamation, civil conspiracy, and false report of child maltreatment against respondent-parents of student athletes. Appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding that (1) he is a public official required to prove actual malice to recover for defamation, (2) the record contains no evidence of actual malice, and (3) the record contains no evidence that maltreatment reports made by two respondents were knowingly or recklessly false. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Nathan McGuire is a kindergarten teacher and basketball coach. He was the head girls' basketball coach at the Academy of Holy Angels (AHA) from 2010 until 2012, during which time he coached the daughter of respondent Julie Bowlin. From 2012 until 2014, McGuire led the girls' basketball program at Woodbury High School. During that time, the daughters of respondent Joy Szondy, respondent Chelon Danielson, and respondent Cheryl Hewitt participated in the Woodbury basketball program, as did Bowlin's daughter, who transferred from AHA to play for McGuire.
The Woodbury program consisted of four teams—a varsity team, a junior varsity (JV) team, a sophomore (or "B") team, and a freshman team—and six coaches, including McGuire. McGuire supervised the assistant coaches, coached the varsity team, determined practice schedules, and frequently reassigned players between the four teams.
During McGuire's first season (2012-2013), Szondy's daughter and Danielson's daughter were juniors and played on the JV team. Szondy and Danielson had concerns about the basketball program. Danielson was concerned, based primarily on her daughter's reports, that McGuire yelled at, singled out, and ridiculed the players; threw basketballs in anger; and physically handled the players by grabbing their jerseys and moving them. Szondy was troubled by the hours-long daily practices and unsuccessfully challenged McGuire's late-season decision to remove her daughter from the roster based on behavioral issues. Neither Szondy's daughter nor Danielson's daughter played basketball the following year.
During the 2013-14 season, Hewitt's daughter was a freshman originally assigned to the B team and later reassigned to the JV/varsity teams, and Bowlin's daughter was a freshman assigned to the varsity team. Hewitt and Bowlin also had concerns about the basketball program. Hewitt did not believe players should be penalized for missing practices during holidays or school breaks and thought that practices ran too long and interfered with academics. She was also concerned, based on her daughter's statements, that McGuire swore around and yelled at players, physically moved players by their shoulders and hips, and entered the girls' locker room. Bowlin was concerned about her daughter's role on the team and playing time and troubled by her daughter's report that McGuire pushed her during a drill. Bowlin also heard from her daughter and other players and parents that McGuire yelled at and singled out players, swore in front of players, threw basketballs in anger, and was inconsiderate of players' academic and other obligations.
In November or early December 2013, Bowlin met with the athletics director, the coaching staff, and the school principal. She also approached other basketball parents, suggesting that they should complain to the athletics director because McGuire was "let go" from AHA after parents had done so there. Bowlin's daughter transferred to another school on or around December 11.
Hewitt learned of the transfer and called Bowlin. She told Bowlin that she shared her concerns based on reports from players during the previous season about McGuire yelling and swearing, giving back rubs, and throwing balls.
On December 29, Hewitt, Bowlin, and three former players (the daughters of Szondy, Danielson, and Bowlin) met at Hewitt's residence to prepare for an upcoming meeting with the school district superintendent. The group, led primarily by Bowlin and the former players, discussed various aspects of McGuire's conduct. Bowlin told the group that McGuire was asked to resign from AHA in lieu of being fired after parents complained to the principal and athletics director. Hewitt took notes during the meeting, which she subsequently distributed to the other attendees.
In early January 2014, Bowlin, Danielson, Szondy's daughter, and another parent filed complaints with the Minnesota Department of Education, alleging that McGuire had engaged in maltreatment of at least four players.
Around the same time, school administrators met with players and parents, including Hewitt, Szondy, and Bowlin, to address complaints related to McGuire's performance as the girls' head basketball coach. The school district subsequently placed McGuire on paid administrative leave and hired a law firm to investigate the allegations against him. The investigation yielded a report that largely rejected claims of physical improprieties such as pushing or massaging players, but found several of the complaints were substantiated, including that McGuire failed to consider the emotional well-being of his players, yelled and swore in front of players, and ran a demanding and uncompromising practice schedule. On March 14, the school district notified McGuire that it would not renew his coaching contract.
Approximately one year later, the department of education concluded its investigation of the maltreatment reports, determining that none of the players had been maltreated.
McGuire initiated this action against Bowlin, Szondy, Danielson, and Hewitt, alleging defamation and civil conspiracy, and that Bowlin and Danielson knowingly or recklessly filed false child-maltreatment reports. After two rounds of summary-judgment motions, the district court dismissed all claims, reasoning that McGuire was a public official and the record lacks evidence of false statements made with actual malice or knowingly or recklessly false maltreatment reports. McGuire appeals.
McGuire also asserted all three claims against Thomas Bowlin. The district court dismissed the claims, and McGuire does not challenge the dismissal in this appeal. Accordingly, all references to Bowlin herein are to Julie Bowlin.
DECISION
I. McGuire was a public official.
A plaintiff asserting a defamation claim must prove the defendant made (1) a false statement about the plaintiff, (2) in "unprivileged publication to a third party," (3) that harmed the plaintiff's reputation in the community, and (4) "fault, at least negligence." Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn. 1991). If the plaintiff is a "public official" who alleges defamation in a statement concerning his official conduct, the constitution demands even more—proof that the statement was made with "actual malice." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726 (1964). "The public or private status of the plaintiff in a defamation action is a question of law" that we review de novo. Britton, 470 N.W.2d at 520.
The Supreme Court has declined to specify categories of individuals who would or would not be included in the ranks of public officials. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 S. Ct. 669, 675 (1966). Instead, it outlined a general approach for determining whether a particular public employee is a public official:
[T]he "public official" designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs . . . [and to an employee whose] position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds
it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees.Id. at 85-86, 86 S. Ct. at 676. Minnesota follows the Rosenblatt approach but focuses particularly on "whether th[e] employee is able to assert the authority of the government while performing his duties." Britton, 470 N.W.2d at 521, 523.
Whether a public high school coach falls within these parameters is a question that neither the Supreme Court nor Minnesota's appellate courts have addressed, and other states have split on the issue. But we have considered a similar public employee—a teacher. Elstrom v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 270, 533 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. July 27, 1995). In Elstrom, we identified several factors that persuaded us that public school teachers are public officials for defamation purposes. Id. We noted that Minnesota strongly emphasizes education and places teachers in a position of special trust and authority, creating in the public a "greater than normal interest" in being able to debate and freely criticize teachers' conduct. Id. Teachers "act with the authority of the government." Id. And teachers who abuse their positions "may affect many lives." Id.
See Basarich v. Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (high school "athletic coaches" were public officials); Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196 (Ohio 1984) (high school head wrestling coach was not a public official), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985), overruled on other grounds, 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978) (grade school wrestling coach was a public official); Johnson v Sw. Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. App. 1993) (high school athletic director and head football coach was a public official); O'Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1220 (Utah 2007) (high school basketball coach was not a public official).
McGuire argues that Elstrom is inapposite because a coach is not analogous to a teacher. We disagree. High school sports play a formative role in the lives of student athletes and a significant role in their families and in the community that watches from the bleachers and pays the school levies. The coaches who direct young athletes enjoy positions of trust and authority, the abuse of which may affect many lives. Accordingly, as with teachers, the public has an interest in coaches' qualifications and conduct. See Minn. Stat. §§ 122A.15, subd. 2 (subjecting "athletic coaches" to teacher licensure requirements), .33 (establishing licensure exemption for otherwise qualified head coach) (2016); see also Christopher v. Windom Area Sch. Bd., 781 N.W.2d 904, 910 (Minn. App. 2010) (comparing school board's non-renewal of a coach's contract to a teacher's non-renewal), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2010). For these reasons, states that have considered both types of public employees consistently treat teachers and coaches the same in the context of defamation actions. Basarich, 321 N.E.2d at 742; Johnston, 583 P.2d at 1103; see also O'Connor, 165 P.3d at 1220 (holding that neither teachers nor coaches are public officials).
Although we need not decide here whether all public high school coaches are public officials, the undisputed facts persuade us that McGuire was a public official. Like a teacher, he had extensive contact with his student athletes during hours-long daily practices and had a substantial impact on their lives, as demonstrated by the very complaints at issue in this litigation. As head of the high school basketball program, he had a significant supervisory and administrative role. Five coaches worked under him in the program, three of whom he hired. And he established the structure and priorities of the program with respect to team rosters, practice schedules, and policies regarding missed practices and player discipline.
McGuire testified during his deposition that he independently hired three assistant coaches.
We appreciate the challenges that coaches face in addressing parents' criticisms, both fair and unfair. In this, too, coaches are like teachers. Coaches like McGuire, who lead sports programs, regularly field both collective and individual complaints on topics ranging from the program's competitive success, to coaching methods and style, to a particular child's playing time. But these challenges do not outweigh the public interest in freely debating and criticizing the conduct of persons in positions of authority (both teachers and coaches) who play a prominent role in the lives of students. We conclude that McGuire was a public figure for purposes of his defamation claims.
The district court rejected McGuire's argument that any public-official status would not apply to allegedly defamatory statements made after he was removed from his coaching position. McGuire does not assert this argument on appeal.
II. The record contains no evidence that respondents made false statements about McGuire with actual malice.
We review de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 855 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Minn. 2014). In a defamation case, "the test is whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence." McDevitt v. Tilson, 453 N.W.2d 53, 57 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. May 23, 1990).
"Actual malice" is a term of art, not a reference to ill will or spite. Chafoulias v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 654 (Minn. 2003). A statement is made with "actual malice" when it is made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S. Ct. at 726. Reckless disregard means the defendant had "serious doubts" about the truth of the statement. Elstrom, 533 N.W.2d at 56. "Errors in judgment do not establish actual malice; nor does failure to investigate." Id. And neither does a mere "slanted perspective." Chafoulias, 668 N.W.2d at 655.
It is within this context that we address McGuire's allegations against each of the respondents except Szondy, focusing principally, as McGuire does, on those against Bowlin.
McGuire acknowledged in his summary-judgment memorandum that there is no record evidence that Szondy made defamatory statements.
Danielson
McGuire alleges that Danielson defamed him by stating at the December 29, 2013 parent-player meeting that she saw McGuire give players back rubs. McGuire denies doing so. These differing accounts demonstrate a fact question regarding McGuire's conduct. But McGuire's denial is not evidence that Danielson made her statement about witnessing back rubs knowing it was false or recklessly disregarding its veracity. In the absence of any such evidence, McGuire's defamation claim against Danielson fails as a matter of law.
Hewitt
McGuire asserts that Hewitt defamed him by (1) telling Bowlin during a December 2013 phone call that he inappropriately touched players and gave players back rubs, (2) stating at the December 29 meeting that he "singles out players in front of everyone" for criticism or punishment, (3) drafting notes from that meeting without independently investigating the truth of the statements she recorded, and (4) stating in an August 23, 2014 email to Bowlin, "I heard from someone not involved in [basketball] at all that they heard he was just put in jail? Is there any truth to that?" When read in context, the record demonstrates all of Hewitt's claimed defamatory statements reflect information she received from others—players' descriptions of their interactions with McGuire, other parents' descriptions of their daughters' experiences, and an unknown person's report that McGuire was "put in jail," the truth of which she expressly questioned. There is no evidence that—at the time Hewitt made the statements—she knew they were false, or made them recklessly, without considering their veracity. Accordingly, McGuire's defamation claim against Hewitt fails as a matter of law.
Bowlin
McGuire contends that Bowlin made defamatory statements about him with actual malice on three separate occasions. First, McGuire contends that Bowlin acted with actual malice when she stated in a December 2013 email to other Woodbury basketball parents that McGuire was "let go" from his coaching position at AHA. He argues Bowlin knew this statement was false because she and other parents received an email from AHA's athletics director in February 2012 indicating that McGuire "decided to resign." This argument is unavailing. Bowlin's email itself reflects information she had recently received showing that McGuire left AHA because of parents' concerns: "All girls from Varsity but [Bowlin's daughter] went to see the [athletics director] at AHA...I was just told this last night. This is what AHA did and that is how he was let go because of his behavior." This is consistent with her statement to other parents and players later in December 2013 that "McGuire was asked to resign or he would have been fired." And Bowlin's statements are consistent with the AHA athletics director's statements that he received emails from concerned parents and told McGuire that he was not sure the school was a good place for him, and McGuire's own acknowledgment that the "climate" at AHA led him to resign. Overall, this record reflects that Bowlin did not knowingly or recklessly disseminate false information about the nature of McGuire's separation from AHA but relied on information she received from others to form and communicate an opinion that parental complaints were the impetus for his departure.
Second, McGuire argues that Bowlin acted with actual malice by telling a friend in two August 2014 emails, that she "heard" McGuire "was recently put in jail" but would "find out the truth and call the state today and find out," then later the same day that he "may lose his teaching job and do jail time." He contends that Bowlin "had no basis, good faith or otherwise, for fabricating the information that McGuire had been in jail or could be jailed." The record reflects otherwise. Bowlin accurately communicated to her friend that she "heard" (from Hewitt) that McGuire may have been jailed. Her emails indicate that she understood the jail consequences related to the maltreatment report she filed with the department of education, which was pending at the time. In her second email, Bowlin stated that she "spoke to the State today and they are interviewing the 4 kids that turned the claim in" and referred by name to the investigator, who interviewed Bowlin and her daughter less than two weeks later. That Bowlin would contemplate, or even hope, that McGuire would be jailed for maltreatment may suggest her subjective ill will toward McGuire but does not establish actual malice to support a defamation claim.
Bowlin's reference to possible criminal consequences or revocation of McGuire's license is consistent with the potential consequences in cases of substantiated child maltreatment. See Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10(e) (2016).
Third, McGuire asserts that Bowlin acted with actual malice by sending a text message to a friend in December 2014 with a photo of a local newspaper story about a Woodbury man who was sentenced to jail for stealing funds, some of which he used to pay a Woodbury basketball coach, and the statement: "[T]his was part of the Woodbury stuff with Mcguire that was going on. This guy too got busted." McGuire insists that Bowlin's statements are "false and defamatory" because she "knew he was not involved in the events described in the article." But it is apparent from the article itself and undisputed that the Woodbury man in question was a man whose daughter played basketball with Bowlin's daughter, and that McGuire was not the affected coach. Thus, while it is unclear precisely why Bowlin referenced McGuire in sharing the article, nothing in the article or her vague statement suggests that McGuire had anything to do with stealing funds or receiving stolen funds. See McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn. 2013) (recognizing that whether a statement conveys a defamatory meaning depends on how an ordinary person would understand the statement in the light of surrounding circumstances). Because the record lacks evidence that Bowlin knowingly or recklessly made false statements about McGuire, his defamation claim against her fails as a matter of law.
Because McGuire's defamation claims fail as a matter of law, his derivative civil-conspiracy claims likewise fail.
III. The record contains no evidence that Bowlin knowingly or recklessly filed a false maltreatment report.
A person who knows, has reason to believe, or suspects a child is being neglected or physically or sexually abused in a school environment may report to the local welfare agency, department of education, or law enforcement. Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subds. 3(b), 3b (2016). But any person who "knowingly or recklessly makes a false report" can be held liable in a civil suit. Id., subd. 5 (2016). As noted above, we review de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Larson, 855 N.W.2d at 299.
McGuire challenges the district court's dismissal of his claim that Bowlin knowingly or recklessly filed a false report alleging that he maltreated her daughter. He contends that there are fact questions regarding whether Bowlin "filed her report out of spite and with an ulterior motive intended to cause McGuire to lose his teaching and coaching positions." But any such fact questions are not material as they do not bear on the statutory elements of a false-report claim—whether Bowlin's report was false, and if so whether she knew it was false or recklessly disregarded the risk it was false.
Two documents establish the allegations Bowlin reported. First, Bowlin's reporting form alleges physical abuse, noting "pushing in drill," and unspecified emotional abuse. Second, the investigator's report details the written and oral statements of Bowlin and her daughter that McGuire "pushed" Bowlin's daughter while participating with players in a drill and "verbally abused" her by singling her out and yelling at her, causing her loss of sleep, emotional disturbance, and decline in academic performance.
The investigator found a factual basis for Bowlin's report, determining that evidence supports the allegation that McGuire "used a loud voice which could be perceived as yelling during practices" and that "physical contact with athletes occurred during practice drills and games." But the investigator determined that these circumstances do not amount to maltreatment because McGuire's use of a loud voice did not specifically target Bowlin's daughter and his physical contact with her "occurred during practice drills and games for the purpose of direction and teaching," was not targeted, and was not "inappropriate for athletic situations."
In short, the record evidence establishes that Bowlin's report was not "false"; its supported allegations simply did not meet the legal definition of maltreatment. Consequently, Bowlin is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
McGuire does not challenge summary judgment on his false-maltreatment-report claim against Danielson. As with the claim against Bowlin, the record reflects that Danielson's complaint of neglect and emotional abuse allege conduct that Danielson and her daughter perceived as punitive and targeted, but the investigator found was equally "intense" toward all players and within legal parameters. --------
Affirmed.