Opinion
No. 98 C 3958
August 2, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is a motion of Defendant, Village of Alsip, that is in substance a motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
James McGreal is a long time police officer with the Village of Alsip, a south suburb of Chicago. This suit arises out of alleged retaliation that McGreal claims to have suffered after he unsuccessfully ran for mayor, and after he brought public attention to a number of issues involving illegal gambling, liquor licenses, the mayor of Alsip, the Alsip Police Department, and a local judge.
According to McGreal, his election bid and speech about these issues constituted an exercise of his First Amendment rights. McGreal claims that Defendants retaliated against him through a series of adverse employment actions for exercising those rights. In response to the alleged retaliation, McGreal filed this suit seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This case was scheduled for trial in the fall of 2001, and the parties submitted the requited final pre-trial order at that time. After reviewing the final pre-trial order, the court continued the trial and invited counsel to file motions concerning, inter alia, municipal liability under Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Village of Alsip (hereinafter "the Village") has submitted a motion, which is in substance a motion for summary judgment, arguing that McGreal has no evidence that the Village is liable under Monell. The Village's motion is fully briefed and ripe for ruling.
A § 1983 suit against public officials in their official capacity is a suit against the governing body itself. See Armstrong v. Squadrito 152 F.3d 564, 577 (7th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the court construes the Village's motion to include any claims made against Defendants Police Chief Woods and Lt. Snooks in their official capacity. The remaining individual Defendants. Chief Woods and Lt. Snooks, have filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on the claims against them in their individual capacity. That motion is under advisement, and is not the subject of this opinion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is permissible when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The nonmoving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must identify specific facts, see Cornfield v. Consolidated High School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir. 1993), that raise more than a mere scintilla of evidence to show a genuine triable issue of material fact. See Murphy v. ITT Technical Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1999). Indeed, a party opposing summary judgment must do more than raise a "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts. See Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriately entered against
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Village of Alsip's motion for summary judgment is granted. The court grants summary judgment in favor of Village of Alsip, and Chief Woods and Lt. Snooks in their official capacities as to all of Plaintiffs claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.