Opinion
12-2857-cv
11-01-2013
CHARLES F. MCGRATH, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMSON REUTERS, Defendant-Appellee.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Charles F. McGrath, Jr., pro se, Brooklyn, New York. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Mitchell Boyarsky, Gibbons P.C., Newark, New Jersey.
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 1st day of November, two thousand thirteen. PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
DENNY CHIN,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
Charles F. McGrath, Jr., pro se,
Brooklyn, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
Mitchell Boyarsky, Gibbons P.C.,
Newark, New Jersey.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rakoff, J.; Francis, M.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-appellant Charles F. McGrath, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's judgment entered June 12, 2012, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Thomson Reuters ("TR"). By order dated June 10, 2012, the district court adopted the report and recommendation ("R&R") of the magistrate judge (Francis, M.J.) dated April 30, 2012, and dismissed McGrath's complaint, which alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues for review.
Upon de novo review, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court's order and the magistrate judge's thorough R&R.
As explained in detail in the R&R, McGrath failed to establish the existence of triable issues of fact as to his claims of religious, age, and disability discrimination, and he failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a connection between any of his protected categories and any purported adverse employment action. Moreover, TR provided legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for each of McGrath's alleged adverse employment actions, and McGrath did not present any evidence that these actions were merely pretextual.
McGrath also failed to present evidence sufficient to show an objectively hostile work environment, with respect to his religion, his age, or his disability. And he has provided neither direct nor indirect evidence that his termination was in retaliation for his threat to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Because we affirm the judgment of the district court on its merits, we agree with the court that it is not necessary to decide whether, under all the circumstances, McGrath waived his right to review by failing to timely file a formal objection to the R&R.
We have considered McGrath's remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk