Such is the well-established rule that has long been followed and expounded by this court. Chapin v. Hill, 1 R.I. 446; Perry v. Hunter, 2 R.I. 80; Lewis v. Douglass, 14 R.I. 604; McGough v. Hughes, 18 R.I. 768; Matteson v. Brown, 33 R.I. 339; Hanley v. Fernell, 54 R.I. 84; Industrial Trust Co. v. Hall, 66 R.I. 201. But the complainants argue that the language which the testatrix has used in providing for the ultimate disposition of the trust estate "to the children then living of my children" should, under the circumstances, be construed in the same sense as if she used the words "my legal heirs", and that she intended that her property should go to her "heirs at law then living" in the event of no grandchild surviving the death of her last child.
There can be no doubt that the intention of a testator is to be gathered from the will, and that extrinsic facts cannot be received to vary the terms of a will, when they are clear. Lewis v. Douglass, 14 R.I. 604; McGough v. Hughes, 18 R.I. 768. But it is also well settled that a misnomer of a legatee or devisee is immaterial, if the person intended can be identified by the description in the will.