Opinion
A-13-CA-035-SS
02-14-2013
MICHAEL McGOLDRICK v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO: THE HONORABLE SAM SPARKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The Magistrate Judge submits this Report and Recommendation to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 1(e) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrates, as amended, effective December 1, 2002.
Before the Court is Petitioner's Application for Habeas Corpus Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Document 1). Petitioner, proceeding pro se, has paid the applicable filing fee. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that Petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus should be denied in part and dismissed in part.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Petitioner's Criminal History
According to Petitioner, the Director has custody of him pursuant to a judgment and sentence of the 26th Judicial District Court of Williamson County, Texas. Petitioner pleaded guilty to and was convicted on 21 counts of possession of child pornography. The district court assessed sentences of ten years in prison on each count. The sentences on the first five counts were set to run consecutively, while the remainder were to run concurrently with each other. The court ordered these latter 16 concurrent terms to run consecutively to the first five, and to be probated for ten years. The resulting aggregate sentence is 50 years in prison, plus an additional ten-year prison term probated for ten years.
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on August 29, 2007. McGoldrick v. State, No. 03-07-00132-CR (Tex. App. - Austin 2007, no pet.). Petitioner also challenged his conviction in a state application for habeas corpus relief filed on February 22, 2012. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied it in part and dismissed it in part in a written order on May 2, 2012. Ex parte McGoldrick, No. WR-77423-01, 2012 WL 1554472 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
B. Petitioner's Grounds for Relief
Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:
1. The state committed fraud by filing a second state application for habeas corpus relief on Petitioner's behalf;
2. Petitioner's cumulative sentence is void, because he committed his offenses on May 23, 2005;
3. The State lacked jurisdiction to cumulate his sentences, which violated due process; and
4. The State failed to give evidence that the offense was committed on May 23, 2005.
II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Second State Habeas Application
Petitioner accuses the Williamson County District Attorney of fraudulently filing a second state habeas application on his behalf. Petitioner notified both the Williamson County District Clerk and the Court of Criminal Appeals that he did not file the second state application and he did not wish to proceed. Pursuant to his request, on October 31, 2012, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the second state application. Ex parte McGoldrick, No. 77,423-02. This Court has obtained Petitioner's purported second state habeas application from the Court of Criminal Appeals. The second application was filed by Inmate John G. Mascitti Jr. #627154 on behalf of Petitioner and is attached to this Report and Recommendation as Appendix A. As Petitioner has not alleged a valid claim for federal habeas corpus relief with respect to his second state application, his claim should be denied.
B. Statute of Limitations
Petitioner's remaining claims are time-barred. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") establishes a one-year statute of limitations for state inmates seeking federal habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). That section provides, in relevant part:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
B. Application
Petitioner's conviction became final, at the latest, on September 28, 2007, at the conclusion of time during which he could have timely filed a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which according to Tex. R. App. R. 68.2, is 30 days following the court of appeals' judgment affirming his conviction. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 623 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding a conviction becomes final when the time for seeking further direct review in the state court expires). Therefore, Petitioner had until September 28, 2008, to timely file his federal application for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner did not execute his federal application until December 19, 2012, more than four years after the expiration of the limitations period. Petitioner's first state application did not operate to toll the limitations period, because it was filed on February 22, 2012, after the limitations period had already expired. Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000).
The record does not reflect that any unconstitutional state action impeded Petitioner from filing for federal habeas corpus relief prior to the end of the limitations period. Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that he did not know the factual predicate of his claims earlier. Finally, the claims do not concern a constitutional right recognized by the Supreme Court within the last year and made retroactive to cases on collateral review.
III. RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that Petitioner's claim regarding his second state application for habeas corpus relief be denied and Petitioner's remaining claims be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding "unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (1)(A). Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, effective December 1, 2009, the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.
A certificate of appealability may issue only if a petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court fully explained the requirement associated with a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000). In cases where a district court rejected a petitioner's constitutional claims on the merits, "the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Id. "When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the petitioner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the petitioner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id.
In this case, reasonable jurists could not debate the denial or dismissal of the Petitioner's section 2254 petition on substantive or procedural grounds, nor find that the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003) (citing Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court shall not issue a certificate of appealability.
V. OBJECTIONS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Battles v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the district court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-153, 106 S. Ct. 466, 472-74 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return receipt requested.
___________
ANDREW W. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE