A number of other Tennessee cases since Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner illustrate the subject. In McGinniss v. Brown, 30 Tenn. App. 178, 204 S.W.2d 334 (1947), defendant had placed coal tracks in a mine too close to the wooden pillars which supported the roof of the mine. Plaintiff removed a pillar in an effort to allow free passage for the cars.

Smith accurately argues that, under Tennessee law, the issue of proximate cause of an injury is a question for the jury, unless the determinative facts are undisputed. See McGinniss v. Brown, 204 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1947). In a case such as this one, where Smith suffered complex internal injuries, Tennessee law requires a plaintiff to produce expert medical testimony to establish the causal connection between the alleged defect and the plaintiff's injuries.

Smith accurately argues that, under Tennessee law, the issue of proximate cause of an injury is a question for the jury, unless the determinative facts are undisputed. See McGinniss v. Brown, 204 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1947). In a case such as this one, where Smith suffered complex internal injuries, Tennessee law requires a plaintiff to produce expert medical testimony to establish the causal connection between the alleged defect and the plaintiff's injuries.

See Ehredt v. Dehavill and Aircraft Co. of Can., Ltd., 705 P.2d 913 (Alaska 1985); Hammels v. Britten, 85 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1939); Garcia v. De Leon, 59 A.2d 637 (DC. 1948); Filch v. Mayer, 258 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. Cc. App. 1953); Brown v. Standard Oil Co., 14 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 1944); Morgan v. Robacker, 151 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956); Muldrow v. Weinstein, 68 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1951); Workman v. Anderson Music Co., 149 P.3d 1060 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); McGinniss v. Brown, 204 S.W.2d 334 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947); Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Robinson, 280 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1955); Bates v. Sirk, 230 S.E.2d 738 (W.Va. 1976).See Hall v. Burton, 19 Cal. Rptr. 797 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Stroup v. Reno, 530 N.W.2d 441 (Iowa 1995); Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc. 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 1996).

legingonly an accident not covered by the insurance policy, and is,therefore, demurrable: 219 S.C. 191, 64 S.E.2d 534; 197 N.C. 122, 147 S.E. 740; 40 Ga. App. 171, 149 S.E. 76; 252 Mich. 279, 233 N.W. 228; 176 S.C. 260, 180 S.E. 55; 29-A Am. Jur. Sec. 1134. Frank Sawyer, Esq., of Spartanburg, for Respondent, cites: As to complaint stating a cause of action, and demurrerwill not lie: 29A Am. Jur. 288, Sec. 1134; 161 Tenn. 41, 28 S.W.2d 339; 115 Tenn. 513, 92 S.W. 402, 112 Am. St. Rep. 870, 5 Am. Cas. 777; Joyce on Insurance, Secs. 2821, 2824; 26 C.J. 340; 326 S.W.2d 443; 251 Wis. 188, 28 N.W.2d 306; 115 S.E.2d 500; 6 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice 386, Sec. 4129; 61 S.W.2d 698, 187 Ark. 676 affirmed, 54 S. Ct. 486, 291 U.S. 575, 78 L.Ed. 999, reh. den., 54 S.Ct. 629, 292 U.S. 600; 273 F.2d 500. As to what is theproximate cause of an accident: 45 F.2d 166; 40 N.W.2d 820, 152 Neb. 230, 15 A.L.R.2d 1008; 127 S.E. 688, 189 N.C. 644; 239 S.W.2d 366, 34 Tenn. App. 451; 204 S.W.2d 334, 30 Tenn. App. 178; 61 S.W.2d 462, 166 Tenn. 373; 13 How. 164; 65 A.2d 757, 3 N.J. Super. 165; 67 N.E. 409, 203 Ill. 87; 44 N.E.2d 940, 316 Ill. App. 286; 18 A.2d 364, 127 Conn. 488; 43 S.E.2d 201; 221 S.C. 497, 71 S.E.2d 404; 231 S.C. 75, 97 S.E.2d 205; 206 S.W.2d 104; 14 How. 351, 14 L.Ed. 452. As to the wordsDirect Cause, as used in insurance policies, being synonymous, in legal intendment, with proximate cause: 149 F.2d 196; 133 F.2d 583; 219 P. 408, 93 Okla. 13. May 11, 1961.

"Whether an act or omission is the proximate cause of an injury is a question for the jury, unless the determinative facts are undisputed, and the minds of all reasonable men could reach only one conclusion from such facts as to the proximate cause of the injury. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dickson, 27 Tenn. App. 752, 173 S.W.2d 714; Tri-State Transit Co. of Louisiana, Inc., v. Duffey, 27 Tenn. App. 731, 173 S.W.2d 706." The statements in the above referred to cases are cited with approval in McGinniss v. Brown, 30 Tenn. App. 178, 204 S.W.2d 334, 335. The Court has reviewed every citation relied upon by the defendant as shown by the excellent brief of his counsel and we have no fault whatsoever with those citations for they do support the propositions of law outlined in the brief.

Whether the plaintiff under the evidence was guilty of negligence which proximately caused or contributed to his injuries by walking on the unlighted spur track in the night-time when he could have safely walked to his work on a well-lighted street was a question under the circumstances for the jury and not an issue to be determined by the Court as a matter of law, it being a question about which reasonable minds might differ. Duling v. Burnett, 22 Tenn. App. 522, 124 S.W.2d 294; Patillo v. Gambill, 22 Tenn. App. 485, 124 S.W.2d 272; McBroom v. S.E. Greyhound Lines, Tenn. App. 193 S.W.2d 92; Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery, etc., Co., 22 Tenn. App. 70, 118 S.W.2d 561; Brown v. Chattanooga, 180 Tenn. 284, 174 S.W.2d 466; Fields v. Gordon, Tenn. App., 203 S.W.2d 934; McGinniss v. Brown, Tenn. App., 204 S.W.2d 334; Campbell v. Campbell, Tenn. App., 199 S.W.2d 931; Walters v. Staton, 21 Tenn. App. 401, 111 S.W.2d 381. Defendants complain that the verdict was so excessive as to indicate passion, prejudice and caprice on the part of the jury.