McGhee v. State

40 Citing cases

  1. Ex Parte Smith

    694 So. 2d 1261 (Ala. 1997)   Cited 2 times

    "In a prosecution for vehicular homicide, evidence of the defendant's prior history regarding drugs, alcohol, and driving may be admissible in order to prove that the defendant had been drinking or using drugs prior to the accident, the defendant's intent, or the defendant's reckless indifference to the probable consequences of his acts, regardless of whether the prior arrests resulted in convictions. See Smoot v. State, 520 So.2d 182, 184-85 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); Holifield v. State, 520 So.2d 240, 243-44 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); Klingel v. State, 518 So.2d 853, 855-56 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); Patterson v. State, 518 So.2d 809, 813-14 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); Brown v. State, 492 So.2d 661, 663-64 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986); Reeves v. State, 470 So.2d 1374, 1376 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985); Palmer v. State, 401 So.2d 266, 268-70 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 270 (Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982); McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865, 868-69 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976) (admission constituted error where prior DUI convictions were 10 years old)."

  2. Palmer v. State

    401 So. 2d 266 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)   Cited 49 times
    In Palmer v. State, 401 So.2d 266 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), this court held that "where ample evidence, even though conflicting, exists from which the trial judge could conclude that the appellant was not intoxicated to the extent of mania, the admission of a confession for a jury's consideration is not an abuse of discretion."

    The defendant objected to the admission of these prior offenses on the grounds that they were "not relevant in point of time" and because there was no showing that the defendant was represented by counsel. In McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865, 868 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976), this Court addressed this same issue. There this Court reversed the conviction because the State introduced prior convictions of the defendant for driving while his license was revoked, running stop signs, reckless driving, speeding and improper brakes, which convictions occurred, on the average, approximately ten years before the fatal accident. In reaching this decision this Court noted:

  3. Thigpen v. Thigpen

    926 F.2d 1003 (11th Cir. 1991)   Cited 33 times
    Holding extraneous offense evidence admissible where relevant to show the defendant's and a co-defendant's relative motives

    Clearly, Thigpen wanted Williams' testimony because Williams intended to change his story and had so notified Thigpen or his attorneys. The admission of a certified judgment entry to show the prior conviction was proper. Arthur, 472 So.2d at 667; McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865, 869 (Ala.Crim.App. 1976). Finally, Thigpen was not prejudiced by the absence of a limiting instruction telling the jury to consider the evidence of his prior conviction only for motive, and warning it not to consider the prior conviction to show a propensity for criminal behavior.

  4. Boone v. State (Ex parte Boone)

    228 So. 3d 993 (Ala. 2016)   Cited 4 times
    In Boone, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the defendant's gang affiliation was irrelevant to show his motive for shooting the victim because no evidence indicated that the victim was in a rival gang or that the shooting was gang-related.

    Mason v. State, 259 Ala. 438, 66 So.2d 557 (1953) ; Nicks v. State. If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or to not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the state's case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Crim.App.1976)." ‘ "....

  5. Capote v. State

    323 So. 3d 104 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020)   Cited 16 times
    In Capote, Peter Capote, Young’s codefendant, argued that the circuit court erred in admitting Bates’s and Hammonds’s testimony that Capote was the shooter in the video from the Spring Creek Apartments and Det. Holland’s testimony that Hammonds had identified Capote from the video.

    If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or to not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the state's case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. McGhee v. State, 333 So. 2d 865 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)."" ‘....

  6. Billups v. State

    86 So. 3d 1032 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)   Cited 14 times
    Stating that ‘[p]resenting the jury with such a far-reaching “limiting” instruction carries with it the same problems as providing the jury with no specific purpose for considering the other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence’ and that, ‘[b]y simply reciting the complete “laundry list” of permissible theories under Rule 404(b), the trial court's instruction in this case gave the jury inadequate guidance’

    If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the State's case-in-chief rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App.1976); McDonald v. State, 57 Ala.App. 529, 329 So.2d 583 (1975), writ quashed, 295 Ala. 410, 329 So.2d 596 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834, 97 S.Ct. 99, 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976).’

  7. Irvin v. State

    940 So. 2d 331 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)   Cited 74 times
    Holding that delay of 32 months is presumptively prejudicial

    If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the State's case-in-chief rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976); McDonald v. State, 57 Ala.App. 529, 329 So.2d 583 (1975), writ quashed, 295 Ala. 410, 329 So.2d 596 (1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 834, 97 S.Ct. 99, 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976)."

  8. Stephens v. State

    982 So. 2d 1110 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)   Cited 14 times

    If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the State's case-in-chief rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976); McDonald v. State, 57 Ala.App. 529, 329 So.2d 583 (1975), writ quashed, 295 Ala. 410, 329 So.2d 596 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834, 97 S.Ct. 99, 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976)." As previously stated, probative evidence of collateral bad acts may be excluded only when the evidence is " unduly and unfairly prejudicial."

  9. Anderson v. State

    886 So. 2d 895 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)   Cited 2 times

    The decision to allow or not to allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the state's case-in-chief rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976). "The trial court may exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

  10. Hocker v. State

    840 So. 2d 197 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that any error in admitting evidence of a "collateral bad act" was harmless in light of defendant's corroborated confession

    Mason v. State, 259 Ala. 438, 66 So.2d 557 (1953); Nicks v. State. If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or to not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the state's case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976)."