"In a prosecution for vehicular homicide, evidence of the defendant's prior history regarding drugs, alcohol, and driving may be admissible in order to prove that the defendant had been drinking or using drugs prior to the accident, the defendant's intent, or the defendant's reckless indifference to the probable consequences of his acts, regardless of whether the prior arrests resulted in convictions. See Smoot v. State, 520 So.2d 182, 184-85 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); Holifield v. State, 520 So.2d 240, 243-44 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); Klingel v. State, 518 So.2d 853, 855-56 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); Patterson v. State, 518 So.2d 809, 813-14 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); Brown v. State, 492 So.2d 661, 663-64 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986); Reeves v. State, 470 So.2d 1374, 1376 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985); Palmer v. State, 401 So.2d 266, 268-70 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 270 (Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982); McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865, 868-69 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976) (admission constituted error where prior DUI convictions were 10 years old)."
The defendant objected to the admission of these prior offenses on the grounds that they were "not relevant in point of time" and because there was no showing that the defendant was represented by counsel. In McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865, 868 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976), this Court addressed this same issue. There this Court reversed the conviction because the State introduced prior convictions of the defendant for driving while his license was revoked, running stop signs, reckless driving, speeding and improper brakes, which convictions occurred, on the average, approximately ten years before the fatal accident. In reaching this decision this Court noted:
Clearly, Thigpen wanted Williams' testimony because Williams intended to change his story and had so notified Thigpen or his attorneys. The admission of a certified judgment entry to show the prior conviction was proper. Arthur, 472 So.2d at 667; McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865, 869 (Ala.Crim.App. 1976). Finally, Thigpen was not prejudiced by the absence of a limiting instruction telling the jury to consider the evidence of his prior conviction only for motive, and warning it not to consider the prior conviction to show a propensity for criminal behavior.
Mason v. State, 259 Ala. 438, 66 So.2d 557 (1953) ; Nicks v. State. If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or to not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the state's case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Crim.App.1976)." ‘ "....
If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or to not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the state's case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. McGhee v. State, 333 So. 2d 865 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)."" ‘....
If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the State's case-in-chief rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App.1976); McDonald v. State, 57 Ala.App. 529, 329 So.2d 583 (1975), writ quashed, 295 Ala. 410, 329 So.2d 596 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834, 97 S.Ct. 99, 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976).’
If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the State's case-in-chief rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976); McDonald v. State, 57 Ala.App. 529, 329 So.2d 583 (1975), writ quashed, 295 Ala. 410, 329 So.2d 596 (1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 834, 97 S.Ct. 99, 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976)."
If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the State's case-in-chief rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976); McDonald v. State, 57 Ala.App. 529, 329 So.2d 583 (1975), writ quashed, 295 Ala. 410, 329 So.2d 596 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834, 97 S.Ct. 99, 50 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976)." As previously stated, probative evidence of collateral bad acts may be excluded only when the evidence is " unduly and unfairly prejudicial."
The decision to allow or not to allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the state's case-in-chief rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976). "The trial court may exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Mason v. State, 259 Ala. 438, 66 So.2d 557 (1953); Nicks v. State. If the evidence is not so remote as to lose its relevancy, the decision to allow or to not allow evidence of collateral crimes or acts as part of the state's case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. McGhee v. State, 333 So.2d 865 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976)."