Opinion
Civil Action 23-430
05-04-2023
DARELLE TOBERT MCGHEE, Plaintiff, v. SCI GREENE, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”).
II. Report
A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff Darelle Tobert McGhee commenced this pro se in forma pauperis (“IFP”) lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation of his right from “not being fed food.” (ECF No. 7 at 3.) McGhee was granted IFP status on April 25, 2023 (ECF No. 6), and his Complaint was docketed on April 26, 2023. (ECF No. 7.)
B. Relevant Factual Background
Both the factual allegations and legal grounds in the Complaint are not entirely clear. (See generally, ECF No. 7.) It appears that McGhee is bringing a claim against SCI Greene due to a correctional officer identified as “Stanish” not giving McGhee a breakfast tray on February 25, 2023 at 6:23 am and February 26, 2023 at 6:23 am. (Id.) He seeks damages in the amount of $50,000 for the violation of his right to receive three meals a day. (Id.)
C. Legal Standard
Section 1915 requires courts to screen an IFP complaint and dismiss the action before the complaint is served if the complaint fails to state a claim or is frivolous or malicious. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013)). In screening complaints under § 1915, courts utilize the same standard that is applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
A complaint is susceptible to dismissal if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Additionally, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Therefore, when screening a complaint, a court must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Mowery v. Wetzel, 1:19-CV-44, 2019 WL 2931672, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted by, 2019 WL 2929002 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2019).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction “defined (within constitutional bounds) by federal statute.” Badgerow v. Walters, 142 S.Ct. 1310, 1315 (2022) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). District courts have jurisdiction over “two main kinds of cases,” diversity cases and cases involving a federal question. Id. at 131516. Diversity cases are “suits between citizens of different States as to any matter valued at more than $75,000.” Id. at 1316 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). Federal question cases are those that arise under federal law. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). “Typically, an action arises under federal law if that law ‘creates the cause of action asserted.'” Id. (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013)).
As McGhee is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his factual allegations liberally. See Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”).
D. Discussion
1. SCI Greene is Entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Although McGhee does not specify a constitutional provision in his Section 1983 Complaint, a liberal reading of his Complaint shows that as a convicted prisoner who has been sentenced (see ECF No. 7 at 4), he is alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment arising out of his failure to receive a breakfast tray two days in a row.
Although McGhee identifies correctional officer “Stanish” as being the person who did not provide him with his breakfast tray,McGhee's Complaint identifies only SCI Greene, a state correctional facility, as a defendant.
Even if McGhee's claim was against Stanish in his individual capacity, it would still be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. “[P]rison officials violate an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights when they deprive her of ‘a single identifiable human need such as food....'” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).) “But an inmate's claim that she was subjected to such a deprivation does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless: (1) the prison official deprived the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities; and (2) the prison official acted with deliberate indifference in doing so, thereby exposing the inmate to a substantial risk of serious damage to her future health. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994).) The Third Circuit has found that “the alleged deprivation of three meals over two days fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Zanders v. Ferko, 439 Fed.Appx. 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011); see also, Barnes v. Medva, No. 3:19-CV-00202-SLH, 2022 WL 4367603, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2022), report and recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 4367603 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 21, 2022) (“Plaintiff's allegations that he was denied four meals - two breakfasts and two lunches - over a period of two days does not rise to the level of a substantial deprivation of food to set forth a viable Eighth Amendment claim.” (collecting cases).) Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied two meals over two days.
The Eleventh Amendment protects States and their agencies and departments from suit in federal court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100104 S.Ct. 900 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment”); Estate of Logano v. Bergen Co. Prosecutor's Office, 769 F.3d. 850, 857 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Sovereign immunity extends to state agencies and state officers, ‘as long as the state is the real party in interest.'”) (quoting Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989)). Thus, “[u]nder the Eleventh Amendment, states and their agencies are immune from suits in federal court, unless Congress has overridden that immunity or the State has waived its immunity.” Sims v. Wexford Health Sources, 635 Fed.Appx. 16, 19 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Neither exception is applicable here. “When enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress did not override Pennsylvania's immunity from suit,” and “Pennsylvania has expressly withheld its consent to be sued.” Id. (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-45 (1979) and 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b).)
Because SCI Greene is a part of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, which itself is a state agency, see Sims, 635 Fed.Appx. at 19 (citing 71 P.S. § 310-1), SCI Greene is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit and is not a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.; see also, Foye v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-2478, 2016 WL 1296182, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2016) aff'd by 675 Fed.Appx. 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2017).
Therefore, the Court recommends dismissing McGhee § 1983 claim against the SCI Greene pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity without prejudice. Merritts v. Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 772 (3d Cir. Mar. 16, 2023) (noting that because “Eleventh Amendment immunity is a ‘threshold, nonmerits issue' that ‘does not entail any assumption by the court of substantive lawdeclaring power,' ... dismissal on that basis, like dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, should normally be without prejudice.”).
2. Futility of Amendment
When dismissing a civil rights case for failure to state a claim, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint, regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Here, McGhee claims against SCI Greene are clearly barred pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity and thus any further claim would be futile.
E. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss McGhee's Complaint under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
F. Notice
In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).