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reducing hours for a "garden-variety discovery-sanction motion" from 140 hours to "a still fairly generous forty hours"
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03 Civ. 1870 (WHP) (MHD).
June 6, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
By Memorandum and Order dated February 24, 2005, we granted in part a motion by defendants for sanctions against plaintiff for his determined flouting of his discovery obligations over an extended period of time. As part of the remedy, we specified that defendants were entitled to reimbursement of the expenses of their motion, including reasonable attorney's fees. (Feb. 24, 2005 Memo Order at 11).
The District Court adopted that decision by order dated March 22, 2005.
In the wake of that decision, defendants have submitted an application for a fee and expense award, supported by an affirmation of counsel and a set of contemporaneous time records. (See Affirmation of Joanne Skolnick, Esq., executed March 10, 2005 Ex. B). Based on that submission, they seek an award of $30,779.99. This figure represents 136.75 hours spent by a partner at $300.00 per hour and 4.15 hours spent by a more junior attorney at $200.00 an hour, plus disbursements totaling $1,377.15. (See id. at Ex. B).
Plaintiff has filed a brief submission in opposition. He offers little more than the observation that the amount sought is "hardly reasonable costs for the action." (See Pltff's Response at first page).
ANALYSIS
A. The Governing Criteria
When assessing fee applications under the discovery rules, the courts look to the long-accepted lodestar method of determining attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557, 564 (1988); SEC. v. Thrasher, 1995 WL 552704, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1995); Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Fly See Travel Inc., 1991 WL 258767, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1991). Under the lodestar analysis, "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate for attorneys and paraprofessionals."Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992). Accord, e.g., Clark v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1992). We briefly summarize the criteria applicable to each aspect of the analysis.
To determine the number of hours that should be compensable, the court must initially look to the amount of time spent on each category of tasks, as documented by contemporaneous time records of the moving party's attorney. See, e.g., New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1983). The court must then determine how much of that time was "reasonably" expended. "In calculating the number of `reasonable hours,' the court must look to its own familiarity with the case and its experience with the case and its experience generally as well as to the evidentiary submissions and arguments of the parties." Clark, 960 F.2d at 1153 (quoting DiFillipo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1985)). If the court concludes that portions of the expended time were not reasonably necessary to achieve the successful result obtained by the movant, it should reduce the time for which compensation is awarded. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1983); Clark, 960 F.2d at 1153; Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 935 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1991). Such reductions are appropriate to account for work on claims unrelated to those on which the movant ultimately prevailed,see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546, 558-61 (1986); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 705 (2d Cir. 2001), or for plainly inefficient or duplicative work. See, e.g., Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-35; Orchano v. Advanced Recovery, Inc., 107 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1997).
As for the appropriate hourly rates, the court should look to the rates "prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11 (1984) (citing cases); Chambless v. Masters, Mates Pilots Pension Plan, 885 F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1989). In meeting this requirement, the fee applicant bears the burden of proof, see, e.g., Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n. 11; Chambless, 885 F.2d at 1059, although the court may also take judicial notice of prevailing rates in its own legal community. See, e.g., Miele v. New York State Teamsters Conf. Pension Retirement Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1987). Accord, Chambless, 885 F.2d at 1059.
In making findings with respect to the proper hourly rate, the court should look to fees charged by attorneys comparably situated to those representing the movant. Thus, if the movant is represented by a small or medium-sized firm, the appropriate rates are those typically charged by such firms, whereas a movant may obtain higher compensation rates if represented by a large urban firm, since such firms typically charge more per hour to cover a higher overhead. See, e.g., Chambless, 885 F.2d at 1058-59;Huertas v. East River Housing Corp., 662 F. Supp. 282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), vac. on other gds., 813 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1987).
Although the lodestar figure is the presumptively appropriate amount to award, there may be circumstances that justify an adjustment. Enhancement may be justified by significant delay in obtaining an award or by the court's finding that the attorney assumed a substantial and provable risk of loss. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1989); Delaware Valey Citizens Council, 483 U.S. at 730-31.
B. Assessment of Defendants' Application
By our prior decision, we recognized an entitlement on the part of defendants to the expenses, including reasonable fees, engendered by their sanctions motion. For the work product that was proffered by defendants in support of a garden-variety discovery-sanction motion — although that product was entirely competent — the more than 140 hours of attorney time that defendants claim is extraordinary. This may be partly attributable to the fact that counsel appear to have included at least some time devoted to tasks not related to the preparation of their motion papers. Nonetheless, even if we subtract out such time, the remainder is still grossly out of line with what should have been required to prepare a set of papers (including reply papers) in this case.
We recognize that estimating the time reasonably required to perform legal tasks is fraught with arbitrariness and, occasionally, some degree of wishful thinking. Nonetheless, we have little hesitation in concluding that, simply as a measure of reasonable time, counsel's claimed time should be reduced to a still fairly generous forty hours. Moreover, since much of the briefing addressed the propriety of dismissing the complaint, an argument that we rejected, we further reduce that figure to twenty-five hours, one of which we will attribute to the junior attorney.
As for the hourly rates, the two attorneys are seeking reimbursement for $300.00 and $200.00, respectively. Although neither offers any information about their background and experience, or about the nature of their law firm, we recognize that fee rates at these levels are well within the range of reasonableness even of small firms in this district. Accordingly, we accept these rates.
Based on the foregoing assessment, we conclude that defendants should be reimbursed for fees in the amount of $7,400.00. As for defendants' claimed disbursements, almost all represent computer research and photocopy charges. Some of these charges seem surprisingly high, and we are not convinced that all were related to the preparation of the motion papers, a concern heightened by the description of some of the attorney tasks for which compensation is sought. Nonetheless, we will impose only a modest ten percent reduction to account for these problems, thus yielding an expense award of $1,239.34.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we award defendants $7,400.00 in fees plus $1,239.34 in disbursements related to their sanctions motion against plaintiff.