Nevertheless, “[t]he defense is entitled to an instruction covering its theory of the case so long as there is evidence in the record that would support that theory without regard to the probative value of that evidence so long as it is more than a mere scintilla of proof.” Lester v. State, 862 So.2d 582, 586 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing McGee v. State, 820 So.2d 700, 705 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2000)). ¶ 47.

The trial court enjoys considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of jury instructions. McGee v. State, 820 So.2d 700, 705 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000). "The principal concern is that the jury was fairly instructed and that it understood each party's theory of the case."

“[T]he defense is entitled to an instruction covering the theory of the case so long as there is evidence in the record that would support that theory without regard to the probative value of that evidence so long as it is more than a mere scintilla of proof.” Lester v. State, 862 So.2d 582, 586 (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing McGee v. State, 820 So.2d 700, 705 (Miss.Ct.App.2000)). ¶ 20.

[t]he defense is entitled to an instruction covering its theory of the case so long as there is evidence in the record that would support that theory without regard to the probative value of that evidence so long as it is more than a mere scintilla of proof. E.g. McGee v. State, 820 So. 2d 700[, 705] (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). However, in this case, the only evidence dealing with Lester’s use of force against Marple came from Lester’s own testimony.

¶39. Yarborough cites McGee v. State, 820 So.2d 700 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000), to show an example of a judge prejudging a case. The relevant exchange follows:

"A party has the right to have his theory of the case presented to the jury by instructions, provided that there is credible evidence that supports that theory." McGee v. State , 820 So. 2d 700, 705 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Alley v. Praschak Mach. Co. , 366 So. 2d 661, 665 (Miss. 1979) ).

The standard test for recusal is that the judge must recuse himself "if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality." McGee v. State, 820 So.2d 700, 711 (¶ 33) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000) (quoting Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 (1995)). A presumption exists that the judge is qualified and unbiased; in order to overcome this presumption, the evidence must produce a reasonable doubt about the validity of the presumption.

The test for recusal is as follows: "A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality." McGee v. State, 820 So.2d 700, 711 (¶ 33) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000) (quoting Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 (1995)). We are unable to find evidence that the circuit court judge showed any signs of bias in favor of Johns's attorney.

In this regard we have held, "A party has the right to have his theory of the case presented to the jury by instructions, provided that there is credible evidence that supports that theory." McGee v. State, 820 So.2d 700, 705 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000) (citation omitted). In the record we find credible evidence presented to support Renfroe's theory of his employment status in addition to Berryhill's theory of contributory negligence, if Renfroe was found not to be an employee.

The defense is entitled to an instruction covering its theory of the case so long as there is evidence in the record that would support that theory without regard to the probative value of that evidence so long as it is more than a mere scintilla of proof. E.g., McGee v. State, 820 So.2d 700 (¶ 9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). However, in this case, the only evidence dealing with Lester's use of force against Marple came from Lester's own testimony.