McGavock v. Woodlief

25 Citing cases

  1. Riggs v. Turnbull

    66 A. 13 (Md. 1907)   Cited 21 times
    In Riggs v. Turnbull, 105 Md. 135, 66 A. 13 (1907), a property owner agreed that he would pay the usual commission if the broker "sold the house."

    But if the principal accepts him, either upon the terms previously proposed or upon modified terms then agreed on, and a valid contract is entered into between the principal and the person presented by the broker, the commission is earned. But if, as was the case in McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221, the principal rejects the purchaser, and the broker claims his commissions, he must show, not only that the person furnished was willing to accept the offer precisely as made, but, in addition, that he was an eligible purchaser, and such as the principal was bound, as between himself and the broker, to accept."

  2. Coppage v. Howard

    96 A. 642 (Md. 1916)   Cited 29 times
    In Coppage v. Howard, 127 Md. 512, 522, this court quoted with approval from 19 Cyc. 246: "A broker employed to find a purchaser is not entitled to a commission where no sale is made, unless the purchaser is able, ready and willing to take the property upon the terms specified by the principal.

    The undertaking to procure a purchaser required of the party so undertaking, to produce a party capable and who ultimately becomes the purchaser. These propositions are settled in Keener v. Harrod and Brooke, 2 Md. 63, and McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221.'" He also quoted the statement of the Supreme Court in the case of McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 229, cited by JUDGE ALVEY in Kimberley v. Henderson, supra: "The broker must complete the sale; that is he must find a purchaser in a situation, and ready and willing to complete the purchase on the terms agreed on, before he is entitled to his commissions.

  3. Greenwood & Co. Real Estate v. C-D Inv. Co.

    18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)

    And before a broker can be said to have earned his commission, it must also be shown that he produced a purchaser, who was ready and willing to make the purchase and that he was the procuring cause of the lease. (McGavock v. Woodlief (1857) 61 U.S. (20 How.) 221, 15 L.Ed. 884; Wylie v. Marine National Bank (1875) 61 N.Y. 415.)         There is no serious dispute about most of these prerequisites.

  4. Crowe v. Trickey

    204 U.S. 228 (1907)   Cited 27 times
    In Crowe v. Trickey (1907), 204 U.S. 228, 27 Sup. Ct. 275, 51 L.Ed. 454, George W. Crowe brought an action against the administrator of the estate of Norman H. Chapin to recover $5,000 as commission on a sale of a one-fourth interest in a mine alleged to have been effected by Crowe for Chapin, during Chapin's lifetime.

    In these circumstances we concur in the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory. In McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221, it was laid down that in order to be entitled to commission "the broker must complete the sale, that is, he must find a purchaser in a situation and ready and willing to complete the purchase on the terms agreed on." But this rule is inapplicable when the owner refuses without sufficient reasons, to fulfill the agreement which the agent has made. Kock v. Emmerling, 22 How. 69. Even though he could not have been compelled to carry out his contract if he had chosen to set up the statute of frauds.

  5. Sweet v. H.R. Howenstein Co.

    73 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1934)   Cited 6 times

    Such an introduction of Mrs. Fravel to Mr. Howenstein is not the production of a purchaser ready, able, and willing to buy, for such a purchaser must be prepared to close and able to perform his contract. Mannix v. Hildreth, 2 App. D.C. 259; Block v. Ryan, 4 App. D.C. 283; Fox v. Cohen, 34 App. D.C. 389; Riggs v. Turnbull, 105 Md. 135, 66 A. 13, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 824, 11 Ann. Cas. 783; McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221, 15 L. Ed. 884. However, this action rests not upon the usual contract between owner and broker but upon a special and conditional contract pleaded and proved by the plaintiff, from which it is apparent that the defendant's liability was contingent upon an occurrence which never took place. For the contract fixes the total commission at $8,900, receivable in certain installments, "if paid by purchaser."

  6. Wisconsin Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Day

    35 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1929)   Cited 8 times
    In Wisconsin Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Day (C.C.A. 8) 35 F.2d 563, 566, Judge Munger, speaking for this court, said: "If different inferences may reasonably be drawn from those facts, the question is for the jury."

    Such a contract with one acting as a broker requires the broker to find a purchaser ready, able, and willing, to buy on the terms proposed by the seller to the broker, unless the owner refuses to sell without sufficient reasons. McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221, 227, 15 L. Ed. 884; Crowe v. Trickey, 204 U.S. 228, 238, 239, 27 S. Ct. 275, 51 L. Ed. 454; 9 Corp. Jur. 611. The instructions given by the court allowed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff, if the negotiations between appellee and the appellant were continuous, and if the appellee brought a purchaser to the appellant during the life of the contract, to whom a sale was made.

  7. Land Co. of Florida v. Fetty

    15 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1926)   Cited 11 times

    When plaintiff procured a purchaser ready, able, and willing to buy, he had complied with his contract. McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221, 15 L. Ed. 884. In view of the facts, we do not think the contract of employment between plaintiff and defendant could be considered as governed by the laws of Florida.

  8. Grommet v. Newman

    2009 WY 150 (Wyo. 2009)   Cited 10 times

    Irvine finally entered into an altogether different sale agreement. The performance relied on by the plaintiff does not meet the requirements of the rule announced by the decisions hereinabove reviewed and cited, and succinctly declared by Mr. Justice Nelson in McGavock v. Woodlief, 61 U.S. 221, 227, 20 How. 221, 15 L.Ed. 884, where he said: `The broker must complete the sale; that is, he must find a purchaser in a situation and ready and willing to complete the purchase on the terms agreed on, before he is entitled to his commissions.

  9. In re Ward's Estate

    47 N.M. 55 (N.M. 1943)   Cited 7 times

    This case, was appealed to and affirmed by, the Supreme Court of the United States ( 204 U.S. 228, 27 S.Ct. 275, 51 L.Ed. 454), and that court stated that the deaths of Chapin and Neville (the owners) terminated the authority of Crowe to sell on commission; as the power to sell was not coupled with an interest in the property on which the power was to operate. To support its conclusion the Supreme Court cited McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221, 15 L.Ed. 884, and Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N.Y. 378, 38 Am.Rep. 441. Also see Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L.Ed. 589; Peter's Ex'r et al. v. Beverly et al., 10 Pet. 532, 9 L.Ed. 522; State of Missouri v. Walker, 125 U.S. 339, 8 S.Ct. 929, 31 L.Ed. 769; Martin Son v. Lamkin, 188 Ill. App. 431; Kyle v. Gaff et al., 105 Mo. App. 672, 78 S.W. 1047; Weaver v. Richards, 144 Mich. 395, 108 N.W. 382, 6 L.R.A., N.S., 855; Hartford v. McGillicuddy; 103 Me. 224, 68 A. 860, 16 L.R.A., N.S., 431, 12 Ann.Cas. 1083; Swearingen v. Moore, 215 Mo. App. 531, 257 S.W. 815.

  10. Johnson v. Insurance Co.

    20 S.E.2d 327 (N.C. 1942)   Cited 5 times

    Under the view taken by the court as to the principle sustaining the judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff's exception to the exclusion of evidence tending to show there was a bona fide commitment on the part of Bennett as purchaser of the property becomes immaterial. It is considered that it was the duty of plaintiff to make a full disclosure to the defendant in response to its request for the name of the purchaser; Trust Co. v. Adams, 145 N.C. 161, 58 S.E. 1008 — that it was required that he should produce a purchaser willing, ready and able to take and pay for the property. Crowell v. Parker, 171 N.C. 392, 88 S.E. 497; Gerding v. Haskings, 141 N.Y. 514, 36 N.E. 60; McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 Howard (U.S.), 221, 15 L.Ed., 884; Kaercher v. Schee, 189 Minn. 272, 249 N.W. 180, 88 A.L.R., 294; Am. Law Inst. Restatement, Agency, Vol. 2, pp. 1038-1041, sec. 445. Plaintiff's counsel refers us, also, to Real Estate Co. v. Moser, 175 N.C. 255, 95 S.E. 498; Clark v. Lumber Co., 158 N.C. 139, 73 S.E. 793; Aycock v. Bogue, 182 N.C. 105, 108 S.E. 434; Ingle v. Green, 202 N.C. 122, 162 S.E. 476; Harris v. Trust Co., 205 N.C. 530, 172 S.E. 177; Veasey v. Carson (Mass.), 58 N.E. 171, and to 8 Am. Jur., 1038-1039. These authorities are not thought to be at variance with the conclusion reached by the Court on the crucial point of performance of the contract as here discussed.