Plaintiff's defamation claims against the State Defendants are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to such claims. See Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) (actions for libel and slander “shall be commenced within two years”); Songa v. Sunrise Senior Living Invs., 22 F.Supp.3d 939, 942 (D.Minn.2014) (“In Minnesota, claims for defamation ... are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.”); McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn.App.1989) (“The statute of limitations governing defamation claims is two years.”); see also Shepard v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 509 Fed.Appx. 556, 556 (8th Cir.2013) (per curiam). The latest defamatory statement by the State Defendants was allegedly made by Moen in 2011, more than two years before Plaintiff filed the instant action in 2014.

Plaintiff's defamation claims against the State Defendants are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to such claims. See Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (actions for libel and slander "shall be commenced within two years"); Songa v. Sunrise SeniorLiving Invs., No. 13-cv-2254 (DSD/JJG), 22 F. Supp. 3d 939, 942 (D. Minn. 2014) ("In Minnesota, claims for defamation . . . are subject to a two-year statute of limitations."); McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. App. 1989) ("The statute of limitations governing defamation claims is two years."); seealso Shepard v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 509 Fed. App'x 556, 556 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). The latest defamatory statement by the State Defendants was allegedly made by Moen in 2011, more than two years before Plaintiff filed the instant action in 2014.

The Dirkswager-type absolute privilege is to be applied sparingly and protects only "top-level, cabinet-equivalent executives." See, e.g., id. at 221 (Commissioner of Public Welfare has an absolute privilege to defame); McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Minn.App. 1989) (chair of Metropolitan Airport Commission has an absolute privilege to defame), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).

Regardless, "in the absence of fraud, ignorance of the existence of the cause of action does not toll the statute of limitations." Johnson v. Winthrop Labs. Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1971); see also McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("Lack of knowledge of a defamatory publication will not toll the statute of limitations; the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of publication."). Although fraudulent concealment of a cause of action may permit tolling of the statute of limitations, Fredin has not plausibly alleged that Kreil fraudulently concealed her identity. "Under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard, 'allegations of fraud, including fraudulent concealment for tolling purposes, [must] be pleaded with particularity.

However, where a tortious interference claim is predicated on "defamatory" activity, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to libel or slander claims applies. See Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1); Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775, 793 (1975); McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Minn.App. 1989). The task in this case, then, is to identify the allegedly tortious activity about which Randy's complains.

See Harris v. Tietex Int'l Ltd., 790 S.E.2d 411, 416 (S.C. Ct. App. 2016); Horne v. Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 746 S.E.2d 13, 20 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); Casa de Meadows Inc. (Cayman Is.) v. Zaman, 908 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631-32 (N.Y.App.Div. 2010); Lewis v. Del. Cnty. Joint Vocational Sch. Dist., 829 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 821-22 (Tenn. 1994); Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano, Erikson & Kupfer, P.A. v. Flanagan, 629 So.2d 113, 115 (Fla. 1993); LaPan v. Myers, 491 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Neb. 1992); McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989); L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1425, 1429 (D. Conn. 1986) (applying Connecticut law); Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 721, 725 (R.I. 1985); Lawrence v. Bauer Publ'g & Printing Ltd., 396 A.2d 569, 571 (N.J. 1979) (Pashman, J., concurring); Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107, 109-10 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying Kentucky law); Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F.Supp. 850, 852-53 (D. Kan. 1977) (applying Kansas law); Brown v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 212 F.Supp. 832, 835 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (applying Missouri law). See Arthaud v. Fuglie, 987 N.W.2d 379, 381 (N.D. 2023) ("We find it unnecessary to determine whether the discovery rule should apply to defamation claims because the Uniform Single Publication Act, as adopted by the North Dakota legislature, precludes application of the discovery rule when the alleged defamatory statement was made to the public."); Linn, 903 N.W.2d at 343 (stating that Iowa has "not decided whether the discovery rule applies to [the limitations

In order to invoke this equitable doctrine, Hunter must have pleaded a specific act of fraud committed by respondents in order to conceal the allegedly defamatory statements. McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).

Each new publication restarts the statute of limitations. See McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Minn.App. 1989) (concluding that a defamation action based on a 1981 memorandum was time-barred but reviewing a defamation action based on a 1985 republication of the 1981 memorandum), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).

1975). Concealment must take place through an affirmative action designed to present discovery. McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn.App. 1989), review denied (Minn. June 20, 1989).

See Minn. Stat. § 541.07 (libel, slander, assault); Christenson v.Argonaut Ins. Cos., 380 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn.App. 1986) (intentional infliction of emotional distress), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 1986); McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn.App. 1989) (for defamation, statute of limitations begins at time of publication), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989); Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 447, 234 N.W.2d 775, 793 (1975) (section 541.07 applies where claimed wrongful interference with business occurs through defamation).