MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton

30 Citing cases

  1. Knight v. Knight

    316 Ga. App. 599 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 24 times
    Holding plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of causation in a medical-malpractice case when expert testified, inter alia, doctor’s failure to timely diagnose the patient was a contributing cause leading to her ultimate death

    Dr. Guyton testified that Mrs. Knight's death was the downstream result of the dissection. Based on this combined expert testimony, we conclude that Knight presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact over whether the myocardial infarction, reflecting the rupture of Mrs. Knight's aortic dissection, would have been prevented if Dr. Roberts had properly complied with the standard of care during Mrs. Knight's examination in the ER. See Naik v. Booker, 303 Ga.App. 282, 286–287, 692 S.E.2d 855 (2010) (affirming the denial of summary judgment to a physician who had failed to timely identify and stop the patient's hemorrhage, which contributed to the patient's ultimate death); MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga.App. 577, 583–584(2), (3), 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007) (affirming the denial of the Board of Regent's motion for summary judgment since a jury question regarding causation existed based upon expert testimony that the physician's delay in diagnosing the patient's torsion condition prevented emergency surgery to salvage the patient's testicle); Walker, supra, 276 Ga.App. at 641–642(1), 624 S.E.2d 191 (concluding that a jury issue as to causation was presented in the patient's medical malpractice action based upon combined expert testimony that the rupture of the patient's appendix could have been avoided if she had not been misdiagnosed upon her first admission into the hospital). Since there was expert testimony reflecting that Dr. Robert's misdiagnosis contributed to Mrs. Knight's death, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Dr. Roberts's favor.

  2. Jenkins v. Corizon Health Inc.

    CASE NO. CV418-099 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2020)

    Additionally, the Court is not persuaded by Corizon Defendants' argument that summary judgment is appropriate because the experts cannot opine on a time in which Alexander passed the "point of no return." In MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 583, 647 S.E.2d 81, 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007), the plaintiff offered expert testimony that the following actions were deviations from the standard of care: (1) the hospital staff's act of negligently misplacing his form from the hospital's emergency communication center in which his hospital admission had already been approved, and (2) the triage nurse's act of classifying him as "non-urgent" following her examination of him. The plaintiff's medical expert opined that these actions were deviations from the standard of care and that the actions delayed Plaintiff from being seen by a physician which ultimately led to the loss of his testicle.

  3. Nathans v. Diamond

    282 Ga. 804 (Ga. 2007)   Cited 60 times
    Granting summary judgment to defendant where plaintiff failed to comply with requirement in OCGA § 9–11–9.1 that the affidavit be given by an expert competent to testify

    Gotten v. Phillips, 280 Ga. App. 280, 284 ( 633 SE2d 655) (2006). Accord MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 581 ( 647 SE2d 81) (2007); Mays v. Ellis, 283 Ga. App. 195, 198 ( 641 SE2d 201) (2007).Gotten, 280 Ga. App. at 284; MCG Health, 285 Ga. App. at 581; Mays, 283 Ga. App. at 198.

  4. Pneumo Abex, LLC v. Long

    357 Ga. App. 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 28 times

    To the contrary, Georgia law requires only that "an expert state an opinion regarding proximate causation in terms stronger than that of medical possibility, i.e., reasonable medical probability or reasonable medical certainty."MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 582 (2), 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007) (punctuation omitted); accordMoore v. Singh , 326 Ga. App. 805, 808 (1), 755 S.E.2d 319 (2014). In portions of their brief, the appellants suggest that this Court should apply a lesser or different standard than the one that we apply in medical-malpractice cases because this is not a medical-malpractice case against a defendant doctor.

  5. Mekoya v. Clancy

    360 Ga. App. 452 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 7 times
    Affirming denial of summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim against hospital nursing staff for failing to notify doctor of patient's drop in blood pressure and failing to escalate family's request for a cardiology consult

    was qualified to give expert testimony about the accepted standard of medical care applicable to a physician interpreting the type of x-ray at issue here and to render an opinion whether [the emergency physician's] interpretation of [the patient's x-ray] breached that standard of care"); Cotten , 280 Ga. App. at 282-284, 633 S.E.2d 655 (trial court did not abuse discretion in holding that vascular surgeon was qualified to testify as to orthopedic surgeon's failure to properly assess, monitor, and respond to patient's vascular condition during orthopedic treatment and surgery); Mays v. Ellis , 283 Ga. App. 195, 196-199 (1), 641 S.E.2d 201 (2007) (concluding that gastroenterologist was qualified to render opinion that OB/GYN — who performed surgery on patient based on OB/GYN's diagnosis that patient was suffering from pancreatitis — had committed negligence by misdiagnosing patient's pancreatitis ; and that if timely diagnosed, patient's condition could have been treated nonsurgically); MCG Health v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 580-582 (1), 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007) (a medical doctor in one specialty may have the requisite knowledge and experience under Rule 702 (c) (2) to give expert opinion testimony regarding the acts or omissions of a medical doctor in another specialty). 2.

  6. Swint v. Alphonse

    348 Ga. App. 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 13 times
    Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant doctor when the plaintiff's expert testified that, in his professional opinion, there was a "high probability" that the defendant doctor's breach of the standard of care caused the plaintiff's injuries

    Dr. Palese’s opinion lacked sufficient supporting facts and data. Our precedent makes clear, however, that an expert’s opinion testimony that a physician’s breach of the standard of care caused a patient’s condition to become worse is sufficient to present a question of causation for the jury, where that opinion is based on the expert’s review of medical records and his training and experience. See Knight v. Roberts , 316 Ga. App. 599, 605-606 (1) (a), 730 S.E.2d 78 (2012) (opinion testimony of three different physicians that an ER physician’s misdiagnosis contributed to the patient’s death 10 days after being treated at the ER and after the patient had been treated by three additional physicians at two additional hospitals, was sufficient to create a question of fact on the issue of causation; the physicians’ opinions were based on the review of medical files and their significant experience either as ER physicians or as specialists in treating the plaintiff’s undiagnosed condition); MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007). In reaching this conclusion, the trial court pointed to the fact that Dr. Palese declined to opine as to whether, following the development of the compartment syndrome during the approximately 9 1/2 hour surgery at issue, Mr. Swint’s failure to be seen by the vascular or plastic surgery departments until the following day decreased Mr. Swint’s chances of regaining the full use of his arm.

  7. Harvard v. John D. Archbold Mem'l Hosp.

    365 Ga. App. 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Edokpolor v. Grady Mem. Hosp. Corp. , 347 Ga. App. 285, 287 (1), 819 S.E.2d 92 (2018) ; see also Mekoya , 360 Ga. App. at 462 (2), 861 S.E.2d 409 ; Swint v. Mae , 340 Ga. App. 480, 482 (1), 798 S.E.2d 23 (2017) ("The expert must state his or her opinion regarding proximate causation in terms stronger than that of medical possibility[.]"); MCG Health v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 582 (2), 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007) ("A mere showing of negligence without proof of causation is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Furthermore, medical causation must be proved to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and cannot be based on mere speculation.")

  8. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta/Lowndes Cnty. v. Fender

    802 S.E.2d 346 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 17 times

    (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) MCG Health v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 578, 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007). "We do not resolve disputed facts, reconcile the issues, weigh the evidence, or determine its credibility, as those matters must be submitted to a jury for resolution."

  9. Hospital Authority of Valdosta/Lowndes County v. Fender

    342 Ga. App. 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 1 times
    In Fender, supra, this Court considered the issue of whether the 2005 passage of Georgia’s apportionment statute superseded the Respon-deat Superior Rule.

    (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577 , 578 (647 SE2d 81 ) (2007). “We do not resolve disputed facts, reconcile the issues, weigh the evidence, or determine its credibility, as those matters must be submitted to a jury for resolution.”

  10. Hankla v. Jackson

    305 Ga. App. 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 21 times
    Holding trial court did not err in allowing biomechanical engineer to testify in medical malpractice case about “the myriad causes of brachial plexus injuries in general, the normal forces exerted by a mother and birth attendants during labor and delivery, and the current medical literature regarding causation of this type of injury”

    Indeed, all of the cases that have addressed this issue have premised exclusion of testimony based on inadmissible commentary on the standard of care and not on causation. See id.; MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 581-582 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81) (2007) (issue of qualification turns on the allegations of the complaint and not on the particular practice area of the defendant physician); Gotten v. Phillips, 280 Ga. App. 280, 287 ( 633 SE2d 655) (2006) (holding that OCGA § 24-9-67.1 does not require that a physician practice in the same specialty in order to testify regarding breach of the standard of care by the defendant physician).