Dr. Guyton testified that Mrs. Knight's death was the downstream result of the dissection. Based on this combined expert testimony, we conclude that Knight presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact over whether the myocardial infarction, reflecting the rupture of Mrs. Knight's aortic dissection, would have been prevented if Dr. Roberts had properly complied with the standard of care during Mrs. Knight's examination in the ER. See Naik v. Booker, 303 Ga.App. 282, 286–287, 692 S.E.2d 855 (2010) (affirming the denial of summary judgment to a physician who had failed to timely identify and stop the patient's hemorrhage, which contributed to the patient's ultimate death); MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga.App. 577, 583–584(2), (3), 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007) (affirming the denial of the Board of Regent's motion for summary judgment since a jury question regarding causation existed based upon expert testimony that the physician's delay in diagnosing the patient's torsion condition prevented emergency surgery to salvage the patient's testicle); Walker, supra, 276 Ga.App. at 641–642(1), 624 S.E.2d 191 (concluding that a jury issue as to causation was presented in the patient's medical malpractice action based upon combined expert testimony that the rupture of the patient's appendix could have been avoided if she had not been misdiagnosed upon her first admission into the hospital). Since there was expert testimony reflecting that Dr. Robert's misdiagnosis contributed to Mrs. Knight's death, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Dr. Roberts's favor.
Additionally, the Court is not persuaded by Corizon Defendants' argument that summary judgment is appropriate because the experts cannot opine on a time in which Alexander passed the "point of no return." In MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 583, 647 S.E.2d 81, 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007), the plaintiff offered expert testimony that the following actions were deviations from the standard of care: (1) the hospital staff's act of negligently misplacing his form from the hospital's emergency communication center in which his hospital admission had already been approved, and (2) the triage nurse's act of classifying him as "non-urgent" following her examination of him. The plaintiff's medical expert opined that these actions were deviations from the standard of care and that the actions delayed Plaintiff from being seen by a physician which ultimately led to the loss of his testicle.
Gotten v. Phillips, 280 Ga. App. 280, 284 ( 633 SE2d 655) (2006). Accord MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 581 ( 647 SE2d 81) (2007); Mays v. Ellis, 283 Ga. App. 195, 198 ( 641 SE2d 201) (2007).Gotten, 280 Ga. App. at 284; MCG Health, 285 Ga. App. at 581; Mays, 283 Ga. App. at 198.
To the contrary, Georgia law requires only that "an expert state an opinion regarding proximate causation in terms stronger than that of medical possibility, i.e., reasonable medical probability or reasonable medical certainty."MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 582 (2), 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007) (punctuation omitted); accordMoore v. Singh , 326 Ga. App. 805, 808 (1), 755 S.E.2d 319 (2014). In portions of their brief, the appellants suggest that this Court should apply a lesser or different standard than the one that we apply in medical-malpractice cases because this is not a medical-malpractice case against a defendant doctor.
was qualified to give expert testimony about the accepted standard of medical care applicable to a physician interpreting the type of x-ray at issue here and to render an opinion whether [the emergency physician's] interpretation of [the patient's x-ray] breached that standard of care"); Cotten , 280 Ga. App. at 282-284, 633 S.E.2d 655 (trial court did not abuse discretion in holding that vascular surgeon was qualified to testify as to orthopedic surgeon's failure to properly assess, monitor, and respond to patient's vascular condition during orthopedic treatment and surgery); Mays v. Ellis , 283 Ga. App. 195, 196-199 (1), 641 S.E.2d 201 (2007) (concluding that gastroenterologist was qualified to render opinion that OB/GYN — who performed surgery on patient based on OB/GYN's diagnosis that patient was suffering from pancreatitis — had committed negligence by misdiagnosing patient's pancreatitis ; and that if timely diagnosed, patient's condition could have been treated nonsurgically); MCG Health v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 580-582 (1), 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007) (a medical doctor in one specialty may have the requisite knowledge and experience under Rule 702 (c) (2) to give expert opinion testimony regarding the acts or omissions of a medical doctor in another specialty). 2.
Dr. Palese’s opinion lacked sufficient supporting facts and data. Our precedent makes clear, however, that an expert’s opinion testimony that a physician’s breach of the standard of care caused a patient’s condition to become worse is sufficient to present a question of causation for the jury, where that opinion is based on the expert’s review of medical records and his training and experience. See Knight v. Roberts , 316 Ga. App. 599, 605-606 (1) (a), 730 S.E.2d 78 (2012) (opinion testimony of three different physicians that an ER physician’s misdiagnosis contributed to the patient’s death 10 days after being treated at the ER and after the patient had been treated by three additional physicians at two additional hospitals, was sufficient to create a question of fact on the issue of causation; the physicians’ opinions were based on the review of medical files and their significant experience either as ER physicians or as specialists in treating the plaintiff’s undiagnosed condition); MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007). In reaching this conclusion, the trial court pointed to the fact that Dr. Palese declined to opine as to whether, following the development of the compartment syndrome during the approximately 9 1/2 hour surgery at issue, Mr. Swint’s failure to be seen by the vascular or plastic surgery departments until the following day decreased Mr. Swint’s chances of regaining the full use of his arm.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Edokpolor v. Grady Mem. Hosp. Corp. , 347 Ga. App. 285, 287 (1), 819 S.E.2d 92 (2018) ; see also Mekoya , 360 Ga. App. at 462 (2), 861 S.E.2d 409 ; Swint v. Mae , 340 Ga. App. 480, 482 (1), 798 S.E.2d 23 (2017) ("The expert must state his or her opinion regarding proximate causation in terms stronger than that of medical possibility[.]"); MCG Health v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 582 (2), 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007) ("A mere showing of negligence without proof of causation is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Furthermore, medical causation must be proved to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and cannot be based on mere speculation.")
(Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) MCG Health v. Barton , 285 Ga. App. 577, 578, 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007). "We do not resolve disputed facts, reconcile the issues, weigh the evidence, or determine its credibility, as those matters must be submitted to a jury for resolution."
(Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577 , 578 (647 SE2d 81 ) (2007). “We do not resolve disputed facts, reconcile the issues, weigh the evidence, or determine its credibility, as those matters must be submitted to a jury for resolution.”
Indeed, all of the cases that have addressed this issue have premised exclusion of testimony based on inadmissible commentary on the standard of care and not on causation. See id.; MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 581-582 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81) (2007) (issue of qualification turns on the allegations of the complaint and not on the particular practice area of the defendant physician); Gotten v. Phillips, 280 Ga. App. 280, 287 ( 633 SE2d 655) (2006) (holding that OCGA § 24-9-67.1 does not require that a physician practice in the same specialty in order to testify regarding breach of the standard of care by the defendant physician).