Opinion
217 CA 14-01690.
03-18-2016
Reginald McFADDEN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Eric T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General, Marcus Mastrocco, Deputy Solicitor General, and Anthony J. Annucci, Acting Commissioner, New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Defendants–Respondents.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of Counsel), for Defendants–Respondents. Reginald McFadden, Plaintiff–Appellant Pro Se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of Counsel), for Defendants–Respondents.
Reginald McFadden, Plaintiff–Appellant Pro Se.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:
Plaintiff appeals from an order that denied his motion seeking a default judgment on his complaint seeking declaratory relief (see CPLR 3215[a] ), and granted defendants' cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) seeking to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, Supreme Court did not exceed its authority or otherwise err in denying his motion for a default judgment inasmuch as plaintiff failed to establish that he effected service of the summons and complaint on defendants pursuant to CPLR 312–a (a) through (d), as required by CPLR 3215(f) (see Klein v. Educational Loan Servicing, LLC, 71 A.D.3d 957, 958, 897 N.Y.S.2d 220). In any event, “ ‘[a] default judgment in a declaratory judgment action will not be granted on the default and pleadings alone for it is necessary that plaintiff[ ] establish a right to a declaration’ and, here, plaintiff[ ] did not establish [his] entitlement to the declaration sought” (Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 66 A.D.3d 1493, 1494, 885 N.Y.S.2d 657).
We reject plaintiff's further contention that the court erred in granting defendants' cross motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It is well established that, “[i]n assessing a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), ... ‘the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one’ ” (Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511). “Although the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 ..., the allegations in a complaint cannot be vague and conclusory ..., and ‘[b]are legal conclusions' will not suffice” (Rios v. Tiny Giants Daycare, Inc., 135 A.D.3d 845, ––––, 22 N.Y.S.3d 890; see Williams v. Maddi, 306 A.D.2d 852, 852–853, 761 N.Y.S.2d 890, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 516, 769 N.Y.S.2d 202, 801 N.E.2d 423, cert. denied 541 U.S. 960, 124 S.Ct. 1716, 158 L.Ed.2d 400). We conclude that the allegations contained in the complaint are vague and conclusory and do not allege a justiciable controversy, i.e., “a substantial legal controversy between the parties that may be resolved by a declaration of the parties' legal rights” (Rice v. Cayuga–Onondaga Healthcare Plan, 190 A.D.2d 330, 333, 599 N.Y.S.2d 344), or any other valid cause of action for which relief may be granted.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, CURRAN, and SCUDDER, JJ., concur.