(Emphasis added.) In Ex parte Hubbard Properties, Inc., 205 So.3d 1211, 1213 (Ala.2016), this Court reaffirmed the following principles set forth in Waters v. Hipp, 600 So.2d 981 (Ala.1992), concerning the language in § 6–5–410 that only a personal representative may commence a wrongful-death action: "In Waters v. Hipp, 600 So.2d 981, 982 (Ala.1992), this Court explained:
"The Alabama Supreme Court has consistently held that only the appointed administrator or executor of a decedent's estate can maintain a wrongful death action and if there is no administrator or executor appointed at the time an action is filed, such action is a legal nullity. See Watson v. University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, 263 So. 3d 1030 (Ala. 2018), Ex parte Hubbard Properties, Inc., 205 So. 3d 1211 (Ala. 2016), Northstar Anesthesia v. Noble, 215 So. 3d 1044 (Ala. 2016), Ex parte Bio-Medical Applications of Alabama, Inc., 216 So. 3d 420 (Ala. 2016)."Letters of Administration as well as Waivers of Heirs, and other forms such as the renunciation of the County Administrator and the Bond were drafted on the Plaintiff's behalf on May 2, 3, and 4; however, those documents were not filed until May 8, 2017, after the Complaint had been filed.
On January 6, 2014, the probate court granted Darrick letters testamentary, establishing him as the personal representative of Pamela's estate. Under § 6–5–410, Ala.Code 1975, only Darrick, as personal representative, had the authority to bring a wrongful-death action. See Ex parte Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So.3d 1211 (Ala.2016). On June 26, 2014, Corey filed a wrongful-death action against the defendants, which had provided health-care services to Pamela shortly before her death.
This Court has consistently held that these requirements can be met in cases in which someone other than a personal representative commences a wrongful-death action. See, e.g., Ex parte Bio-Medical Applications of Alabama, Inc., 216 So.3d 420 (Ala. 2016); Ex parte Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So.3d 1211 (2016). In determining whether to grant mandamus relief, "this Court reviews issues of law de novo."
Watson does not dispute that a legally appointed personal representative who has been discharged and released as the personal representative of a decedent's estate no longer has the capacity to bring a wrongful-death action. See Northstar Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC v. Noble, 215 So.3d 1044 (Ala. 2016) (plurality opinion)(holding that personal representative of decedent's estate who had been discharged and released as the personal representative lacked the representative capacity to commence a wrongful-death action); see also Ex parte Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So.3d 1211 (Ala. 2016) (holding that a wrongful-death action brought by a person who was not a personal representative was a nullity). Rather, Watson argues that the probate court's March 23, 2017, order establishes that he was never discharged in his capacity as personal representative of Fejeran's estate and that he was serving in that capacity at the time he commenced the wrongful-death action.
The Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that this provision limits standing in wrongful death actions to only the personal representative of the decedent. Ex Parte Hubbard Properties, Inc., 205 So.3d 1211, 1213 (Ala. 2016); Waters v. Hipp, 600 So.2d 981, 982 (Ala. 1992) (“[O]ne who sues under this section without having been appointed executor or administrator does not qualify under this section as its personal representative, and the suit is a nullity.”).
See, e.g., Ex parte Bio-Med. Applications of Alabama, Inc., 216 So.3d 420, 422 (Ala. 2016) ("'"A wrongful death action is purely statutory; no such action existed at common law."'" (quoting Ex parte Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So.3d 1211, 1213 (Ala. 2016), quoting in turn Waters v. Hipp, 600 So.2d 981, 982 (Ala. 1992))); Giles v. Parker, 230 Ala. 119, 121, 159 So. 826, 827 (1935) ("There is no civil liability, under the common law, as interpreted in this jurisdiction, against one who wrongfully or negligently causes the death of a human being; and hence no right of action exists under the common law therefor. The right of action is purely statutory."); Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 611-12, 55 So. 104, 104 (1911) ("It has been decided and many times reaffirmed by this court that actions under [the wrongful-death statutes] are purely statutory.
" Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 974 So.2d 288, 292 (Ala. 2007).’ " Ex parte Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So.3d 1211, 1213 (Ala. 2016) (quoting Ex parte Rhodes, 144 So.3d 316, 318 (Ala. 2013) ). This Court set forth the applicable standard of review in Ex parte Bio–Medical Applications of Alabama, Inc., 216 So.3d 420, 422 (Ala. 2016) :
The supreme court apparently has recognized an exception to the above-referenced precedents when a wrongful-death action is filed by a person other than the personal representative of a decedent's estate. See Ex parte Continental Motors, Inc., 270 So. 3d 1148, 1152 (Ala. 2018) ; Ex parte Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So. 3d 1211, 1213 (Ala. 2016). This observation is in no way intended as a comment on the propriety of those decisions, particularly in light of the numerous precedents recognizing the unique and statutory nature of that type of private-law action.