McEachern v. Town of Highland Park

9 Citing cases

  1. McEachern v. Town of Highland Park

    73 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1934)   Cited 10 times

    During the pendency of said suit the governing authorities of the Town of Highland Park passed a zoning ordinance, based upon the authority of an Act of the 40th Legislature, Ch. 283, p. 424, authorizing cities and incorporated villages to enact zoning regulations, and plead such zoning ordinance in defense of its refusal to issue the permit. Judgment in favor of the town of Highland Park was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals ( 34 S.W.2d 676) and McEachern brings error to the Supreme Court. Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.

  2. Mcclain v. City of Ennis

    340 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)   Cited 5 times

    A property owner and his property are subject to a Zoning Ordinance adopted subsequent to his application for a building permit, and subsequent to his suit after refusal of permit. Sec. 43, p. 206, 10 Tex.Jur. 10 Yr.Supp.; Connor v. City of University Park, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 706, Er.Ref.; City of University Park v. Rahl, Tex.Civ.App., 36 S.W.2d 1075, Er.Dis.; City of Dallas v. Meserole, Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 564, Er.Ref.; McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 676, affirmed 124 Tex. 36, 73 S.W.2d 487. In the McEachern case supra ( 34 S.W.2d 676, 678) the Court of Civil Appeals said:

  3. A. N. “Ab” Young Co. Zoning Case

    61 A.2d 839 (Pa. 1948)   Cited 16 times

    In that case no improvements had been made on the lot or any money expended in connection therewith. See: Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98, 103, 56 A.2d 210. There are cases from other jurisdictions holding that a mere application for a permit confers no vested right as of that time, and an application may be refused or permit vacated because of an ordinance passed after the date of the application: Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 250 Mass. 63, 145 N.E. 265; Brett v.Building Commissioner of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269; McEachern v. Town of Highland Park et al. (Tex.), 34 S.W.2d 676; Cayce v. Hopkinsville et al., 217 Ky. 135, 289 S.W. 223; Wheat et ux. v. Barrett (Calif.), 290 P. 1033; Baxley v. Frederick et al. (Okla.), 271 P. 257; Berger v. City of Salem et al. (Ore.), 284 P. 273; Rohrs v. Zabriskie et al. (Sup. Court of N.J.), 133 A. 65; In re Cherry, 193 N.Y. Supp. 57; Gulf Refining Co. v. McKernan (N.C.), 102 S.E. 505; unless the holder of a permit previously issued does something of a substantial character toward construction, in good faith, before the enactment of the new zoning ordinance: City of Lansing et al. v. Dawley (Mich.), 225 N.W. 500; People ex rel. Ortenberg v. Bales, 229 N.Y. Supp. 550, 250 N.Y. 598, 166 N.E. 339. Appellant contends that he expended money for the preparation of a plan prior to the date of the application for permit and hence possessed a vested right to have the permit issued to him.

  4. City of Dallas v. Crownrich

    506 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)   Cited 8 times

    Moreover, Texas courts have held that property and its owner are subject to a zoning ordinance adopted subsequent to an application for a building permit, and subsequent to his suit after refusal of permit. McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, 34 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso, 1931, affirmed McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, 124 Tex. 36, 73 S.W.2d 487 (1934); Town of Renner v. Wiley, 458 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas, 1970, no writ); McClain v. City of Ennis, 340 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco, 1960, no writ). We are of the opinion that the same rule should apply to the resolution passed by the City Council in the instant case as was applied to zoning ordinances in the above cases.

  5. Town of Renner v. Wiley

    458 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)   Cited 4 times

    And the rule is applicable though an application for a building permit may have been made and a suit filed prior to the passage of a valid ordinance. MeEachern v. Town of Highland Park, 34 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1931, affirmed McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, 124 Tex. 36, 73 S.W.2d 487, 1934); Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. et al. v. Reprimo Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1936, writ dism'd); Connor v. City of University Park, 142 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1940, writ ref'd); City of Dallas v. Meserole Bros., 164 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1942, writ ref'd w.m.); H.A. McClain v. City of Ennis, 340 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco 1960, no writ). Even if it should be held that the judgment in the first lawsuit is Res judicata of the validity of the ordinance of November 18, 1966 we think appellee must comply with subsequent valid ordinances in order to obtain additional light and power services to his property.

  6. Pedroso v. De Walt

    340 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)   Cited 2 times

    Moreover, the record before us reflects that relator applied for the permit under the March 1955 Ordinance, and that this ordinance was repealed and superseded by a new ordinance passed on 10 February, 1960. Relator's rights are governed by thenew ordinance even though same was passed subsequent to his application for a permit, and subsequent to his suit for mandamus after refusal of permit. See: McClain v. City of Ennis, Tex.Civ.App., 340 S.W.2d 66; Sec. 43, p. 206, 10 Tex.Jur., 10 Year Supp.; Connor v. City of University Park, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 706, Er.Ref.; City of University Park v. Rahl, Tex.Civ.App., 36 S.W.2d 1075, Er.Dis.; City of Dallas v. Meserole, Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 564, Er.Ref.; McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 676; affirmed 124 Tex. 36, 73 S.W.2d 487. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.

  7. Caruthers v. Bd. of Adjustment

    290 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)   Cited 21 times
    Concluding property owners had no vested right to compel recognition of their planned subdivision in case in which parties did not assert an article I, section 16 violation, but stating that all property rights are subordinate to the valid and reasonable use of the police power

    The court, as indeed was necessary to reach the result arrived at, overruled as having been long since determined adversely to the petitioner his 'insistence that the right of property or the unrestricted use of property is not subject to the police power'. Contemporaneously with the decision of the Lombardo case, the Supreme Court decided McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, 124 Tex. 36, 73 S.W.2d 487. There the Supreme Court approved the disposition made by the El Paso Court, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 676, of plaintiff's insistence that because he had applied for a permit and filed a suit upon its refusal before zoning, the ordinance there involved could not be retroactively or retrospectively invoked against him. The ruling of the El Paso court appears from the following:

  8. City Dallas v. Meserole Bros

    164 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)   Cited 12 times
    In City of Dallas v. Meserole, 155 S.W.2d 1019, the city enacted a temporary zoning ordinance for all newly annexed areas.

    As said by the Supreme Court of California, in Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479, the courts take judicial notice of the fact that it will take much time to work out the details of a zoning plan, and that it will be destructive of the plan if, during the period of incubation, persons seeking to evade its operation should be permitted to enter upon a course of construction which might progress so far as to defeat in whole or in part the ultimate execution of the plan. It has been made to appear that on February 18, 1942, pending these appeals, the City Council passed an ordinance permanently zoning the area in question as residential property, forbidding the construction of commercial buildings in that area; hence, we think it follows inescapably, that the questions presented in cause No. 13,295, Meserole Brothers, Appellant, v. Woodall Rodgers, et al. Appellees, have become moot under the doctrine of McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, 34 S.W.2d 676, 678, where the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Higgins, said: "This suit was filed about 30 days prior to adoption by the town of Highland Park of the zoning ordinance in question. Appellant contends that his right to the building permit attached prior to the adoption of the ordinance and the ordinance could not retroactively destroy his right to the permit and to use his land for the purpose indicated.

  9. Sinclair Ref. v. City of Paris

    68 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)   Cited 8 times

    "While the direct question involved has never been before our Supreme Court, it has been presented to several Courts of Civil Appeals. It has been rightly decided by such courts that the operation of a gasoline filling station is a business of such a nature as to render it subject to reasonable regulation under the general police power accorded to cities of this state. City of San Antonio v. Robert Thompson Co., Inc. (Tex.Civ.App.) 23 S.W.2d 796; City of San Antonio et al. v. Humble Oil Refining Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 27 S.W.2d 868; Scott et al. v. Champion Bldg. Co. et al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 28 S.W.2d 178; McEachern v. Town of Highland Park et al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 34 S.W.2d 676. The San Antonio ordinance was also upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of City of San Antonio v. Rubin, 42 F.2d 107."