Summary
noting that civil discovery is a procedural aid for the parties in litigation
Summary of this case from In re Petition of New Hampshire Sec'y of State & New Hampshire Attorney Gen.Opinion
No. 4752.
Argued June 3, 1959.
Decided June 30, 1959.
1. The granting of a motion for discovery, in negligence actions arising from a railroad crossing collision between plaintiffs' motor vehicle and defendant's locomotive, of written reports of all accidents at that crossing between motor vehicles and defendant's trains in the possession of the defendant was within the sound discretion of the Trial Court.
2. In the granting of such discovery the Trial Court may properly limit the period of time to be covered in the production of written reports of such accidents.
3. The fact that such discovery order may produce evidence of accidents which will not be admissible in the actual trial because of dissimilarity in time or condition or would involve undue confusion of collateral issues does not require that it be set aside as a matter of law.
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY, filed by the plaintiffs in connection with a railroad crossing accident involving personal injuries to three of the plaintiffs and death to one. The plaintiffs' declaration alleged in part that "the defendant . . . negligently and unlawfully . . . did inadequately warn and guard Littlefield's Crossing, inadequately warn of the approach of its train . . . ." Paragraph 9 of the motion for discovery, which was granted, and is the only one in dispute in this case, reads as follows: "All written reports of accidents and near collisions at Littlefield's Crossing between highway users and the defendant's trains, in the possession of the defendant."
In support of this motion for discovery the plaintiff, Paul McDuffey, filed an affidavit which contained the following statement: "The defendant's train crew testified [by deposition] that several other accidents occurred at Littlefield's Crossing to their knowledge both prior to and subsequent to the McDuffey accident; yet no public record of these accidents appears to have been made by the defendant; plaintiff desires to discover all such reports to determine whether or not the circumstances surrounding other accidents were sufficiently similar to the circumstances here to supply evidence material to the decision in this case." After hearing the Court directed the defendant to permit the plaintiff to inspect and copy the items set forth in paragraph 9 of his motion for discovery.
The defendant submitted the following statement to the clerk of court in connection with this order: "The defendant respectfully declines to comply with the Court's order with reference to granting paragraph 9 of plaintiff's motion for discovery . . . We believe that this will raise too many collateral issues and will involve a trial of all of these other so-called accidents or near accidents and will only tend to mislead and confuse the jury. We except to the Court's order as to paragraph 9, and if it becomes necessary to do so, we request that this matter be referred to the Supreme Court for determination before compliance."
All questions raised by the defendant's exceptions to the Court's order relating to the plaintiff's motion for discovery and the defendant's declination to comply therewith were reserved and transferred by Keller, J.
McLane, Carleton, Graf, Greene Brown (Mr. Brown orally), for the plaintiffs McDuffey.
Green, Green, Romprey Sullivan for Meyer Green, Adm'r of estate Irene F. McDuffey.
Eugene J. Ratto, Burns, Bryant Hinchey and Lawrence E. Spellman (Mr. Spellman orally), for the defendant.
This litigation arises out of a collision at Littlefield's Crossing in the town of Newfields between an automobile operated by one of the plaintiffs and the defendant's train. Prior to trial the plaintiffs have sought and the Court has ordered discovery of "all written reports of accidents and near collisions at Littlefield's Crossing between highway users and the defendant's trains, in the possession of the defendant." The defendant contends that the order for discovery in this case is an unwarranted fishing expedition which should not be permitted under the doctrine of discovery as announced in recent cases. It contends that the present discovery order is a harassment and an impertinent intrusion into the defendant's files and is therefore not a proper object of discovery. The defendant finally urges the Court to review its recent decisions on discovery for the purpose of limiting their breadth and scope. Therrien v. Company, 99 N.H. 197; Reynolds v. Company, 98 N.H. 251; Lincoln v. Langley, 99 N.H. 158. Counsel perform a useful function to the Bar and to the public in so doing as this at least serves to prevent the Court from unwittingly extending a legal doctrine beyond proper bounds.
Discovery in civil actions has been regarded in this jurisdiction as a proper procedural aid for the parties to prepare their case in advance of trial and has been given a broad and liberal interpretation. Drake v. Bowles, 97 N.H. 471; New Castle v. Rand, 101 N.H. 201. In encouraging use of discovery and depositions (Krook v. Blomberg, 95 N.H. 170) it has been pointed out that it operates with desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of the Presiding Justice of the trial court (Drake v. Bowles, supra) and that this is a logical method of preventing surprise and permitting both court and counsel to have an intelligent grasp of the issues to be litigated and knowledge of the facts underlying them. Taylor v. Thomas, 77 N.H. 410, 411; LaCoss v. Lebanon, 78 N.H. 413; Krook v. Blomberg, supra, 171. See Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective, c. xiv (1952).
It should be noted that the use of discovery in this jurisdiction is not a recent development. The doctrine was launched after extended historical analysis in the landmark case of Reynolds v. Fibre Co., 71 N.H. 332, which Wigmore quotes at length and regards as a sound opinion. VI Wig., Ev. (3d ed.) s. 1862. Subsequent cases have considered the doctrine but have not deemed it advisable to place any crippling limitations on the use of discovery. LaCoss v. Lebanon, supra; Lefebvre v. Somersworth Co., 93 N.H. 354; State v. Cote, 95 N.H. 108; VI Wig., Ev. (3d ed.) s. 1859b.
While the use of discovery in this state has been regarded as a remedial device which has been given a liberal application, we have attempted to indicate that it is subject to limitations. Staargaard v. Company, 96 N.H. 17; Villars v. Portsmouth, 100 N.H. 453, 455. Thus in the Staargaard case (p. 19) the plaintiff sought to produce on deposition accident reports relating to all prior bus accidents. This was held to be too broad because "the requested records would include many relating to accidents the circumstances of which could have no possible `legitimate bearing' on this issue." In Currier v. Company, 101 N.H. 205, we held that in actions for damages where loss of earnings was in issue, there could be discovery of federal income tax returns but the Trial Court could impose stringent requirements on the production of such returns to prevent harassment or impertinent intrusion.
All of the cases cited above "have proceeded on the basic assumption that the orderly dispatch of judicial business is accomplished more efficiently where every plaintiff and every defendant is given adequate opportunity to properly prepare his case before trial." New Castle v. Rand, 101 N.H. 201, 202. We think this assumption continues to be a sound one and that the parties will continue to get adequate protection against harassment and impertinent intrusion under the discretionary orders of the Trial Court subject to review only for abuse of discretion. Ingram v. Railroad, 89 N.H. 277; Kusky v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286; Amoskeag-Lawrence Co. v. State, 101 N.H. 101.
The fact that the discovery order in this case may produce evidence of accidents which will not be admissible in the actual trial because of dissimilarity in time or conditions, or because it would involve an undue confusion of collateral issues is not Beginning with Reynolds v. Fibre Co., 71 N.H. 332, and continuing down to the present time discovery has been allowed of facts which are material to the proper preparation of the plaintiff's action or the defendant's defense thereof. Reynolds v. Company, 98 N.H. 251; Lefebvre v. Somersworth Co., 93 N.H. 354, 356.
In the present case the discovery order seeks to obtain all written reports of accidents between "highway users" and the defendant's trains at Littlefield's Crossing. In oral argument it was stated that by "highway users" the plaintiffs did not seek to procure reports of accidents relating to pedestrians and other cases not involving motor vehicles. We therefore treat the discovery order as being limited to collisions with other motor vehicles. The discovery order contains no limitation on the period to be covered. This does not appear to have been discussed by the parties but course the Trial Court has authority to limit the extent to which the defendant is required to produce written reports of accidents. We conclude that the Court's order for discovery limited to other motor vehicle accidents is not unreasonable and that the order is consistent with the decisions on discovery in this jurisdiction.
Accordingly the order is
Defendant's exceptions overruled.
All concurred.