McDonough v. Cooper

4 Citing cases

  1. Hall v. Chamberlain

    31 Cal.2d 673 (Cal. 1948)   Cited 38 times
    In Hall, a case decided in 1948, a quiet title action was brought by the successor of the owner whose title was claimed to have been divested by proceedings for the sale of the property for delinquent taxes against the defendants who based their claim on a tax deed.

    As to the latter, the deed is only prima facie evidence. ( Bernhard v. Wall, 184 Cal. 612 [ 194 P. 1040]; McDonough v. Cooper, 179 Cal. 384 [ 177 P. 153]; Hayes v. Ducasse, 119 Cal. 682 [52 P. 121].) [5] It is apparent, therefore, that under those sections (Pol. Code, ยงยง 3786, 3787) the deed is prima facie but not conclusive evidence of due publication of the delinquent tax list and the giving of notice (see Gramson v. Geniella, 209 Cal. 610 [ 289 P. 817]; Scott v. Beck, 204 Cal. 78 [ 266 P. 951]; Bell v. Brigance, 74 Cal.App. 322 [ 240 P. 50]), and where a notice is mailed, a direction to return it to the sender if not delivered within a certain time (which is different from that fixed in the statute) is fatal.

  2. Dougery v. Bettencourt

    214 Cal. 455 (Cal. 1931)   Cited 26 times
    In Dougery v. Bettencourt, supra, it was clear that the statute involved (former Pol. Code, ยง 3480) required a tax deed to be recorded with the county recorder. What is said there about copying the instrument into the proper book and indexing it as provided by law (214 Cal. at p. 462) applies to the statutory duties of the county recorder, and does not lay down the standards for the county surveyor under the 1911 act.

    We are further of the opinion that, reasonably interpreted, the provision was inserted for the benefit of the property owner, and that, in order to accomplish this result, the word "record", found in that section, must be interpreted to mean record according to law, i.e., by copying the instrument into the proper book and indexing as provided by law. That the provision of recordation was, among other things, intended for the benefit of the property owner is apparent from the fact, pointed out above, that the act provides for a published notice of the assessment and of the proposed sale, but there is no provision giving the taxpayer any such notice of the fact that the sale has taken place, or that the period of redemption is about to expire. Although the legislature could doubtless dispense entirely with the certificate of sale and, therefore, could dispense with notice thereof ( McDonough v. Cooper, 179 Cal. 384 [ 177 P. 153]), the fact remains that the legislature has seen fit to provide for such certificate and for its recordation. In several cases, by way of dicta, it has been held that the purpose of the certificate of sale and its recordation is to give the owner constructive notice of the sale and of the date the period of redemption will expire.

  3. Woody v. Security Trust Savings Bank

    137 Cal.App. 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934)   Cited 4 times

    1897, p. 254), which supplemented it, contain detailed provisions for the assessment of property and the collection of delinquencies which control such proceedings in irrigation districts coming under their provisions. ( McDonough v. Cooper, 179 Cal. 384 [ 177 P. 153].) These acts contain no provisions similar to those of subdivision five of section 3898 of the Political Code. Tender or repayment of the money paid by appellants is not required by any statute as a prerequisite to quieting title against them.

  4. Jones v. Sturzenberg

    59 Cal.App. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922)   Cited 10 times
    In Jones v. Sturzenberg, 59 Cal.App. 350 [ 210 P. 835], the land, worth $10,000, was assessed in 1913 and sold to the state in 1914 for $50.21.

    "The legislative intent in the enactment of section 3787 was that the deed should be conclusive with respect only to matters not covered by section 3786 of the Political Code, declaring its effect as prima facie evidence. ( McDonough v. Cooper, 179 Cal. 384 [ 177 P. 153]; Escondido High School Dist. v. Escondido Seminary, 130 Cal. 128 [ 62 P. 401]; Bruschi v. Cooper, 30 Cal.App. 682, 692 [159 P. 428]; State of California, by John S. Chambers, v. Royal Com. M. Co., 31 Cal. App. Dec. 132, see, also, 187 Cal. 343 [ 202 P. 133].) "The principle controlling the suit at bar has been well stated in the Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, volume 27, page 755, as follows: 'If the owner of land, or a party having an interest therein, in good faith applies to the proper officer for the purpose of paying the taxes thereon, and payment is prevented by the mistake or fault of such officer, as for example, where a tax is omitted from the list made out by the officer, the attempt to pay is considered in most jurisdictions, as the legal equivalent of payment in so far as to discharge the lien and bar a sale for nonpayment.'