Opinion
CA No. 3:02-CV-2093-R.
July 27, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants J. Vignali and the City of Duncanville, Texas, filed June 9, 2004. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action by Plaintiff Pamela Ann McDonnell ("McDonnell") arises from her detention by K-Mart store security personnel and her subsequent arrest. McDonnell brings state-law claims against Duncanville Police Officer J. Vignali ("Vignali") for false arrest and illegal imprisonment and malicious prosecution. She also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both Vignali and the City of Duncanville, Texas (the "City of Duncanville").On October 7, 2000, McDonnell visited a K-Mart store in Duncanville, Texas. Upon exiting, she was approached by loss prevention officers who suspected her of shoplifting and escorted to a room in the back of the store. Vignali arrived at the scene and thereafter placed McDonnell under arrest.
McDonnell was prosecuted in Dallas County and was acquitted on September 10, 2001. McDonnell maintains that her purchases at the K-Mart were legitimate. According to her, she had paid for some items at one checkout register in cash, but when the machine refused to accept her cash card, she was forced to purchase her remaining items at a separate register. When store security personnel witnessed her passing through the second checkout lane without turning over all of the merchandise to the clerk, she suggests, they did not realize that she had already purchased the items at the first register.
McDonnell argues that this unorthodox checkout procedure was the source of the confusion, and that Officer Vignali should have discovered that her purchases were legitimate before arresting her. Vignali and the City of Duncanville seek summary judgment against McDonnell on all claims.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). An issue is material if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of a suit under governing law. The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Id. at 325. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party may go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Although the nonmovant may satisfy this burden by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, "conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden." Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Summary judgment will be granted "against any party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. § 1983 Claim Against Officer Vignali
McDonnell contends that the Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1483 when she was arrested by Officer Vignali. She claims that Vignali failed to sufficiently investigate to determine whether probable cause existed before arresting her. Section 1983 protects the rights of citizens guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mathias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Home Tel. Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Swann v. City of Dallas, 922 F. Supp. 1184, 1204 (N.D. Tex. 1996). The statute provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
By its terms, § 1983 creates no substantive rights; it merely provides for derivations of rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1985). Two elements are required to state a claim for relief under § 1983: (1) that the defendant acted under the color of law, and (2) that the defendant's actions deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
An individual has a federally protected right to be free from unlawful arrest and detention resulting in a significant restraint of liberty. Dennis v. Warren, 779 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1985). Violation of this right can be grounds for a suit under § 1983. Id. In Texas, a police officer may arrest, without warrant, "persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony." TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon 2004).
Vignali moves for summary judgment primarily on the grounds of qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary functions from liability "unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1995). The analysis of qualified immunity is a two-step process. First the court must determine if the plaintiff alleged a violation of a constitutional right. Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995). Second, if a constitutional violation is alleged, the court must decide if the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time the challenged conduct occurred. Id. "The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law." Goodson v. Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). Law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly commit a constitutional violation are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001). "Thus, a qualified immunity defense cannot succeed where it is obvious that a reasonably competent officer would find no probable cause. On the other hand, if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized." Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Probable cause is a "fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). In determining whether Vignali enjoyed qualified immunity, this Court need not consider whether probable cause in fact existed. Rather, the review calls for a "practical, common-sense determination whether given all of the circumstances a reasonable officer could have believed there is a fair probability" that the suspect had committed the crime charged. Mendenhall, 213 F.3d at 231 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to McDonnell, the facts fail to support a finding that no reasonable officer could have believed probable cause to exist. Upon arrival, Vignali received an eyewitness account from Reyes, the loss prevention officer, that McDonnell had attempted to steal the items. When he requested to see receipts or records that could verify that both transactions had actually occurred, the store manager informed him that none were found. In the course of his investigation, Vignali also listened to McDonnell's version of the incident. In so doing, Vignali was not required to accept McDonnell's version of the facts. See McGaughy v. City of Houston, 77 Fed. Appx. 280, (5th Cir. 2003); see also Glenn, 242 F.3d at 313, n. 3 (noting that "probable cause is not destroyed by a suspect's denial").
McDonnell complains that Vignali did not fully investigate to determine whether probable cause supported her arrest. For example, she notes that Vignali did not locate and inspect video security tapes that she claims would have corroborated her version of the facts. While an officer "may not close her or his eyes to facts that would help clarify the circumstances of an arrest," BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986), he or she need not unearth every possible piece of evidence before deciding whether probable cause exists. Vignali's investigation was aimed at ascertaining probable cause, not guilt or innocence.
Under the totality of the circumstances, at minimum, reasonably competent officers could disagree as to whether there was probable cause to arrest McDonnell. Because a court should not second-guess the officer who must act on the spur of the moment if that officer's actions can be classified as arguably reasonable, Gibson, 44 F.3d at 277, Officer Vignali is entitled to qualified immunity on McDonnell's § 1983 claim. Therefore, McDonnell's § 1983 claim against Vignali fails.
C. Tort Claims Against Officer Vignali
McDonnell also brings state-law claims against Vignali for false arrest and illegal imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Under Texas law, the essential elements of an action for false arrest or imprisonment are: (1) a wilful detention; (2) without consent; (3) and without authority of law. Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Castillo, 693 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. 1985). The elements of a claim for malicious prosecution are: (1) the commencement of a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) initiation or procurement of the action by the defendant; (3) termination of the prosecution in the plaintiff's favor; (4) the plaintiff's innocence; (5) the absence of probable cause for the proceedings; (6) malice in filing the charge; and (7) damage to the plaintiff. Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997).
In Texas, governmental employees are entitled to official immunity from suit arising from the performance of their discretionary duties in good faith as long as they are acting within the scope of their authority. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994). An act is discretionary if it involves personal deliberation, decision making, and judgment. Id. at 654. Moreover, and official "acts within the scope of her authority if she is discharging the duties generally assigned to her." Id. at 658. Because Officer Vignali, in investigating the reported shoplifting incident and arresting McDonnell, was performing a discretionary duty within the scope of his authority, this Court must consider only whether his actions were taken in good faith.
Good faith is established when it is proven that a reasonably prudent government official, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that his actions were justified. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. To controvert an officer's summary judgment proof of good faith, a plaintiff must show that "no reasonable person in the defendant's position could have thought the facts were such that they justified the defendant's actions." Id. at 656-57. If officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized. Id. at 657 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 271 (1986)).
Viewed in a light most favorable to her, McDonnell has not shown that no reasonable officer in Vignali's position could have believed that arresting McDonnell was justified. Accordingly, Vignali is entitled to official immunity and summary judgment with respect to McDonnell's state-law tort claims.
D. § 1983 Claim Against the City of Duncanville
McDonnell alleges that the City of Duncanville is liable because of a custom within the Duncanville Police Department of depriving citizens of their federal rights. Specifically, McDonnell argues that the Duncanville Police Chief's failure to adequately train and/or supervise his officers was an official policy or custom that deprived McDonnell of her rights.
To defeat summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce evidence showing not only that the City's actions deprived her of federally protected rights, but also that an official policy or custom of the City caused the deprivation or violation of rights. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 973 (1992).
McDonnell has not set forth sufficient evidence that the City of Duncanville, the Duncanville Police Department, the Duncanville police chief, or Officer Vignali have adopted an official policy or custom of depriving citizens of their constitutional rights. Apart from her own encounter with Officer Vignali, McDonnell fails to identify any single instance of an alleged constitutional violation. Without additional, specific evidence that constitutional rights were violated, a failure to adequately train or supervise does not establish a custom or policy of depriving citizens of their constitutional rights; inadequate training or supervision does not establish a violation of a citizen's constitutional rights without a predicate offense. Even if a "failure to adequately train and/or supervise" were considered a policy or custom of depriving citizens of protected rights, McDonnell's allegations of inadequate training and supervisory standards within the Department are conclusory. Since conclusory allegations are inadequate to satisfy a nonmovant's summary judgment burden, Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1429, McDonnell's claim for municipal liability is unavailing. In short, McDonnell has offered no facts suggesting that the alleged violation was anything more than an isolated incident. Accordingly, the § 1983 claim against the City of Duncanville fails as a matter of law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants J. Vignali and the City of Duncanville is GRANTED.
It is so ORDERED.