Ward v. Mount Calvary Lutheran Church, 178 Ariz. 350, 354, 873 P.2d 688, 692 (App. 1994) (quoting Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 118 Ariz. 29, 31, 574 P.2d 822, 824 (1978)). A plaintiff who establishes the elements of res ipsa loquitur can withstand a motion for summary judgment and reach the jury without direct proof of negligence. Id; McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 157 Ariz. 316, 318, 757 P.2d 120, 122 (App. 1988). The necessary elements of res ipsa loquitur in Arizona have been:
¶ 6 Res ipsa loquitur (meaning the thing speaks for itself) is "a rule of circumstantial inference of responsibility for an injury." McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 157 Ariz. 316, 318, 757 P.2d 120, 122 (App. 1988). A plaintiff who establishes the elements of res ipsa loquitur can avoid summary judgment and reach the jury without direct proof of negligence.
Negligence, however, can be circumstantially inferred by application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 757 P.2d 120, 122 (Ariz.App. 1988); McKeever v. Phoenix Jewish Community Center, 374 P.2d 875, 877 (Ariz. 1962) The elements of res ipsa loquitur are:
Res ipsa loquitur is "a theory of circumstantial evidence under which the jury may reasonably find negligence and causation from the facts of the accident and the defendant's relation to the accident." Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 118 Ariz. 29, 31, 574 P.2d 822, 824 (1978); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D, comment b (A.L.I. 1965) (hereafter, " Restatement"). A plaintiff who successfully establishes the elements of res ipsa loquitur may withstand a directed verdict even without direct proof of negligence. McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 157 Ariz. 316, 318, 757 P.2d 120, 122 (App. 1988). The "test" for applying the doctrine to the facts of a specific case has been defined in simple terms as "whether a reasonable man could reach the conclusion from the evidence offered that it was more likely than not that the injury involved was the result of negligence on the part of defendant."
The presence, in the motel room, of Plaintiff's decedent overnight and even after the registered guest had left, in the morning does not meet the Hockaday criteria. Among other considerations, this visitor's presence was adverse to the innkeeper's legitimate business interest that is, his right to permit use of the rooms on such terms as he prescribes; see State v. Steele [ 106 N.C. 766], 11 S.E. 478. In Arizona, the particular duty of care owed by a landowner to an entrant on his or her land is determined by the entrant's status as an invitee, licensee or trespasser. Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 131 Ariz. 140, 142, 639 P.2d 330, 332 (1982); McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 157 Ariz. 316, 318, 757 P.2d 120, 122 (App. 1988). Although Woodty urges this court to abolish the common law distinctions of invitee, licensee and trespasser that are used in determining landowner liability, we decline to do so.
A plaintiff must demonstrate only that it was more probable than not that an injury would not occur absent negligence.Byars v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 539 P.2d 534, 540 (Ariz.Ct.App.1975). See also McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, 757 P.2d 120, 125 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988) (allowing res ipsa loquitur instruction when lunch counter seat collapsed although plaintiff did not pinpoint cause). It could be faulty maintenance, pilot error, or any of many causes, with no need for specification by the plaintiff.
A person's status as invitee, licensee, or trespasser determines the duty of care owed by a landowner. McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 157 Ariz. 316, 318, 757 P.2d 120, 122 (Ct.App.1988). Here, Villacci was a customer of the Scottsdale Conference Center and was--all parties agree--a business invitee.
"To establish a proprietor's liability for injuries arising from a dangerous condition of the premises, an invitee must prove either that the dangerous condition was caused or permitted to develop by persons for whom the proprietor was responsible or that the proprietor had actual or constructive knowledge of its existence." McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 757 P.2d 120, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). A dangerous condition is foreseeable when it can "reasonably be expected to occur now and then, and would be recognized as not highly unlikely if it did suggest itself to the actor's mind."
We note, however, that Asarco's argument is "an instance of confusing `the existence of a duty' with `specific details' of conduct." McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 157 Ariz. 316, 318, 757 P.2d 120, 122 (Ct.App. 1988) (quoting Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 355, 706 P.2d at 367). "These details of conduct bear upon the issue of whether the defendant who does have a duty has breached the applicable standard of care and not whether such a standard of care exists in the first instance."
The doctrine may benefit a plaintiff unable directly to prove negligence; it does not relieve a plaintiff too uninquisitive to undertake available proof.” McDonald v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 757 P.2d 120, 125 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1988).