Opinion
Case No. 02 C 8581
January 14, 2003
ORDER
The court finds that Plaintiff, Donald Lee McDonald, a prisoner confined at Stateville Correctional Center, is unable to prepay the filing fee. The court grants plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $6.77 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The trust fund officer at plaintiff's current place of incarceration is ordered to collect, when funds exist, the partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust fund account and pay it directly to the clerk of court. Thereafter, the trust fund officer at the correctional facility where plaintiff is confined is directed to collect monthly payments from plaintiff's trust fund account in the amount of 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the account. Monthly payments collected from plaintiff's trust fund account shall be forwarded to the clerk of court each time the account balance exceeds $10 until the full $150 filing fee is paid. Separate deductions and payments shall be made with respect to each action or appeal filed by plaintiff. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, IL 60604, attn: Fiscal Dept., and shall clearly identify plaintiff's name and the case number assigned to this action.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court is directed to dismiss a suit brought in forma pauperis at any time if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Plaintiff alleges that 1) a watch was taken from his personal property; 2) his prayer beads, which had been altered to include a medallion and additional beads spelling AAllah," was confiscated; 3) he was not permitted to wear his prayer cap during Muslim prayers or during the month of Ramadan; 4) he was denied receipt of a prayer rug that he had ordered through the mail; and 5) he was disciplined for violating a direct order regarding using the dormitory bathroom after evening lockdown, which discipline he challenges. Plaintiff sues various officials of the Stateville Correctional Center including supervisors and the Administrative Review Board, and seeks expungement of his disciplinary record, restoration of his prison job, transfer to Dixon Correctional Center and money damages.
1) Taking of plaintiff's watch: A random and unauthorized taking of property does not violate due process so long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the wrongful taking. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,533 (1984). Illinois does provide inmates with an adequate post-deprivation remedy for their property claims. Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031,1036 (7th Cir. 1993). McDonald does not allege that the loss or damage to his property resulted from any state-sanctioned procedure. Consequently, he has not alleged a cognizable due process claim. If he wishes to pursue his property claims, he must do so in state court.
2) Taking plaintiff's prayer beads with medallion: As with his watch, McDonald has no due process claim for the confiscated prayer beads because he has an adequate post-deprivation state law remedy. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. Nor does McDonald adequately state a First Amendment claim for interference with his right to practice his religion. The exhibits to McDonald's complaint indicate that his prayer beads with the attached medallion were confiscated because they did not comply with prison regulations. Thus it appears that prison regulations permitted him to have prayer beads as long as they conformed to the regulations. A prisoner is entitled to practice his religion as long as doing so does not unduly burden the institution. Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1990). It is well established, however, that a prisoner's right to free exercise of his religion must give way to regulations that are "reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives." Id., quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353. McDonald's complaint offers no basis for the court to infer that the prison regulations governing prayer beads interfere with his right to practice his religion, let alone to infer that the regulations are not reasonably related to valid penological goals.
3) Prayer cap: A review of the complaint and exhibits reveals (and McDonald concedes) that he was allowed to wear the prayer cap during services, just not during transport to and from services. McDonald offers no explanation as to how a prison regulation preventing him from wearing the prayer cap during transport to and from services interferes with the practice of his religion. The court cannot reasonably infer that the regulation interfered with his ability to practice his faith. This claim is therefore dismissed. McDonald also seeks an injunction enabling him and other Muslims to wear prayer caps all day and every day throughout the month of Ramadan. This claim is also dismissed. McDonald may amend his complaint with respect to this claim, however, to provide the court with more information regarding when and under what circumstances he was denied his prayer cap during the month of Ramadan, how such deprivation interferes with the practice of his religion, and why the prison's regulations regarding prayer caps are not reasonably related to valid penological goals. If McDonald chooses to amend, it is crucial that he also explain whether he has exhausted administrative remedies with regard to this issue.
4) Prayer rug: Like his claims for the watch and the prayer beads, McDonald has no due process claim for the prayer rug because he can seek relief from the state courts. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. McDonald provides no basis for a First Amendment claim either. The exhibits show that McDonald ordered a prayer rug which the prison allegedly lost before it was delivered. This is a lost property claim: the fact that the lost property was religious in nature does not convert this to a constitutional claim. Under the First Amendment, applicable to the state prisons through the Fourteenth Amendment, the state prison cannot enact rules, regulations, etc. prohibiting the free exercise of religion. McDonald makes no allegation, nor can the court reasonably infer, that the prison had a policy, regulation, or practice of losing religious property. The prayer rug claim involves a dispute over receipt of personal property ordered through the mail, and thus is governed by Hudson.
5) Disciplinary conviction: Plaintiff seeks to have his discipline expunged, which would necessarily invalidate his conviction for violating the prison rules. To the extent that he seeks to overturn his conviction in toto, he must first show that his conviction has been overturned through state remedies or a federal writ of habeas corpus. Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1584, (1997). See also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 497 (1994); Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 120 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 1997). To the extent that he seeks only to change the conditions of his disciplinary punishment, he seeks transfer to another prison and return of his prison job, neither of which remedy is required. A prisoner has no constitutional right to remain in or be transferred to a correctional institution of their own choosing. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). And regarding the job, a prisoner has no right to hold prison job assignment, attend courses, or receive state pay. Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1982). Therefore, none of these conditions is mandated by the constitution. All claims are accordingly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff may submit an amended complaint regarding his alleged right to wear a prayer cap during Ramadan according to the instructions herein by February 15, 2003.