Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-000910-MR
05-10-2013
JOHNNY ANTHONY MCDONALD APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Johnny Anthony McDonald, pro se Eddyville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Todd Henning Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDGE CLARENCE A. WOODALL III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 12-CI-00037
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CLAYTON, MOORE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES. CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal from the Lyon Circuit Court's denial of the appellant, Johnny Anthony McDonald's, declaration of rights action involving a prison disciplinary action against him. Based upon the following, we will affirm the decision of the circuit court denying McDonald's action.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 22, 2011, McDonald was charged and subsequently convicted of a Category IV, Item 18 institutional infraction by a Prison Adjustment Committee ("Adjustment Committee"). He was given forty-five (45) days of disciplinary segregation as a punishment. McDonald appealed this decision with the prison warden, who upheld the finding. McDonald then brought a pro se petition for declaration of rights in the Lyon Circuit Court asserting that his due process rights had been violated by the disciplinary segregation. The circuit court held that his rights had not been violated and that he was not entitled to his requested punitive money damages of $25 for each day that he was in segregation due to his emotional distress. McDonald then brought this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
While McDonald brought a petition for a declaration of rights, this action was for review of a prison disciplinary proceeding. In reviewing a prison disciplinary proceeding, a court may only determine whether there is any evidence to support the finding by the Adjustment Committee and whether the prisoner received notice, an opportunity to be heard and a brief, written explanation of the decision against him. Webb v. Sharp, 223 S.W.3d 113 (Ky. 2007). A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Committee. Yates v. Fletcher, 120 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Ky. App. 2003). With this standard in mind, we review the circuit court's denial of McDonald's petition.
DISCUSSION
The case of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), provides that prison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, but are civil, administrative actions. Consequently, the prisoner does not have the same rights he would have at a criminal trial. Instead, procedural due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding requires the following:
(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges;Superintendent Mass. Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67. In order for an inmate to have a claim of deprivation of due process, he must demonstrate that either a protected liberty or property interest was involved. See Williams v. Bass, 63 F.3d 483, 485 (6th Cir. 1995). As set forth in Wolff, supra, even minimal due process will achieve this goal.
(2) an opportunity when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense; and
(3) a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Freedom from segregation is not a liberty interest under the United States Constitution. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976). Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The circuit court found that the record showed the Adjustment Committee convicted McDonald based upon the testimony of Correction Officer Long as well as the report of Nurse Gresham. Thus, it dismissed McDonald's petition.
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 US 472,115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the Supreme Court of the United States held that an inmate does not possess a protected liberty interest in freedom from segregation. It found that not all state actions taken for punitive reasons encroach upon liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. Sandin, supra, at 484. Specifically, state actions which do not affect the overall duration of the prisoner's sentence will not be considered a depravation of liberty. Thus, McDonald did not have a protected liberty interest in freedom from segregation.
The remaining issue is whether there was some evidence to support the Adjustment Committee's finding of an institutional infraction. The circuit court found that there was and set forth in its opinion that:
In layman's terms, the "some evidence" standard is a standard that requires a very low threshold of evidence. This standard is easily met through information contained in the record. The record shows that the Adjustment Committee convicted the Petitioner of the institutional infraction based upon the testimony of [Correction Officer] Long as well as the report of Nurse Gresham.In Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), the Court held that "some evidence" was required and that when determining whether there was "some evidence," the analysis "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of evidence." Instead, the "relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary body." Id.
As set forth by the circuit court, there was testimony from Correction Officer Long and a report from Nurse Gresham from which there was evidence of McDonald's infraction. Given the standard above, this was sufficient and the circuit court did not err in dismissing McDonald's petition. Thus, we will affirm the decision of the Lyon Circuit Court to dismiss McDonald's petition.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Johnny Anthony McDonald, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Todd Henning
Frankfort, Kentucky