Messrs. Richard G. Dusenbury, William B. Tyson, Jr., and Eugene A. Fallon, Jr., of Florence, for Appellant, cite: As to prejudicial error in admitting the testimony of the Defendant'sformer attorney and in posing questions to the Defendant,the content of which was privileged informationwhich had been obtained in the context of an attorney-clientrelationship: Rule 33 and Rule 37 of the Supreme Court; ABA Opinion 250 (1943); 159 F. Supp. 917; 279 F.2d 623; Wigmore on Evidence 3d Ed., Vol. 8, paragraphs 2290; 134 S.E.2d 392; 372 N.Y.S.2d 798; Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed., Sec. 21:9, p. 767; 34 S.C. 49, 12 S.E. 657; Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed., Sec. 21:9, p. 769; Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed., Sec. 21:10, p. 774, Footnote 5 Citation; Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed., Sec. 21:18, p. 795; 16 ALR 3d 1021. As to the Court's erring in refusing topermit Defendant to contradict prior inconsistent statementsof the prosecution witness John Bazen as to whether or nothe knew who cooked supper the night he was allegedly poisoned: 46 S.C. 55, 24 S.E. 60; Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed., Section 26:7, Vol. 4, page 189, 104 S.E.2d 357; 199 S.E.2d 304. As to the Court's erring in admitting evidenceas to other crimes where such evidence was highlyprejudicial and where the necessary elements of such crimeswere not established by the requisite degree of proof: 3 ALR 784; 118 S.E. 809; 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286; 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1; 169 S.W.2d 854. As to the preliminaryhearing procedure followed in this case violating Defendant'sconstit
See, e.g., Cohen v. Janic, 57 Ill. App.2d 309, 313 (1965); People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 195, cert. denied sub nom. DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 404 U.S. 805 (1971); McDonald v. Berry, 243 S.C. 453, 456 (1964); Lee Beulah Moor Children's Home v. Reimer, 476 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1972); Lutheran Social Serv., Inc. v. Meyers, 460 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex. 1970). In "the opinion of doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and lawyers . . . it is better for the child, better for the adopting parents, and better for the natural mother if she does not know the names, address and telephone number of the adopting parents."
This is not a case in which the client's address or whereabouts was integrally related to the legal advice sought as it was in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served Upon Field, 408 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), where the client had consulted with his attorneys in connection with his desire to change his residence and the court held that his attorneys could not be compelled to disclose their client's whereabouts to the Grand Jury. Nor is this a domestic relations case in which a court might be motivated by a desire to protect a child's or a spouse's interest and hence their address, from disclosure, as in Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St.2d 176, 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976), and McDonald v. Berry, 243 S.C. 453, 134 S.E.2d 392 (1964). Here, appellants sufficiently demonstrated that there was a legitimate need for the court to require disclosure of the information sought.
An attorney has a duty to protect the confidences of clients who are adoptive parents. McDonald v. Berry, 243 S.C. 453, 134 S.E.2d 392 (1964). Respondent clearly engaged in conduct tending to pollute the administration of justice and to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute. It is conceded the statement concerning his "careful discussion of this situation with the Judge" was totally false.
Our own review of cases from other jurisdictions reveals a wide diversity of opinion regarding whether a client's address is entitled to the protection of the privilege. For instance, in McDonald v. Berry, 243 S.C. 453, 134 S.E.2d 392 (1964), the Supreme Court of South Carolina was presented with a situation wherein the attorney for adoptive parents in an action attacking an adoption decree had been ordered by the lower court to divulge the names and address of his clients. The Supreme Court held that the order was improper and noted the general rule that an address given confidentially by a client to an attorney while consulting him in a professional capacity was a privileged communication.