Opinion
2016–11575 Index No. 442/12
03-27-2019
Emily MCDONAGH, etc., et al., Appellants, v. CARMEL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent.
Raneri, Light & O'Dell, PLLC, White Plains, N.Y. (Kevin D. O'Dell of counsel), for appellants. Henderson & Brennan, White Plains, N.Y. (Lauren J. Demase and Brian Henderson of counsel), for respondent.
Raneri, Light & O'Dell, PLLC, White Plains, N.Y. (Kevin D. O'Dell of counsel), for appellants.
Henderson & Brennan, White Plains, N.Y. (Lauren J. Demase and Brian Henderson of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., COLLEEN D. DUFFY, HECTOR D. LASALLE, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
On March 30, 2011, an adult male committed suicide during school hours in a dugout on the softball field at Carmel High School. His body was discovered by the infant plaintiff and other members of the varsity softball team at the beginning of practice. In February 2012, the infant plaintiff, and her parents suing derivatively, commenced this action against the defendant, the Carmel Central School District, to recover damages for the infant plaintiff's emotional distress and her parents' derivative losses. After the completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs appeal.
"A breach of the duty of care resulting directly in emotional harm is compensable even though no physical injury occurred when the mental injury is a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the breach and when the claim possesses some guarantee of genuineness" ( Ornstein v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 1, 6, 852 N.Y.S.2d 1, 881 N.E.2d 1187 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 504, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 448 N.E.2d 1332 ; Ball v. Miller, 164 A.D.3d 728, 730, 83 N.Y.S.3d 169 ; Taggart v. Costabile, 131 A.D.3d 243, 252, 14 N.Y.S.3d 388 ). Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that the infant plaintiff's claimed emotional injuries did not directly result from its alleged negligent supervision and security, since the suicide was an unforeseeable act which severed the causal nexus (see Sawitsky v. State of New York, 146 A.D.3d 914, 915, 46 N.Y.S.3d 123 ; Maldari v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 131 A.D.3d 1019, 1020, 17 N.Y.S.3d 48 ; Weisbecker v. West Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 109 A.D.3d 657, 658–659, 970 N.Y.S.2d 824 ). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Dismissal of the primary cause of action also necessitates dismissal of the derivative causes of action (see Klein v. Metropolitan Child Servs., Inc., 100 A.D.3d 708, 711, 954 N.Y.S.2d 559 ; Paisley v. Coin Device Corp., 5 A.D.3d 748, 750, 773 N.Y.S.2d 582 ).
Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
MASTRO, J.P., DUFFY, LASALLE and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.