Opinion
CIVIL ACTION, NO. 01-3027, SECTION: "C"(2)
June 3, 2002
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of Industrial Risk Insurers ("IRI"), see Rec. Doc. 15, a Motion to Review Magistrate's Discovery Order Filed on Behalf of Industrial Risk insurers ("Motion to Review"), see Rec. Doc. 25, and a Motion to Continue Hearing on Industrial Risks Insurers [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment and to Continue the Trial Date Filed on Behalf of Plaintiff, McDermott International, Inc. ("McDermott"). After reviewing the arguments of counsel, the record and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of industrial Risk Insurers is hereby DENIED; the Motion to Review Magistrate's Discovery Order Filed on Behalf of Industrial Risk Insurers is hereby DENIED and, accordingly, the Magistrate Judge's March 20, 2002, Order in the above-captioned case is hereby AFFIRMED; the Motion to Continue Hearing on Industrial Risks Insurers [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of Plaintiff, McDermott International, Inc., is hereby DISMISSED as MOOT; and the Motion to Continue the Trial Date Filed on Behalf of Plaintiff, McDermott International, inc., is hereby GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
IRI provided the insurance policy ("Policy") at issue here to McDermott, a Panamanian corporation with its principal place of business in Louisiana, for an initial coverage period of October 1, 2000, through October 1, 2001. See Rec. Doc. 15 at Ex. A. IRI contends, and McDermott has not disputed, that the Policy was issued in Louisiana and negotiated in Louisiana with a Louisiana insurance broker for McDermott. See id., Statement of Material Facts filed on Behalf of IRI at ¶¶ 7-10. IRI contends-and McDermott has not denied-that the policy provided insurance coverage of up to $500 million for McDermott's property in a number of locations, both in the United States — including assets in Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Texas-and abroad. See id. at ¶ 2; id. at Ex. A.
Of particular note here are amendatory endorsements applicable to property in a number of states including Florida, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See id. All require that in the event of nonrenewal of the Policy, the insurer shall provide notice of that nonrenewal by certain specific times. See id. In the case of the three above-mentioned states, the Policy requires IRI to provide the reason(s) for the nonrenewal. See id.
IRI asserts that by a letter dated August 31, 2001, the insurer notified McDermott that the Policy would be renewed subject to several significant changes, notably a reduction in coverage to $250 million. See id. at Ex. B. IRI also claimsmdashiand McDermott has not disputed — that McDermott did not accept the renewal offer before it was rescinded by a letter sent by IRI on September 21, 2001. See id., Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Filed on Behalf of IRI at 2. In the letter, IRI informed McDermott that the Policy would not be renewed and would expire October 1, 2001. See id. at Ex. C. By letter of September 27, 2001, however, IRI notified McDermott that coverage under the Policy would extend to November 20, 2001. See id. at Ex. D. Specifically, the September 27, 2001, letter specifically states that the September 21, 2001, norirenewal notice was "revised to state that coverage will cease and determine as of November 20, 2001. The policy will be extended on the same terms and conditions as apply at present." Id. In neither the September 21, 2001, nor the September 27, 2001, letter does IRI provide a reason for refusing to renew the Policy.
On October 4, 2001, McDermott filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57) ("Complaint") against IRI. See Rec. Doc. I. The Complaint alleges that McDermott failed to properly give notice of its nonrenewal of the Policy. See, e.g., id. at 3. in sum, the Complaint seeks a declaration that the Policy was renewed pursuant to its original terms, through October 1, 2002. See id. at 6.
On December 21, 2001, a Supplemental and Amended Complaint by McDermott International, Inc. ("Supplemental Complaint"), was filed. See Rec. Doc. 10. The Supplemental Complaint seeks damages pursuant to IRI's alleged breach of the Policy and unspecified obligations and duties. See id. at 2. McDermott now claims entitlement to damages based on an assertion that through the above-mentioned actions of IRI in failing to renew the Policy, Defendant breached its duties of good faith and fair dealing. See Rec. Doc. 21.
On January 18, 2002, McDermott filed two motions pertinent to those before the Court: a Motion for Order Overruling Objections to Interrogatories and Compelling Answers and a Motion for Order Overruling Objections to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents and Compelling Production. See Rec. Doc. 11,12. The discovery sought pertains, inter alia, to McDermott's claim that IRI breached extra-contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing. See Rec. Doc. 30.
On February 5, 2002, the Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of industrial Risk Insurers was filed and set for hearing on February 27, 2002. See Rec. Doc. 15. On February 15, 2002, a Motion by Plaintiff to Continue Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed. See Rec. Doc. 17. Then, on February 22, 2002, McDermott filed Plaintiffs Local Rule 56.2E [sic] in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the motion should be denied because (1) IRI failed to comply with certain requirements under the Policy and (2) McDermott required discovery bearing on the issue of whether IRI had breached its duties of good faith and fair dealing. See Rec. Doe. 21. On March 14, 2002, the Court granted the Motion by Plaintiff to Continue Defendanfs Motion for Summary Judgment and set the summary judgment motion for hearing on May 22, 2002. See Rec. Doe. 23.
On March 20, 2002, the Magistrate Judge granted in part and denied in part the Motion for Order Overruling Objections to interrogatories and Compelling Answers and the Motion for Order Overruling Objections to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents. See Rec. Doc. 20. The March 20, 2002, Order overruled objections concerning certain documents McDermott claimed were relevant to the issue of whether IRI breached its alleged duty of good faith and fair dealing in refusing to renew the Policy. See id. The Magistrate Judge noted that this claim remained in the case at the time, necessitating the procession of appropriate discovery. See id. at 2. On March 22, 2002, the Motion to Review Magistrate's Discovery Order Filed on Behalf of industrial Risk Insurers was filed. See Rec. Doc. 25.
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED ON BEHALF OF INDUSTRIAL RISK INSURERSA. Standard of review
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322,106 5. Ct. 2548,2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. his. Co., 784 F.2d 577,578 (51h Cir. 1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be] `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] `material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993,996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248,106 S.Ct. 2505,2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Engstrorn v. First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (citations omitted).
B. Analysis
1. introduction
IRI advances two primary arguments in contending that summary judgment is now appropriate on McDermott's claims for declaratory relief and damages for the alleged breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Rec. Doc. 15. First, IRI contends, it did not commit the alleged breaches of its duties under the terms of the Policy. See id. Second, IRI asserts that it owed McDermott no duty of good faith and fair dealing in refusing to renew the Policy. See id. Before the Court considers these arguments, however, it must establish which jurisdiction's law governs the instant claims.
2. Choice of law
McDermott contends that in deciding the issues herein, this Court must apply the laws of the states (and, presumably, foreign jurisdictions) in which the subject property is located. See Rec. Doc. 21. For this proposition, McDermott appears to advance the following general arguments: (1) because the language of the policy tracks that of certain statutes of particular states requiring insurers to take certain steps when deciding not to renew a policy, IRI intended the law of those states to govern the instant dispute, and (2) the law of the state in which the property is located governs disputes related to the section of the Policy covering that property. See id. The Court rejects both of these rationales.
This Court has jurisdiction over this ease pursuant to the parties' diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. "A federal court considering a diversity ease that implicates choice of laws must determine which [jurisdiction]'s law applies by following the choice of law rules of the forum state." Marcizesani v. Pellerin-Milnor Corp., 269 F.3d 481, 485 (51h Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Louisiana's choice of law rules control the Court's determination of which jurisdiction's law applies to McDermott's claims. See id.
Article 3515 of the Louisiana Civil Code addresses choice-of-law questions in general as follows:
Except as otherwise specified in [the part of the Civil Code addressing choice of law], an issue in a case having contacts with other states is governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue. That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of all involved states in the light of: (1) the relationship of each state to the parties and the dispute; and (2) the policies and needs of the interstate and international systems, including the policies of upholding the justified expectations of parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.Cherokee Pump Equip. Inc., Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 1994).
Louisiana Civil Code Article 3537 further governs choice of law issues in the interpretation of contracts in light of:
(1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties and the transaction, including the place of negotiation, formation, and performance of the contract, the location of the object of the contract, and the place of domicile, habitual residence, or business of the parties; (2) the nature, type, and purpose of the contract; and (3) the policies referred to in Article 3515, as well as the policies of facilitation the orderly planning of transactions, of promoting multistate commercial intercourse, and of protecting one party from undue imposition by the other.Cherokee Pump, 38 F.3d at 250.
With respect to the breach of contract issue, the Court finds that Louisiana law governs. McDermott is a Louisiana corporation and the Policy was delivered and negotiated in Louisiana by McDermott's Louisiana insurance broker. Additionally, Louisiana has a significant public policy interest in regulating its insurance industry. Applying Article 3537, the Court finds that the public policies of Louisiana, rather than those of the jurisdictions in which the property is located, would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the breach of contract claim. See generally Resure, Inc. v. Chem. Distribs., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 190, 192 (M.D. La. 1996), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1184 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Chem. Distribs., Inc. v. Resure, Inc., 523 U.s. 1072; 118 S.Ct. 1511,140 L.Ed.2d 665 (1998); Breese v. Hadson Petroleum (USA), Inc., 955 F. Supp. 648,650 (M.D. La. 1996).
The Court notes that language in several of the amendatory endorsements is similar to that of statutes of states in which the subject property is located. Compare, e.g., Rec. Doc. 15 at Ex. A with Fla. Stat. § 626.9201(1). The inclusion of such language does not mandate that the Court apply the law of the state the Policy terms are taken from. See Breese, 955 F. Supp. at 650 n. 5. Moreover, some language in the Policy tracks the law of Louisiana. Compare Rec. Doc. 15 at Ex. A with La. R.S. § 22:636.4D(1).
Louisiana law also applies to the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. First, Louisiana enjoys the most significant relationship to the parties and the dispute. The insured is a Louisiana corporation. Moreover, none of the states or foreign jurisdictions in which the subject property is located has a more significant relationship to the dispute than Louisiana. One purpose of imposing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on an insurer "is to protect the insured from being exposed to financial risk." E.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Rank for Coops., 849 F. Supp. 1347, 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The states or foreign jurisdictions containing the subject property can have no more interest in protecting McDermott than Louisiana. Additionally, applying the law of the jurisdiction of the location of each property would subject IIRI to the adverse consequences of complying with myriad and differing renewal laws not just of different states, but also of foreign jurisdictions. Accordingly, it is proper to apply Louisiana law to decide McDermott's claim that IRI breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in the nonrenewal of the policy.
3. Breach of contract claim
The Court noxv considers whether IRI breached contractual duties, as alleged, to provide timely notice of and reasons for its nonrenewal of the Policy.
"Under Louisiana law, interpretation of an insurance policy is subject to the general rules of contract interpretation which requires judicial determination of the common intent of the parties to the contract." Thermo Terratech v. GDC Enviro-Solutions, Thc., 265 F.3d 329,334 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n it Interstate Fire Cas. Co., 93-0911 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 759,763). "The intent of the parties, `as reflected by the words in the policy[,] determine the extent of coverage.'" Id. (quoting Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n 630 So.2d at 763). The Court construes the words of an insurance policy by applying their "`general, ordinary, plain, and proper meaning.'" Id. (quoting Louisiana his. Guar Ass'n, 630 So.2d at 763). In addition, "an insurance contract must be interpreted as a whole." FDIC v. Booth, 82 F.3d 670, 674 (5th Cir. 1996).
Exclusions to coverage must be clear and express. See Thermo Terratech, 265 F.3d at 334 (citing Ogima v. Rodriguez, 799 F. Supp. 626, 630 (M.D. La. 1992)). "When the language of an insurance policy is clear, it must be enforced as written." Id. (citing Reynolds v. Select Props, Ltd., 93-1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1180, 1183). "If, however, the terms of the policy are ambiguous, they must be construed against the drafter of the policy." Id. (citing Oaks v. Dupuy, 26, 729 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/5/95), 653 So.2d 165, 168). Therefore, if an exclusionary clause is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Court must adopt the interpretation providing coverage to the insured. See id. at 334-35 (citing Talley v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of La., 99-1974 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/00), 760 So.2d 1193, 1195).
Under the Policy's Louisiana Amendatory Endorsement, which is "[a]pplicable only to locations situated within Louisiana," IRI was required to provide notice of its nonrenewal of the Policy "at least 60 days before its expiration date, or its anniversary date if it is a policy written for a term of more than one year or with no fixed expiration date." Rec. Doc. 15 at Ex. A. Nevertheless, this requirement is subject to the following exception: "The Companies [i.e., IRI] need not mail or deliver notice if . . . the Companies have offered to issue a renewal policy." Id. As noted above, there is evidence that, under the plain language of the Policy, IRI failed to provide timely notice.
IRI appears to contend, however, that it was forgiven from complying with this nonrenewal requirement for two main reasons. For one thing, IRI apparently argues, it extended the term of the policy by 60 days after the notice of nonrenewal was mailed and, in so doing, constructively complied with the Louisiana amendatory endorsement's nonrenewal notice requirement. On a related note, IRI asserts, it was exempted from complying with this nonrenewal notice requirement because it acted in accordance with La. R.S. § 22:636.4D(1), which provides that if a nonrenewal notice is not sent 60 days prior to an insurance policy's expiration, coverage continues for 60 days following the provision of a nonrenexval notice. Additionally, IRI asserts that because it offered McDermott a renewal policy on August 31, 2001, a notice of nonrenewal was neither appropriate nor required. The Court rejects these arguments.
First, the Court notes that the extension of the term of the policy for 60 days following the mailing of the nonrenexval notice may well have been required under § 22:636.4D(1). But even compliance with this requirement does not mean that IRI did not breach its obligation to provide timely notice under the original terms of the Policy itself The obvious intent of § 22:636.4D(1) is to protect insureds from their insurers' failure to provide timely notice of nonrenewal; nothing in this section suggests that insurers also may use its provisions as a breach of contract defense.
Moreover, nothing in the Policy hints that IRI was entitled to rely on § 22:636.4D(1) to excuse its non-compliance with the Louisiana nonrenewal notice requirement. Furthermore, nothing requires that IRI be permitted to assert compliance with § 22:636.4D(1) as a defense to the alleged breach of the Louisiana nonrenewal notice requirement. Indeed, parties to an insurance contract have the right "to impose whatever conditions they please upon their obligations under the policy in the absence of conflicts with laws or public policy." Cf Holland it Stanley Scrubbing Well Serv., 666 F. Supp. 898, 900 (citing Fruge v. First Cont'l Life Accident his. Co., 430 So.2d 1072 (La.Ct.App.), writ denied, 438 So.2d 573 (La. 1983)). IRI has suggested no law or public policymdashiand the Court has been unable to locate such a conflictmdashimandating IRI's relief here under § 22:636.4D(1) where the parties themselves have not provided for the ability of IRI to use this section as a defense. Thus, as there is evidence that IRl did not provide timely notice of nonrenexval under the Louisiana Amendatory Endorsement, summary judgment in the insurer's favor is denied.
Pursuant to the reasoning above, there is evidence, in the form of the Policy, that IRI also breached terms in the following amendatory endorsements requiring timely notice of nonrenewal: Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. See Rec. Doc. 15 at Ex. A.
Moreover, in this case, the plain language of three of the other amendatory endorsements those covering property in Florida, Pennsylvania, and Texas — requires that IRI state the reason(s) for nonrenewal. See Rec. Doc. 15 at Ex. A. There is evidence, in the form of IRIs September 21, 2000, nonrenewal letter, that RI failed to provide reasons. See id. at Ex. C. IRI argues that it was not obligated to provide the reasons(s) for its nonrenewal because this is not required under Louisiana law. Notwithstanding the absence of applicable Louisiana law imposing such a requirement, however, there is evidence in the Policy that IRA bound itself to provide reasoning for the nonrenewal under the Florida, Pennsylvania, and Texas amendatory endorsements. See id. at Ex. A. The Policy in question provided insurance for McDermott's property located in those states. in order to not renew the Policy affecting those properties, IRI agreed to the various nonrenewal terms, including the giving of reasons. Again, IRI has not suggested any conflict with Louisiana law or public policymdashiand the Court has been unable to locate such a conflict — that would, in effect, forgive the insurer from any failure to comply with these requirements under the Policy. Accordingly, as there is evidence that IRA breached these requirements of the Policy, IRI is not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
The Court does not decide here whether Louisiana law expressly required IRI to provide its reasoning for the nonrenewal.
The Court does not decide here whether damages flow from any failure of IRI to provide timely notice of or reasons for the nonrenewal notice under the above-mentioned amendatory endorsements.
Nor is IRI entitled to summary judgment on this issue by virtue of having offered McDermott a renewal policy on August 31, 2Q01. IRI appears to argue that because it offered McDermott a renewal policy, it was relieved from providing McDermott with timely notice of the Policy's nonrenewal. A careful reading of the relevant Policy terms indicates that the exception does not apply. Again, the exception states that "[t]he Companies need not mail or deliver [a nonrenewal] notice if the Companies have offered to issue a renewal policy." IRI (emphasis added). Under this construction, IRI cannot relieve itself of its obligation to timely send a nonrenewal notice by issuing a renewal policy anytime it wishes. This exception must be read in light of the requirement that IRI send a nonrenewal notice 60 days prior to the Policy's expiration date. The exception applies only if the Companies "have" offered to issue a renewal policy, id., meaning prior to the 60-day deadline, not if they offer to issue a renewal policy at any time. Indeed, on August 31, 2001, IRI already was well past the deadline for providing the notice of nonrenewal. Under IRI's logic, it could have provided McDermott with a renewal offer on virtually unacceptable terms a day before the expiration of the Policy and been relieved from complying with the nonrenewal notice requirements.
As the exclusionary clause is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Court must adopt the interpretation providing coverage to the insured. See Thermo Terrrnech, 265 F.3d at 334-35 (citing Talley, 760 So.2d at 1195). Accordingly, in light of the inapplicability of this exception, summary judgment on the breach of contract issue is inappropriate.
4. Breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim
IRI argues that there is no cause of action in Louisiana for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing of an insurer toward an insured. For this proposition, IRI relies on La. R.S. § 22:1220, which provides a list of exclusive theories under which a claimant may bring a cause of action against an insurer for the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Theriot it Midland Risk Ins. Co., 95-2895 (La. 5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184,188. The list of actionable behavior covered by § 22:1220, however, refers only to claims handling. It does not preclude claims for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in other areas.
Indeed, Louisiana Civil Code Article 1983 independently provides that parties have a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of an insurance contract. See Coco v. S. United Fire his. Co., 96-135 (La.App. 3 Cir., 11/13/96), 682 So.2d 1014, 1018. Here, given the evidence that (1) IRI did not notify McDermott of the nonrenewal until ten days prior to the Policy's termination, (2) this was well after it was bound to do so under various amendatory endorsements, and (3) IRI failed to provide reasons for the nonrenewal, as required under several of the endorsements, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether IRI acted in good faith here. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied as to McDermott's claim that IRI breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing.
III. MOTION TO REVIEW MAGISTRATE'S DISCOVERY ORDER FILED ON BEHALF OF INDUSTRIAL RISK INSURERS
As noted above, the Motion to Review concerns information McDermott seeks to discover as to the reasons for the nonrenewal of the Policy. IRI asserts that under Louisiana law, it was not required to provide reasons for its nonrenewal of the Policy and that, accordingly, McDermott is not entitled to assert a cause of action based on IRI's failure to give McDermott its reasons for the nonrenewal. See Rec. Doc. 25. Accordingly, IRI argues, the information McDermott seeks to discover is irrelevant here. See id. As noted above, however, the Court has determined that several amendatory endorsements required IRI to give McDermott reasons for the nonrenewal and there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether that was done in good faith or at all. Thus, in light of the foregoing analysis, the information sought by McDermott "appears reasonably calculated to the discovery of admissible evidence" relevant to the claims asserted here. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Accordingly, the Motion to Review is denied and the Magistrate Judge's Order compelling discovery of the materials sought by McDermott in the Motion for Order Overruling Objections to Interrogatories and Compelling Answers and the Motion for Order Overruling Objections to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents is affirmed.
IV MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING ON INDUSTRIAL RISKS INSURERS [SIC] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL DATE FILED ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF, MCDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
As the Court has ruled on the summary judgment motion, the motion to continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment is dismissed as moot.
Finally, the Court considers the motion to continue the trial. In seeking to continue the trial, McDermott notes that discovery has been delayed by the various discovery motions and their resolution, leaving it unable to comply with the discovery deadlines in the case. As various discovery deadlines either have passed or are approaching within days, see Rec. Doc.7, the motion is granted.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) the Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of Industrial Risk Insurers is
hereby DENIED;
(2) the Motion to Review Magistrate's Discovery Order Filed on Behalf of Industrial Risk Insurers is hereby DENIED and, accordingly, the Magistrate Judge's March 20, 2002, Order in the above-captioned case is hereby AFFIRMED;
(3) the Motion to Continue Hearing on Industrial Risks Insurers [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of Plaintiff, McDermott International, Inc., is hereby DISMISSED as MOOT; and
(4) the Motion to Continue the Trial Date Filed on Behalf of Plaintiff, McDermott International, Inc., is hereby GRANTED. The courtroom deputy shall set new pretrial and trial dates.